Organic Certification, Sustainable Farming and Return on Investment: Empirical Evidence from Ghana by Kleemann, Linda
Aus dem Institut für Ernährungswirtschaft und Verbrauchslehre 
der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organic Certification, Sustainable Farming 
and Return on Investment: 
Empirical Evidence from Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades 
der Agrar- und Ernährungswissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
Diplom-Volkswirtin Linda Kleemann 
aus Regensburg 
 
 
Kiel, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dekan     Prof. Dr. Rainer Horn 
Erster Berichterstatter   Prof. Dr. Awudu Abdulai 
Zweiter Berichterstatter   Prof. Dr. Johannes Sauer 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung 31.01.2013 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gedruckt mit Genehmigung der 
Agrar- und Ernährungswissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diese Arbeit kann als pdf-Dokument unter 
http://eldiss.uni-kiel.de/ aus dem Internet geladen werden.
 Table of Contents 
 
Summary in German ........................................................................................................... 1 
Summary in English ............................................................................................................ 2 
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................ 4 
Chapter 2: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Africa: An Overview ................. 13 
Chapter 3: Knowing Where Organic Markets Move Next - An Analysis of Developing 
Countries in the Pineapple Market .................................................................. 44 
Chapter 4: Organic Farming in Ghana - A Good Choice for Smallholders? ...................... 78 
Chapter 5: Is Organic Farming Worth its Investment? The Adoption and Impact of 
Certified Pineapple Farming in Ghana .......................................................... 118 
Chapter 6: Organic Certification, Agro-Ecological Practices and Return on 
Investment: Farm Level Evidence from Ghana ............................................. 167 
Chapter 7: Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 202 
Appendix: Survey Questionnaire and Interviewer Manual .............................................. 206 
  
 Zusammenfassung auf Deutsch 
 
Diese Dissertation analysiert die Wirtschaftlichkeit und Umweltverträglichkeit von kontrolliert 
biologischer kleinbäuerlicher Landwirtschaft in Afrika vor dem Hintergrund der stark 
wachsenden Nachfrage nach biologischen Lebensmitteln in Europa. 
Zertifizierte Biolandwirtschaft in Afrika erscheint angesichts von unzureichender 
Ernährungssicherheit auf den ersten Blick wie ein Luxus. Allerdings führen 
Umweltbelastungen und degradierte Böden durch die Landwirtschaft und der Klimawandel 
bei internationalen Organisationen, Gebern und lokalen Regierungen zu einem erhöhten 
Bewusstsein für die Bedeutung von Nachhaltigkeit in Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. Aktuelle 
landwirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstrategien versuchen sowohl das Einkommen der ländlichen 
Bevölkerung zu steigern als auch die Umwelt zu schützen. Am Beispiel von 
exportorientiertem Ananasanbau in Ghana analysieren wir, ob zertifizierte Biolandwirtschaft 
diese beiden Ansprüche erfüllen kann. Aus einer Preistransmissionsanalyse können wir mit 
Hilfe der hedonischen Nachfragetheorie schließen, dass die Kernnachfrage nach 
Bioprodukten schneller steigt als das Angebot und damit Potential zur Erweiterung der 
Produktion bei gegebenen Preisrelationen vorhanden ist. Allerdings erfordert die 
Biozertifizierung erhebliche Investitionen von Seiten der Bauern. Die Analyse des Return on 
Investment zeigt, dass diese Investitionen wirtschaftlich sinnvoll sind. Wir benutzen hierfür 
ein neues Verfahren, mit dem wir den Effekt der Zertifizierung von verwandten Effekten wie 
Vertragsanbau und Export separieren können. 
Außerdem dient die Zertifizierung als Katalysator für die stärkere Nutzung von agrar-
ökologischen Anbaumethoden. Der Gebrauch dieser Methoden ist zwar in der Regel 
profitabel, aber immer noch sehr geringen Ausmaßes. Das gefährdet die Nachhaltigkeit des 
kleinbäuerlichen biologischen Anbaus in Afrika. Daher sollte deren verstärkter Einsatz, vor 
allem hinsichtlich der Überwindung von Barrieren durch hohe Transportkosten, und die 
Ausnutzung von Skaleneffekten aktiver unterstützt werden. 
Wenn diese Aspekte bedacht werden, kann biologisch-zertifizierte Landwirtschaft 
nach unseren Analysen ein alternativer Entwicklungspfad für Teile der ländlichen 
Bevölkerung sein, da es eine schnell wachsende internationale Nachfrage mit nachhaltigen 
Produktionsmethoden verbindet, die vor allem für die ärmeren Kleinbauern attraktiv sind. 
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 Summary in English 
This thesis analyzes the economic and environmental performance of certified organic small-
scale agriculture in Africa in light of the rapidly growing demand for organic foods in Europe. 
In the face of the food insecure situation in Africa, certified organic agriculture appears as a 
luxury at first glance. However, climate change, pollution, and soil erosion caused by 
agriculture, lead to an increased awareness of the importance of sustainability in agriculture 
and nutrition among international organizations, donors and local governments. Therefore 
current agricultural development strategies try to increase both the income of the rural 
population and protect the environment. Using the example of export-oriented pineapple 
cultivation in Ghana, we analyze whether certified organic farming meets these two aims.  
Working from large to small, we first analyze the international market integration for 
premium-priced organic certified products. We find that the conventional market acts as a 
price leader for the organic one, but demand shocks are transmitted to the organic market 
through the conventional market with a time lag and lower intensity. In addition, there is 
neither increasing market integration, nor a declining price premium on organic pineapples. 
Employing hedonic demand theory, we can show that this happens when the core demand 
for organic products is growing faster than supply. Thus potential exists for scaling up at 
given price ratios. 
Even though, small-scale farmers tend to have difficulties in meeting international 
market standards and large farms have advantages due to economies of scale, we find that 
production for the export market is possible and profitable for smallholders. Employing value 
chain analysis, organic production seems more profitable than conventional production due 
to the retail level price premium on organic products that is passed on to farmers and that 
overcompensates lower yields on organic farms. Even more, from a theoretical perspective, 
organic farmers should also be more likely to get into contractual relations with exporters. 
However, a premium is paid for certified products only and the certification with 
internationally approved labels requires a substantial investment on the side of the farmers. 
Using novel primary data that allows us to separate the effect of certification of related effects 
such as contract farming and exporting; and controlling for selection bias, we estimate the 
return on investment and find a positive effect of switching from conventional to organic 
production when competing on the global market for pineapple. The data also shows that 
relatively poorer, less educated households are more likely to adopt organic production. 
While we cannot determine whether this happens because they are more attracted by this 
form of production or because of targeting by exporters and NGOs, it nevertheless implies 
that organic certification is pro-poor.  
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In addition, organic certification serves as a catalyst for the increased use of agro-
ecological farming methods and our results suggest that there is not necessarily a trade-off 
between economic efficiency and environmental friendly farming practices. However, even 
though cost-effective, their overall use is still very low. This endangers the sustainability of 
small-scale organic farming in Africa. Therefore, their increased usage should be supported 
more actively, especially by overcoming transport cost barriers and by exploiting economies 
of scale. To sum up, our analysis shows that, given the sufficient use of agro-ecological 
practices, certified organic agriculture can be an alternative path of development for parts of 
the rural population. It combines a rapidly growing international demand with sustainable 
production methods that are attractive to the poorer farmers.  
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 Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation connects three distinct features of agriculture in Africa: First is the 
unsustainable situation of farming in Africa. Second are the difficulties that small-scale 
farmers face when trying to increase their income by accessing world markets. And third is 
the increasing demand in developed countries for food products from certified organic 
agriculture. The overarching question is if the first two problematic features can be alleviated 
by making use of the third feature. This would then be one step towards the distant aim of a 
sustainable, resilient African farming situation with a prospering small-scale sector that is well 
integrated into international value chains.  
Certifications with sustainability standards or ecolabels for the dominantly small 
farmers in Africa promise to provide two types of economic benefits. They hope to reduce 
rural poverty by providing market access and higher profits through a combination of 
premium prices and better or more resilient yields, and offer long-term environmental 
benefits for the local economy. In this dissertation we examine if and under what 
circumstances small-scale farmer organic certification provides these benefits. Certified 
organic farming in this case refers to production which satisfies at minimum the EU organic 
standard (EC) 834/2007 and (EC) 889/2008, which largely prohibits the use of synthetic 
inputs. By contrast the term sustainable agriculture usually refers to a combination of 
methods including reduced use of synthetic inputs and soil fertility enhancing production 
practices, but does not satisfy externally specified and verified criteria. 
Such a certification approach should be supported by development aid and local 
governments, only to the degree that it delivers on its social and ecological objectives. 
Hence, the central policy question is, to what extent innovative agriculture strategies for 
small-scale farmers can provide an alternative development model for specific parts of the 
rural population, while at the same time delivering environmental benefits.  
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 Starting with the first feature, the unsustainable farming situation in Africa, it is without 
doubt that the situation of African agriculture is unsustainable in all three pillars of 
sustainability: economy, society and ecology. At the same time, recurrent hunger crises 
highlight the need for improvement in agriculture, in particular improving yields. This is not 
only a humanitarian dilemma but also a question of social and political stability. Numerous 
scientific studies (e.g. Arezki and Brückner, 2011; Bellemare, 2011; Bush, 2010) find a direct 
correlation between food security crises and political unrest, which constitutes a social 
problem of insufficient availability of food. This social problem is internationalized by an 
increasing global demand for grains for food, feedstock, energy, and biomass and 
aggravated by the effects of climate change. The IAASTD (2009) estimates that the global 
demand for grain will increase by 75% between 2000 and 2050.  
To this pressure add ecologically unsustainable production patterns. Agriculture is 
responsible for environmental damage such as underground water depletion, soil erosion, 
pollution, loss of biodiversity, and deforestation. In parts of Africa, land is already strongly 
degraded (IAASTD, 2009). It is thus necessary to reduce the environmental impacts of 
agriculture so as to not further destroy its own ecological foundations. Sustainable production 
models that intend to increase yields, while protecting the environment and increasing 
resilience to climatic changes, have been promoted by donors and governments (Kassam et 
al., 2012; Branca et al., 2011; FAO, 2011; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Erenstein, 2002). 
This initial situation and proposed solutions are studied in more detail in the overview article 
in chapter 2. 
The second feature, the restructuring of global food value chains with stricter 
requirements for food safety, traceability, and the increasing importance of private voluntary 
standards (PVS), has in many cases led to the exclusion of developing country small-scale 
producers from international value chains, while at the same time, a horticulture industry in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has emerged, facilitated by diversification policies and the 
international demand for tropical vegetables and fruit all year round. Horticulture potentially 
favors small-scale farmers because of its labor intensity and high production value per unit, 
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 which translates into better acceptance of small production units by buyers and a labor 
monitoring cost advantage for family farms. One approach to help re-include smallholders in 
agricultural export activities in this sector is the certification of producers with internationally 
approved food labels. A well-known example is GlobalGAP certification, which is a private 
standard in primary production of plant and animal products and a quasi-precondition to 
enter the European and North American export markets with conventional horticultural 
produce. Organic certification is another example that meets the rising demand for natural 
foods and achieves premium prices internationally. Both systems offer group certification 
options for small farmers.  
Regarding the third feature, the increasing demand for environmental friendly food 
products, the organic food and drinks sector has been growing with an average growth rate 
of over 10% in the last 15 years, considerably higher than that of the conventional market 
and similar to Fairtrade and comparable labels. In addition, organic food is moving from the 
niche market into large specialized stores and supermarkets with consumer demand 
concentrated in North America and Europe. Certification with internationally recognized 
standards gives access to this fast growing high-end market and the price premia paid for it 
(UNEP, 2007). 
This situation creates niche market opportunities for producers in developing 
countries. The compelling idea is that smallholders could simultaneously increase their 
income and produce more sustainably by responding to the global demand for high priced 
organic food. This would potentially alleviate two problems at once: increase ecological 
sustainability and improve incomes in rural areas in developing countries. If viable, this would 
be an interesting approach, the implementation of which donors and local governments 
would want to support if they would know where the key frictions lie.  
The success of this potential win-win solution depends on many factors ranging from 
adjustments of production techniques and costs of certification, to ecological superiority, and 
to external factors to the individual farmer such as future market developments and 
information deficits. This dissertation assesses the overall outcome taking into account the 
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 influence of these factors. The example of pineapple from Ghana is used. The author 
collected primary data from small-scale pineapple producers in Ghana, and assembled 
primary and secondary data on international prices and costs.  
Pineapple is one of Ghana’s most important non-traditional export crops and it is the 
most developed horticultural export sector. At the same time Ghana is a typical African 
country in that it is characterized by an agricultural sector with low levels of technology and 
productivity. Additionally, Ghana has highly degraded soils on which population pressure and 
climate change exert further pressure (Diao and Sarpong, 2007). Therefore, the Ghanaian 
government emphasizes the necessity to modernize the agricultural sector, increase and 
diversify exports and address the problem of declining yields through environmental 
protection (Government of Ghana, 2010). International institutions also place more 
importance on sustainability in agriculture (FAO, 2011; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007) and 
both nationally and internationally organic agriculture is explicitly mentioned as a promising 
solution in this context. 
Working from general level to detail, we begin our study on world markets in chapter 
3, more specifically with the price transmission between conventional and organic products. 
The readiness to substitute conventional by higher priced organic food products, i.e. the 
willingness to pay (WTP) a higher price for organic food based on perceived desirable 
characteristics is well-documented, but the integration of the organic and conventional sub-
markets is underexplored, to some extent due to severe data constraints. We therefore take 
an unusual approach and deduct the dynamic characteristics of the demand functions from 
the international price behavior over time. In so doing we are able to provide more general 
results than by using survey based methods that use cross-section data based on choice 
experiments rather than on actual buying behavior over time. Analyzing spatial price 
transmission between conventional and organic pineapple on the European market, we can 
demonstrate the existence of a non-declining price premium for organic products. Moreover, 
the conventional market acts as a price leader for the organic market, which is the expected 
result, given that the conventional market is much larger than the organic market. We also 
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 find reaction lags and thresholds below which organic prices are unaffected by conventional 
price changes. This price adjustment behavior does not change over time, even while the 
organic niche market expands. Hedonic demand theory explains this observation with a 
situation in which the demand for organic products expands faster than supply. This implies 
large potential for scaling up organic sales. 
In the next chapter, we leave the international price sphere and conduct a value chain 
analysis for Ghanaian conventional and organic pineapple. In order to be beneficial for 
farmers, price premia on consumer markets have to be transferred along the value chain to 
the producers. To what extent this happens and where costs differ between conventional and 
organic pineapple along the value chain is the focus of chapter 4. As it is a common concern 
also in other high value commodities such as coffee that this transmission channel does not 
function well, this question is very relevant.  
The analysis provides the missing link between the literature that finds a high 
willingness to pay a premium for organic products in developed countries (e.g. Teisl et al., 
2002; Nimon and Beghin, 1999; Bjorner et al., 2004) and the literature that finds that certified 
organic agriculture is more profitable than conventional agriculture in developing countries 
(e.g. Bolwig et al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009), by showing how the costs and prices 
for organic produce are formed at the farm level and how they develop along the value chain. 
Ghana provides a particularly interesting case for this analysis because it experienced a 
drastic market-induced change in the pineapple industry. Between 1983 and 2005, the export 
pineapple sector was beneficial for many smallholders that delivered fruit for the export 
market, but a change in the variety demanded on world markets led to massive drop in 
exports and subsequent exclusion of smallholders from the export pineapple value chain due 
to perceived high smallholder production costs and frequent contract breaching. Around the 
same time, certified organic production of pineapples started to increase. With regard to 
donor efforts to bring back smallholders into export production, it is central to know whether 
this happened by chance or whether the organic niche market has properties that make it 
better suited for smallholders and whether the organic sector is sufficiently different from the 
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 conventional one such that diversification into this niche market can serve as a risk 
spreading strategy for the sector. 
To be able to evaluate the profitability of organic production for smallholders, we 
calculate the costs and revenues of production for these farmers and compare them with 
those for conventional smallholders and large farms using secondary data from several farm 
surveys. Our results demonstrate that, contrary to a widely held opinion in Ghana, production 
for the export market is a realistic option for both organic and conventional smallholders. 
Assuming that smallholders export an empirical average share of their production, the 
benefits outweigh costs of production even though smallholders tend to have quality 
problems with their fruit and large farms benefit from economies of scale. In addition, our 
findings suggest that, in percentage terms, a fair share of the organic price premium is 
passed from retail level to Ghanaian farmers. From a theoretical perspective organic farmers 
should also be more likely to get into contractual relations with exporters, because surpluses 
for both groups of actors (smallholders and exporters) exist and side-selling is less attractive 
for organic smallholders. This is the case, because alternative outlets offer a much lower 
price for organic produce and local markets for certified organic products are virtually non-
existent.  
In chapter 5, we go further into detail and analyze smallholder participation and return 
on investment (ROI) in organic certification. We build on the recent literature that analyses 
impacts of private voluntary standard certifications for small-scale farmers in developing 
countries and improve it in several ways. In particular, we give a more representative picture 
of the sector and separate the effect of certification from the effects of exporting and contract 
farming by restricting ourselves to the post-export decision between conventional and 
organic strategies. From a policy perspective this analysis answers the question whether 
organic certified export-oriented farming offers new possibilities to farmers in contrast to 
conventional export-oriented farming.  
We use the ROI as opposed to other income indicators because we focus on 
certification as an investment strategy from the perspective of the farmer. Because 
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 randomization of treatment was neither feasible nor sensible in our case, we rely on 
regression techniques using an endogenous switching regression model (ESR) to control for 
selection bias based on observables and unobservables. We find that organic farmers tend 
to be poorer, less educated and more traditional in terms of farming attitudes and that 
farming strategies are determined to a large extent by current and past social networks and 
current networks within the pineapple sector. Controlling for these characteristics certified 
organic farming is the more profitable option. The reason lies in higher prices achieved on 
export and local markets, which overcompensate for lower yields.  
In the next chapter (chapter 6) we make the environmental aspect in organic 
production explicit. We first estimate the effect that organic certification has on the actual use 
of agro-ecological production methods, such as the planting of cover crops or the use of 
organic fertilizer (as opposed to using no fertilizer at all). We then determine the impact that 
the intensity of use of these practices has on the ROI of small-scale pineapple farming in 
Ghana. 
Our hypothesis is that organic certification acts as catalyst for increased adoption of 
such practices. Since they are not required by the certification standard, the effect has to run 
through different channels. That such channels exists at all is subject to debate and hence 
there is a dilemma of (perceived) insufficient adoption, in which organic farmers in 
developing countries remain in a state of "organic-by-default" production with little or no use 
of inputs or other soil enhancing methods and consequent low yields and unsustainable 
production. Because these practices are widely known in the target population and can be 
applied independently by each farmer, their adoption cannot be considered as a classical 
treatment which we would be able to randomize over the target population. Therefore, we 
rely on a modification of the generalized propensity score approach developed by Hirano and 
Imbens (2004) to control for selection bias. Since the previously done endogenous switching 
regression for the binary choice results in no significant influence of unobservables we can 
safely assume that regression based on selection on observables is sufficient. Our results 
show that organic certification indeed seems to act as a catalyst for adoption.  
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 In the second step, we determine the impact that the intensity of use of agro-
ecological practices has on the ROI for small-scale pineapple farmers in Ghana. This second 
step connects the ecological needs to protect the environment and replenish soil fertility with 
economic rationality by measuring the ROI of increasing their use, keeping in mind that one 
of the main barriers to implementing improved agricultural technologies in developing 
countries that is continuously cited are short-term economic constraints. Above all, significant 
yield changes, which have been measured in response to adoption of agro-ecological 
practices in previous studies, may only materialize in the longer term.  
We find a nonlinear relationship between the ROI and the intensity of agro-ecological 
practice use, where most farmers are caught in a low impact dip. After studying the agro-
ecological method use patterns at different levels, we suppose that transport costs for 
organic material may act as a barrier to more intensive adoption. Since the use of agro-
ecological methods is generally very low and governments and international organizations 
see a strong necessity to increase their use in the face of climate change and food security, it 
would make sense to combine the catalytic effect of certification with active support to reduce 
these barriers. 
 
  
11
 References 
Arezki, R. and M. Brückner (2011). Food Prices and Political Instability. IMF Working Paper 
WP/11/62, International Monetary Fund. 
Bellemare, M.F. (2011). Rising Food Prices, Food Price Volatility, and Political Unrest. 
Unpublished. This document is available at: http://marcfbellemare.com/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/BellemareFoodPricesAugust2011.pdf. 
Bjorner T., L. Hansen, and C.S. Russell (2004). Environmental Labelling and Consumers’ 
Choice - An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Nordic Swan. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 47 (3), pp. 411-434. 
Bolwig, S., P. Gibbon, and S. Jones (2009). The Economics of Smallholder Organic Contract 
Farming in Tropical Africa. World Development, 37 (6), pp. 1094-1104. 
Branca, G., N. McCarthy, L. Lipper, and M.C. Jolejole (2011). Climate Smart Agriculture: A 
Synthesis of Empirical Evidence of Food Security and Mitigation Benefits from Improved 
Cropland Management. FAO Working paper. 
Bush, R. (2010). Food Riots: Poverty, Power, and Protest. Journal of Agrarian Change, 10 
(1), pp. 119-129. 
Diao, X. and D.B. Sarpong (2007). Cost Implications of Agricultural Land Degradation in 
Ghana. IFPRI Discussion Paper, No. 00698. 
Erenstein, O. (2002). Crop residue mulching in tropical and semi-tropical countries: An 
evaluation of residue availability and other technological implications. Soil and Tillage 
Research, 6 (2), pp. 115-33. 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2011). Socio-economic 
analysis of conservation agriculture in southern Africa. Network paper no. 2, FAO Rome. 
Government of Ghana (2010). Medium-term national development policy framework: Ghana 
shared growth and development agenda, 2010-2013. Volume 1, Policy Framework. 
Hirano, K. and G.W. Imbens (2004). The Propensity Score with Continuous Treatments. In: 
A. Gelman and X.-L. Meng (Eds.): Applied Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference from 
Incomplete-Data Perspectives. West Sussex, England: Wiley InterScience. 
International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD) (2009). In: McIntyre, B.D., H.R. Herren, J. Wakhungu, R.T. Watson 
(Eds.): Agriculture at a Crossroads. Island Press, Washington, DC. 
Kassam, A., T. Friedrich, R. Derpsch, R. Lahmar, R. Mrabet, G. Basch, E. Gonzalez-
Sanchez, and R. Serraj (2012). Conservation agriculture in the dry Mediterranean climate. 
Field Crops Research, 132, pp. 7-17. 
Knowler, D. and B. Bradshaw (2007). Farmers’ adoption of conservation agriculture: A 
review and synthesis of recent research. Food Policy, 32 (1), pp. 25-48. 
Maertens, M., and J.F. Swinnen (2009). Trade, Standards, and Poverty: Evidence from 
Senegal. World Development, 37 (1), pp. 161–178. 
Nimon, W. and J.C. Beghin (1999). Are Eco-Labels Valuable? Evidence from the Apparel 
Industry. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, pp. 801-811. 
Teisl, M., B. Roe, and R.L. Hicks (2002). Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 43, pp. 339-359. 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2007). Ecolabelling – as a potential 
marketing tool for African products. 
12
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Africa: An Overview 
 
Linda Kleemann  
December 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Hindenburgufer 66, 24105 Kiel, Email: 
linda.kleemann@ifw-kiel.de.  
  
13
  
Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Africa: An Overview 
 
Abstract 
The development of the agricultural sector and the improvement of the food security situation 
are seen as essential components to sustainable development in Africa. However, continuing 
population growth, impacts of climate change and environmental degradation add to an 
unprecedented combination of pressures that threaten existing efforts and solutions. This 
article discusses the challenges of meeting the food security needs in a sustainable way. 
Due to its involvement of all three dimensions of sustainable development, economic, social 
and ecological, we argue that organic farming could be one possible approach to create a 
more sustainable agricultural system. 
 
Keywords: sustainability, organic agriculture, food security 
JEL codes: O13, Q01, Q56 
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1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted that hunger and malnutrition are not just a problem of food availability, 
but also a problem of access to food. As argued by Sen (1999), people suffer from hunger 
when they cannot establish their entitlement over an adequate amount of food. Thus, to 
eliminate hunger and malnutrition in the long-run, it is crucial to understand how policies can 
increase the production of food and ensure an equitable distribution of the food produced, as 
well as of the resources needed for production. Both policy makers and analysts 
acknowledge the need for improving agricultural productivity and in boosting food security in 
Africa. However, the problem of long-term food security appears to be compounded by the 
effects of climate change, large-scale investments in agricultural land, and highly volatile 
world market prices, especially for staple foods. Successively evolving causes and context 
factors, as well as multiple reciprocal cause-effect relationships complicate the ability to 
make a clear-cut statement of causality. The expansion of the world population, changing 
consumer habits, which lead to an increase in the demand for meat products, along with EU 
agricultural subsidies and the use of land for cultivation of biofuels, are just some of the many 
complex influential factors (von Braun et al., 2008).  
The development of the agricultural sector and the improvement of the food security 
situation strongly influence other sectors of the economy and are seen as essential 
components to sustainable development in Africa. Progress in achieving food security is also 
a prerequisite to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).1 From the African 
perspective, the fight against hunger is the most pressing social challenge. On the production 
side, it is of dire importance to increase the productivity of smallholder farming and the more 
effective use of large farms to meet the dietary needs of the rural poor. At the same time, it is 
also necessary to reduce the environmental impacts of the agricultural sector so as to not 
destroy its own ecological foundations. In many parts of Africa, the land is already strongly 
degraded. The agricultural successes of the recent decades, with their methods of increasing 
productivity by use of mineral fertilizers and pesticides, have damaged the foundations of the 
long-term productivity of the land (IAASTD, 2009).  
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Globalization has also posed a second challenge to the African farming landscape. 
According to the IAASTD, the global demand for grain will increase by 75% from 2000 to 
2050 (IAASTD, 2009). Hence, a dwindling amount of water and soil must feed more people, 
and, at the same time, feed animals for meat production as well as produce energy crops 
and biomass for the chemical industry. This raises the pressure on an already precarious 
food supply in Africa.  
Due to the complexity of the influencing factors, the approaches to be pursued in 
order to achieve sustainable agriculture and food security in Africa need to be differentiated 
and tailored to the specific circumstances. Drawing on available literature, this article 
presents an overview of the challenges facing sustainable food production in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Given the potential conflict between increased food production that may lead to both 
higher emissions and better food security, information on the sustainability of food production 
in sub-Saharan Africa could be of interest to both analysts and policy makers.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the concept of 
sustainability, as well as the three dimensions of sustainability. This is followed by an outline 
of the food security challenges in sub-Saharan Africa and the reasons for the low agricultural 
productivity. The fourth section discusses the strategies employed to promote sustainable 
food production in the region. The final section presents concluding remarks and 
implications. 
 
2 Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security 
2.1 Sustainability in Agriculture 
Development is defined as sustainable according to the so-called Brundtland report when it 
‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’ (UN WCED, 1987). Sustainable agriculture and food security therefore 
stands for maximizing the productivity of the land and improving the well-being of people 
under the constraint of minimal damage to natural resources (land, water, air, and 
biodiversity) (Pretty, 1999). Agriculture is seen as a multifunctional system. Through the 
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incorporation of the whole value chain for food products, nutrition becomes part of this 
system.  
Sustainable agriculture has often been discussed in a controversial manner, with 
various authors suggesting different competing strategies to accomplish this goal. Pretty 
(1999) uses a capital-based model of agriculture, in which capital consists of natural, social, 
human, financial and physical capital, and provides services that underpin the agricultural 
system. Capital in this model is affected by politics, production processes and institutions. If 
this influence is successfully used, feedback processes will strengthen the capital base. If it 
is not successfully used, then it results for instance in environmental pollution or social 
tensions, which reduce the total capital stock. According to Pretty, a sustainable system 
increases the capital stock over time. Other authors assume that an absence of capital stock 
reduction is sufficient. Availability of and access to the five different types of capital depends 
on contextual factors. These are divided, according to Pretty, into (short term) fixed factors 
(e.g. climate, agricultural ecology, soil and culture) and dynamic factors that can be 
externally influenced (e.g. legislation) (Pretty, 1999). The problem with models of this kind is 
the absence of a comparable measure for evaluating the different parts of the capital stock. 
Dimensions used to approximate such a measure are energy or monetary values.  
In the three pillars of sustainability, economic sustainability ensures that farmers do 
not make any financial losses. This means, first, that his physical and financial capital, 
expressed in monetary units, does not decrease, which in turn is influenced by factors, such 
as prices, conditions of trade and yield that are considered in the following paragraphs in 
more detail.  
The first factor, prices, often opens up the question of whether high food prices help 
to promote African farmers. This cannot be easily answered. The price fluctuations of the 
past four years and the resulting scientific studies do not show a clear picture. High prices 
can make farming in Africa more profitable and encourage investment in the sector. At the 
individual level, this is especially true for farmers who have enough land and access to 
adequate infrastructure, and are able to meet stringent international quality standards. Those 
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who should benefit under the social aspect of sustainability, namely small and poor farmers 
lose from increasing prices, because they are mostly net food buyers (see for example 
Swinnen, 2011, World Bank, 2008). In the long term, they could also benefit if high prices 
lead to increased investment in food production and thereby to a higher production volume 
that is shared equitably. However that part of the price increases and price volatility that can 
be traced back to speculation (Gilbert, 2010), affects all farmers negatively through increased 
uncertainty. 
Second are conditions of trade. Small farmers in Africa have so far hardly benefited 
from the benefits of international agricultural trade because barriers are high between African 
countries and regulations for processed food in both developed countries hamper processing 
industries (IAASTD, 2009). Against the backdrop of growing markets for high quality and 
organic products in industrialized countries, new marketing channels are opening up. These 
can create new income opportunities under the condition that there is support for farmers to 
meet the required environmental regulations and quality standards.  
Third, for economic sustainability with particular consideration to small farmers, 
framework conditions are particularly important. This concerns the physical infrastructure- 
especially transport routes, markets and storage facilities, the information infrastructure, and 
the institutional framework. Numerous studies emphasize the significance of contract security 
(for the reduction of transaction costs), and social safety nets (e.g. agricultural insurance) 
(Barrett et al., 2012). Also, land ownership or secure long-term leases are starting points to 
enable small farmers to escape out of poverty and malnutrition, since access to credit and 
investments in innovations and long-term measures, such as the preservation of soil fertility, 
are highly correlated to the security of land tenure (Abdulai, et al., 2011).  
The social dimension of sustainability in agriculture and nutrition is reflected in the 
justice, health, distribution, gender, and cultural aspects of society and is summarized in 
Pretty's model under social and human capital. Without long-term food security social 
sustainability is inconceivable. Increases in global food production will only lead to the 
alleviation of hunger, when the availability of food for the poor, through lower prices, higher 
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incomes or better infrastructure, is improved. Measures to increase production volumes can 
even deteriorate access when vulnerable parts of the society are deprived of the opportunity 
for subsistence agriculture without simultaneously creating new income opportunities for 
them.  
Against the backdrop of a growing global demand for resource-intensive food and 
renewable raw materials, a further intensification of agricultural production in Africa risks that 
its benefits are not used primarily to improve food security. 1 to 2% of global arable land is 
already used for energy crops and this number shows an upward trend. On social grounds, 
among the major causes of rural poverty and malnutrition are the unequal distribution of land 
and insecure and unclear land tenure rights. With the aim of counteracting unequal 
distribution of land, land reforms have been implemented in several African countries. 
However, not all have been successful. The ongoing relocation of peasants to make way for 
large-scale agricultural investment projects counteracts these efforts to distribute land more 
equally. In addition, from a social standpoint, access to water should be fairly distributed and 
the use of limited water resources should primarily benefit food security. 
The improvement of educational opportunities for the poor is an effective way to 
create social sustainability while combating hunger. Numerous studies show a positive 
correlation between education level, income opportunities and nutritional status. A virtuous 
cycle is set in motion because well-fed and, thus healthier people are better able to feed 
themselves adequately and have improved employment opportunities. To this adds the 
advantage of better education for agricultural production itself, since sustainable agriculture 
is highly knowledge intensive. 
The final pillar of sustainability concerns natural capital, which is termed ecological 
sustainability. It is based strongly on the original ideas of sustainability, not to overexploit 
nature. An ecologically sustainable way of life would use the environment and natural 
resources only to an extent that these regenerate. In particular, the industrial high-yielding 
agriculture is often viewed as environmentally unsustainable as it is very input-intensive and 
dominated by large-scale monocultures. 
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2.2 Is Africa’s food security situation sustainable? 
The food security and nutrition situation in sub-Saharan Africa is clearly not sustainable. 
Even though a recent report from the United Nations on the Millennium Development Goals 
discloses that the number of people living in absolute poverty in developing countries has 
declined from 1.8 billion in 1990 to 1.4 billion in 2005, the regional and intra-African 
distribution of poverty is highly heterogeneous: in Sub Saharan Africa- the world region with 
the highest poverty rate- 51% of the population lived in absolute poverty in 2005; in South 
Asia that number was at 39% of the population; in the Latin American-Caribbean region, 8%, 
and in Northern Africa it is at 3% of the population (UN, 2010).  
Poverty can hinder the acquisition of sufficient quantities of food and affects both the 
urban and rural population. In the latter, poverty can prevent improvements in productivity 
when inputs cannot be purchased. Labor productivity is also low due to little educational 
opportunities and inadequate access to health care and/or malnutrition leading a vicious 
cycle of poverty and hunger.  
While the proportion of hungry people in the world has declined recently, the absolute 
number has increased (according to data from FAOSTAT). According to statistics from the 
UNSCN, the southern Africa region with 239 million hungry people comes second after the 
Asia Pacific region with 578 million. However, the number of hungry people in Asia has 
decreased over the past 20 years while it has increased by 40% in Africa. In percentage 
terms Sub-Saharan Africa leads the way with 25% malnourishment. Accordingly, the World 
Hunger Index (WHI)2 prepared by IFPRI, Concern Worldwide, and Welthungerhilfe (2011), 
also shows the worst picture for Southern Africa and the worst country case examples are 
also in Africa: Congo, Burundi, Eritrea and Chad, where continuing conflict and political 
instability worsen the situation.  
Beyond the mere lack of calories, the problem of food insecurity also includes the so-
called hidden hunger; that is malnutrition due to nutrient deficiencies, such as vitamin and 
mineral deficiencies. These are mostly associated with other health problems (von Braun, 
2001)3. Again Africa is the largest region in the world with a high nutrient deficiency. On a 
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global scale, deficiencies in iodine affect an estimated two billion people worldwide, zinc (1.2 
to 2 billion), iron (0.8 to 1.2 billion), and Vitamin A, that can cause blindness (200 million), are 
the most common. Many people suffer from multiple micronutrient deficiencies.  
The problem of food security in Africa is as much a problem of quantity as a question 
of access. Taking the current world harvest as basis, there is theoretically more than 
sufficient energy available globally, namely the equivalent of about 800 grams of grain per 
day (Flachowski, 2011)4. Nonetheless, this amount is distributed extremely unequally. Africa 
imports far more food than it exports (Figure 2.1) and the quantity of imports has increased 
significantly over the last five decades, as per-capita food production has continuously 
declined (Mc Arthur, 2011). Inaccessible rural areas and areas of conflict are particularly 
underserved. The presence of adequate amount of food and nutrients is therefore a 
necessary but not a satisfactory condition for food security. 
There are two types of access to food: self-sufficiency and markets. As a result of 
poverty, subsistence farmers are unable to feed themselves because they have insufficient 
factors of production at their disposal. Under these circumstances, they are just as 
dependent as the urban population on the purchase of food products. These parts of the 
population at risk of hunger or already food insecure are particularly vulnerable to changes in 
food markets. The most obvious example is rising prices. The average African spends 50-
80% of his income on food, compared to 12% for the average German. Under these 
circumstances, rising food prices lead to reduced intake of calories and/or a reduction in the 
quality and diversity of food. Often animal products, fruits and vegetables are replaced by 
cheaper grains (UNSCN, 2010). Table A.2.1 shows the enormous differences in caloric 
intake and consumption of food of animal origin. It is noteworthy to mention that the minimum 
in all the above mentioned categories is in Africa. 
Some African countries suffer from the so-called ‘double burden of hunger and 
obesity’, i.e. the simultaneous problem of malnutrition and obesity and the resulting health 
issues. The background behind this problem lies with the adaption to the dietary habits and 
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eating styles of the industrialized countries - the so-called ‘nutrition transition’ (Mendez and 
and Popkin, 2004). 
 
3 Reasons for the Current Agriculture and Food Security Situation in Africa 
The relationship between the three pillars of sustainability is particularly obvious in 
agriculture. If the soil is degraded, farming will not be economically productive. That is, it 
produces too little food. As a result, people suffer from hunger or malnutrition, which in turn 
leads to a destruction of natural resources. This implies that ecological sustainability is 
influenced not only by geographic and climatic factors and changes in agricultural 
technologies, but rather depends more on political, social and economic terms. These factors 
are discussed in this section. 
Starting with geographical conditions, a large part of Africa’s climate is considered not 
well suited for agriculture, a reason often given for its long history of famines. This is 
expressed as a limited availability of natural resources, especially water, even though Africa 
is rich in many other natural resources.  
For instance land is not generally considered a limiting factor for the African 
agricultural landscape. Large stretches of land have so far hardly been put into agricultural 
use. However, only 10% of the land is truly fertile (UNEP, 2008a) and 13- 16% of the arable 
land has been damaged from erosion or been degraded as a result of other chemical and 
physical changes, such as infrastructure, cities, and pollutants (Bai et al., 2008). A recent 
study by von Braun et al. (2011) shows that about 17% of the agricultural production in Sub-
Saharan Africa is lost due to land degradation, in some regions up to 40%, and on average 
8% throughout the continent. This consequently leads to an increasing use of moderately 
arable soils. Forests, which cover about 20% of the African landscape, are strongly 
deforested. The deforestation rate is more than four million hectares per year, twice the world 
average (Kelatwang and Garzuglia, 2006).  
Rapid population growth raises the pressure on the forests and already heavily 
farmed areas. Almost the entire global population growth in the next couple of years will, 
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according to calculations done by the United Nations, take place in developing countries. 
This will increase the populations in many African countries by more than 50%. Through this 
population surge, the amount of theoretically available arable land per person is predicted to 
decline from 4.7 hectares per person in 1970 to 1.5 in 2050. In reality, this may occur faster 
than predicted in the model, since competition from renewable resources and settlements 
must be considered in the equation. Due to the fact that settlements are often located in 
fertile river valleys and coastal plains, some of the best agricultural land is converted almost 
irreversibly into cities and roads. 
Africa is the warmest and second-driest continent, making water a limiting factor in 
the expansion of the agricultural landscape. Water is as much a staple food as a basis for 
food production. With an average share of 70%, in some African countries even above 90% 
agriculture uses the most amount of water. This water use is not sustainable if the rate of use 
exceeds ground water recharge or if it leads to a contamination of ground- or surface water. 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) irregular and reduced 
precipitation will quadruple the number of people affected by water shortages in Africa by the 
year 2050 to more than 250 million (IPCC, 2007). Low levels of irrigation in agriculture and 
efficiency in water use limit agricultural production growth. 
The effects of global warming are already appear to be destroying harvests and 
threatening food security in Africa. There are five major effects of climate change on 
agriculture: First, the increases in the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, which can in 
turn lead to a fertilization effect; second, higher average temperatures and third, changes in 
the availability of water, which are expected to have strong yet different regional effects. 
Fourth is the increased weather extremes and fifth, higher soil degradation that can lead to 
significant harvest losses (Dusseldorp and Sauter, 2011). The expected rise in droughts for 
already dry regions and the higher risk of flooding wetlands will present Africa with higher 
risks for famine. Globally, the entire agricultural yield potential is not expected to change 
significantly by 2080 due to the effects of climate change, yet predictions for Africa are 
negative. By 2020, crop yields from rain-fed agriculture, which accounts for 90% of farming, 
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in some African countries are projected to decline by up to 50% (IPCC, 2007). The United 
Nations Environment Program reports that the total of climate-related decline in agricultural 
production will be as much as 10% in southern Africa (UNEP, 2008a). 
Further reducing local availability of food post-harvest losses amount to about one-
third of the total harvest volume.5 In southern and eastern Africa, the post-harvest losses in 
cereals alone are 10-30%. In Tanzania, about 60 million liters of milk (16% of the total 
production in the dry season and 25% in the rainy season) are lost (UNSCN, 2010). Large 
post-harvest losses are caused by lack of investment in harvesting technology and storage 
facilities, improper handling and transport, and poor infrastructure. Even in densely populated 
areas in parts of Southern Africa it may take more than five hours to reach the nearest 
market (Nellemann et al, 2009). Much of the post-harvest losses could be prevented with 
existing technology if invested locally, but weak institutions and political instability in some 
countries discourage investments. 
Another key factor that contributes to a decline in agricultural productivity is low 
spending on research and development (R&D) in agriculture. While other developing 
countries recorded an increasing trend, the real expenditure on agricultural R&D in southern 
Africa has been decreasing. In 1981, the expenditures were at US$1.15 billion; in 2000 they 
decreased to US$0.87 billion (UNEP, 2008b). In addition, protected agricultural markets 
reduce profits in the sector and thereby limit investments. Rosegrant et al. (2001) calculate 
that global trade liberalization in the agricultural sector would allow for an estimated US$4.4 
billion in additional income in sub-Saharan Africa (US$22 billion for all developing countries). 
However, depending on comparative advantages, a strategy of export growth within a weak 
national regulatory framework can negatively affect ecological sustainability. 
On the demand side the weak purchasing power of the African populations slows 
down progress. Poverty not only causes low demand, it also increases environmental 
degradation. Bai et al. (2008) find a positive correlation between the degradation of land and 
poverty. This relationship is explained by the attempt of the resource poor to be self-
sufficient, without concerns for the environment. At the same time environmental degradation 
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is taking away the most important resource from the poor and thereby reinforces their 
poverty, producing a vicious circle.  
The climatic and economic factors mentioned combined with the low prices for land in 
Africa, make farmland attractive to investors. Financially strong state and private investors 
have recently been either long-term leasing or purchasing large areas of productive 
farmland. The economic, ecological and social consequences of such investments are 
controversial. On the one hand, the agricultural policy in Africa has been neglected so that 
there is a strong need for investment. On the other hand, there is not only an unstable food 
security situation, but also unclear property rights and weak government control and 
regulation in many African countries. Contracts for land can thereby place both the local 
population and the environment at a disadvantage. Unregulated land use can either lead to 
degradation and erosion, high greenhouse gas emissions, and overuse of the water supply 
or take advantage of unexploited harvest potentials, and an increase productivity and food 
security. The local population may lose their land without adequate compensation or they 
may profit from better infrastructure and new employment possibilities in rural areas.  
Against the background of climate change, agriculture also plays an important role in 
ecological sustainability. About one-third of all global greenhouse gas emissions come from 
farming (UNEP, 2008a), where the emissions from the livestock industry are in the most 
critical position since it claims 70% of agricultural land in the world (IAASTD, 2009). A meat-
based diet affects the ecological sustainability negatively, because the direct emissions 
(through the livestock themselves) and the indirect emissions (through fodder production) are 
on average higher than for the production of plant-based foods, though, the emission level 
depends, among other things, on the technology used and the location of production. Figure 
2.2 shows the nitrogen oxide emissions for different world regions. Africa has the lowest 
amount of emissions. However, agriculture has a far bigger share in this region than in richer 
regions of the world6.  
Environmental degradation is a major limiting factor of agricultural productivity growth. 
When soils are subject to unsustainable exploitation in the course of food production, these 
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processes limit their suitability for or impede further use (through erosion, salinization, 
acidification, compaction, contamination with toxic substances and the loss of soil organic 
matter). A sustainable agriculture must at least maintain, and best promote soil fertility. Since 
agricultural use generally leads to a net discharge of nutrients from the soil, they have to be 
replaced through organic or mineral fertilizers. The protection of soil fertility requires a long-
term investment. Unclear and weak property rights in land reduce incentives to invest in the 
resource land, and to take measures to improve the soil and prevent erosion (e.g. Abdulai et. 
al., 2010). Investments in land in turn affect farming yields, which are higher for users with 
secure land rights than for users with insecure land rights. 
Climate change and agriculture share a reciprocal relationship: on the one hand, 
agriculture influences climate change in several ways; on the other hand, climate change 
affects agricultural production. Changes in rainfall, temperature and other climatic factors are 
expected to negatively affect food production in Africa (see section 2). 
This overview shows that there are many, partly competing aspects of sustainability. 
Proposed solutions aim to cover one or more aspects more or less completely.  
 
4 Solution Proposals and the Example of Organic Farming 
4.1 Solution Proposals 
There are a number of partly competing proposals that prioritize different aspects of 
sustainability differently. The question of the best priorities and solutions is highly 
controversial.  
As traditionally most poor work in farming, many researchers believe that growth in 
the agricultural sector is the most effective way to reduce poverty and thereby increase food 
security (e.g. Dewbre et al., 2011, Byerlee et al., 2009, Thirtle et al., 2003). But whether this 
is done best by the establishment of large farms or supporting existing smallholders is a 
critical point of disagreement between scientists.  
The Alliance for a Green Revolution for Africa promotes a package of new high-
yielding varieties, increased use of inputs and better access to markets and financial 
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services. Whether or not genetic engineering of crops should be part of such a strategy is 
subject to intense debate. Amid the potential benefits are high-yielding crops that grow under 
adverse environmental conditions and on so far unsuitable lands. Opponents point towards 
the risks of reducing genetic diversity and contamination of the natural environment.  
Adaptation to climate change is also needed, using better technology or expanding 
cultivated land or compensate through increasing food imports. This solution would target the 
use of plants that can adapt to new climate conditions and the adjustment of agricultural 
methods, such as the timing of sowing and the use of water. Additionally, agroforestry has 
the potential to mitigate the effects of climate change (IAASTD, 2009). 
Among the less contested proposals for ways forward is a strong increase in 
agricultural research, education and extension services. The CAADP (Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program) under the supervision of the African Union agreed on a 
target mark of 1% of the income in agriculture to be spent for agricultural research as well as 
10% of the total government budget that should be put into agriculture in general. Most of the 
participating countries do not achieve these targets yet, but there is a positive development 
(Omilola et al., 2010). Industrialized countries could also invest more in research, in 
particular to reduce the latent conflict between environmental protection, resource 
conservation and food security. Estimates by IFPRI suggest that 20-30% of global 
development assistance should be channeled into agriculture to ensure food security (vpn 
Braun et al., 2008). Furthermore, a reduction of trade restrictions by developed countries and 
a decrease in subsidies for the domestic agricultural industry would be beneficial for the 
agricultural sector in Africa in general.  
Now, one solution proposal, organic agriculture, will be discussed in more detail and 
with special attention to local circumstances and alternatives in Africa. As the name 
suggests, it is aimed at principally ecological sustainability. The central theme of organic 
farming is conducting economic activity in accordance with the principles of ecosystems. This 
allegedly leads to improved (social, ecological and economic) sustainability (Lampkin and 
Padel, 1994). Besides the production of food, raw materials or energy, agriculture is 
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responsible for environmental and resource protection. Instead of relying on the principle of 
output maximization, as used in conventional agriculture, inputs are optimized. Nutrients 
should be efficiently used in quasi-closed cycles. These principles lead to a focus on the use 
of local resources and the avoidance of external inputs where possible. Organic farming also 
seeks to increase productivity but only as long as intensification of production is compatible 
with sustainability. 
In Africa, organic farming is often promoted as a promising sustainability and food 
security strategy. Due to its similarity to the traditional local agriculture, the transition to 
organic farming is supposed to be particularly easy to achieve for poor farmers that live in 
remote areas. Additionally, converting to organic farming supposedly eliminates the 
dependence on expensive fertilizers and pesticides. Whereas uncertified produce usually 
serves the local market, certified organic produce in Africa is almost exclusively allocated to 
the export market. Europe and North America account for 97% of the world market (Willer 
and Kilcher, 2009), and the market is growing rapidly in these regions. Many studies have 
demonstrated the willingness of consumers to pay a higher price for organic products (e.g. 
Bjorner et al., 2004; Loureiro and Hine, 2002; Nimon and Beghin, 1999). Hence, certified 
organic produce also offers an attractive market in the North. This is why in Africa most 
organic produce is certified according EU or US organic regulations. So far, there has been 
little research into the demand for organic - certified or uncertified - produce within Africa. 
When limited resources such as phosphate and the rising costs of energy-intensive 
production of mineral fertilizers to lead to increases in production costs and farmers in 
marginal areas of Africa face already high costs due to poor infrastructure, the substitution of 
artificial fertilizers with organic compost can be not only an ecological, but also an economic 
advantage. Therefore conversion to organic agriculture in Africa is promoted by a range of 
non-governmental organizations, development cooperation projects and entrepreneurial 
initiatives. 
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4.2 Economic Impacts of Organic Agriculture 
The yield potential of organic farming in locations with medium and low soil productivity, 
especially in the tropics and subtropics, is perceived to be equal or superior to that of 
conventional production at the present state of knowledge. This is due to the fact that inputs 
used in conventional farming are often used in low quantities or not at all by farmers in these 
regions that the effectiveness of mineral fertilizers on soils with low nutrient retention capacity 
is reduced, and that high-yielding varieties are often unsuitable for cultivation in sub-optimal 
locations. According to Dusseldorp and Sauter (2011), the great variance in results in 
empirical studies comparing yields from conventional and organic production indicates that 
the potential for intensifying ecological production is underutilized in comparison to 
conventional production and that widespread view that organic farming could only feed a 
small proportion of the world’s population is a preliminary judgment based on limited data.  
A number of scientific studies have employed case studies to examine the economic 
consequences of a conversion to organic farming and organic certification for small farmers 
in developing countries. Even if, due to the methodology employed in the studies, it is not 
always clear whether the results stem from the actual conversion, or from other aspects, e.g. 
unobservable characteristics of the farmers, generally a cautious positive image emerges 
from the results. A study by Pretty and Hine (2001) that observes a group of 208 sustainable 
agriculture projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America, shows that sustainable agriculture can 
increase yields and visibly improves the overall nutritional condition of small farmers. In the 
45 projects examined in 17 African countries, the production volume of the farms increased 
in all cases. Also, according to Pretty (1999), natural and human capital, which are the basis 
for the sustainability of projects, were accumulated. Overall, most studies find that because 
of higher prices from certified organic products, small farmers profit more from certified 
organic, than from conventional farming, while production costs are similar to those of 
conventional production7 (e.g. Bolwig et al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Hence, 
those farmers that manage to meet the certification requirements and quality standards of 
the international market are most likely to benefit.  
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The question of whether and under what circumstances a significant number of 
farmers are able to meet these standards, has a mixed answer. The literature gives us both 
positive and negative examples (e.g. Markelova et.al, 2009; Roy and Thorat, 2008; Wollni 
and Zellner, 2007). The cost of certification alone is generally not affordable for small farmers 
or cooperatives in Africa without substantial support by governments, businesses or aid 
programs.8  
Furthermore, the high level of management and knowledge intensity of organic 
farming can be an important entry barrier for poorly educated farmers with limited access to 
information systems and poor links to other farmers in similar situations and is often a reason 
for the breakdown of organic agriculture initiatives in Africa. This problem is also reflected in 
the low yields that are reported in many scientific studies on organic compared to 
conventional small-scale farms in Africa despite the aforementioned yield potentials. 
Organic and sustainable agriculture are often equated colloquially. However, several 
tests have shown that organic agriculture plus minor use of chemical inputs often reach the 
best results in terms of yield and environmental compatibility in an African context, and thus 
could be called sustainable, too. However, in this case the option of certification and thereby 
to achieve higher prices is no longer applicable.  
 
4.3 Social Impacts of Organic Agriculture 
With respect to the improvement of the nutritional situation of the disadvantaged and rural 
population that are mainly peasant farmers, it seems that organic agriculture can empower 
them to increase their production with limited productive resources, to decrease their 
production risk by enhancing the diversity of their cultivation systems and therefore to 
contribute to adapting to climate change. Furthermore, higher labor intensity and lower 
capital intensity of organic agriculture can have a positive impact on employment 
opportunities in rural areas. Studies have shown that by refraining from using chemicals, 
which were rarely used properly, a positive impact on the health of farmers (fewer symptoms 
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of poisoning, less water-related health issues) could be observed. So far, however, in most 
cases not all of the named potentials are being exploited. 
Cultural proximity to traditional agriculture is often highlighted by supporters. 
However, this aspect is hard to investigate empirically. Nevertheless, it seems that organic 
agriculture is more suitable for (traditional) small and medium-scale diversified farms and 
less for (modern) large-scale specialized plantations. If this tendency is confirmed, the poorer 
parts of the rural population, respectively small-scale farmers, could benefit 
disproportionately from investments in the sector. If the yield potential of organic agriculture 
would be utilized, the availability of food would increase where access to food is the limiting 
factor for food security. Likewise, the above mentioned support of small-scale farmers with 
new production technologies, and the distribution of agricultural knowledge and training act in 
a similar fashion as investments in education of the rural population. 
 
4.4 Ecological Impacts of Organic Agriculture 
Obviously, abstaining from the use of chemical additives has a positive impact on the 
environment through lower pollution. This positive aspect is particularly important in Africa, 
because improper use of chemicals in agriculture by African small-scale farmers is very 
common, including the use of excessive amounts, insufficient safety measures during 
application, careless storage and use of highly toxic outdated substances. 
Since agricultural use leads to a net outflow of nutrients from the soil, especially when 
crop production and livestock are spatially separated, nutrients have to be supplied through 
organic or mineral fertilizer to preserve soil fertility and thus the yield potential of the soil. 
Small-scale farmers in developing countries often fail in doing so. There is a tendency that 
farmers which are getting certified are those who practice so-called ‘organic by default’ 
agriculture, i.e. traditional shifting cultivation without or with low addition of nutrients. From an 
ecological point of view, this method will only be sustainable if the fallow period is long 
enough, which is rarely anymore the case due to an increasing population density and 
resulting shortage of land. In the present circumstances, this method leads to leaching of 
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soils. So far no scientific studies exist that can affirm or reject this hypothesis on the basis of 
data on the nutrient content of agricultural soils. However, there are many studies, including 
those named in the last section that suggest that the principles of organic agriculture are 
understood and taught as negative laws in Africa. Little importance is given to positive 
instructions, of what one should do to maintain soil fertility. In this respect, organic farming in 
Africa has a vast untapped potential. This type of agriculture can have positive effects on the 
protection of resources, of the soil and the biodiversity if the application of the principle of the 
closed nutrient cycle is applied. A number of studies (such as Niggli and Kasterine, 2007 and 
UNCTAD, 2006) have also shown that organic agriculture does better than conventional 
agriculture in adaptation to and prevention of climate change. Through a better CO2-balance, 
organic farming can mitigate the effects of climate change. The amount of emissions per 
hectare is significantly lower; however they are similar or higher per unit of output. In 
addition, organically managed soils absorb more CO2 (carbon sequestration) (Niggli and 
Kasterine, 2007). Furthermore, adapting to climate change seems easier using organic 
farming because the induced diversification spreads risk and more robust varieties are grown 
(UNCTAD, 2006; Stolze et al., 2000). 
Some authors conclude that practicing organic farming in conformity with its holistic 
principles leads to synergies that only come through the interplay of several factors (e.g., 
Pretty, 1999; Shiferaw and Holden, 1999). The change of single factors– a ceteris paribus 
approach –, for example the introduction of water conservation practices through terraces 
without making improvements at other points of the system at the same time is much more 
ineffective and possibly unprofitable than if several factors are changed together. In this 
example this could be the further simultaneous use of improved organic fertilizer to increase 
productivity and the improvement of access to the credit market to finance the new activities.  
 
4.5 Adoption and Diffusion of Organic Agriculture 
The number of certified small-scale farmers is relatively high. In 2009, Uganda was, after 
India, the country with the second largest number of certified producers in the world, and 
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Ethiopia, Tanzania and Burkina Faso were also ranked in to the top ten (Willer and Kilcher, 
2009). However organic-certified agricultural land in Africa remains limited despite intensive 
research and mostly positive observed impacts and untapped potentials of organic 
agriculture (see Figure 2.3).  
There is a vast literature on the adoption and diffusion of agricultural technologies in 
developing countries (see e.g. Feder et al., 1985 and Feder and Savastano, 2006; Foster 
and Rosenzweig, 1995, 1996, and 2010) trying to explain this phenomenon. Scientific 
studies have identified several typical barriers to agricultural technology adoption which can 
be summarized in six groups: biophysical characteristics of farms, complexity of the 
technology, household features, poverty of the land tenants, property rights, and input and 
output markets. The width of this list shows that the spread of organic agriculture can 
stagnate at many points. The complexity of organic agriculture that exists due to its holistic 
approach is one of the reasons why its realization can be difficult or at least lengthy. A lot of 
support programs and initiatives just take up single aspects such as the certification. They 
also often do not accompany the whole process of conversion9. If the parts are 
interdependent, this strategy is not very helpful. 
The time-lag of organic agriculture is a disadvantage. Many of the positive effects 
only become visible in the long-term, amongst others because soil fertility changes slowly. In 
the certification system this reflects in the three-year transitional period before products can 
be sold as organic certified.  
Furthermore there are other aspects that can have a great impact on the diffusion of 
organic agriculture in Africa. One of these aspects is the role of collective institutions such as 
cooperatives which are frequently used to disseminate agricultural technologies and organize 
the process of certification for small-scale farmers. The meaning of the functioning of these 
institutions and the incentives for farmers to join them should not be underestimated. The 
investigation of the question how farmers or farm households decide for or against a new 
technology such as organic agriculture within a complex entity of new and old technologies, 
institutional environment, market conditions, available resources, and cultural and social 
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networks, cannot be derived from traditional theoretical models of agricultural household 
(e.g. de Janvry, et al., 1991) and is subject of current research. For instance, higher prices 
for final goods can have very diverse impacts. The return of land and labor increase and 
thereby encourage investments in agriculture. This can be new technologies that improve 
soil fertility. But higher prices can also cause the opposite and aggravate ecological damage. 
If these prices are not expected to be non-permanent, or the discount rate in the future is 
very high, it may make more sense for the farmer to leach the soil in order to make a higher 
profit quickly rather than investing in more sustainable long-term technologies.  
Overall, the problem of slow diffusion is not just a problem of organic agriculture but 
many technologies in Africa and other developing countries. Therefore, a number of 
researchers currently try to answer questions about barriers to adoption and diffusion, and 
the question of individual profitability of new technologies (e.g. Suri, 2011).  
 
5 Concluding Remarks  
The increase in the number of both undernourished and malnourished people in sub-
Saharan Africa over the last decade has intensified the calls for measures to help boost 
agricultural productivity and output in order to enhance the food security situation in the 
region. The challenge for African agriculture is therefore substantial. Alongside this challenge 
to find ways to increase food and livestock production are concerns about agricultural 
sustainability, as an unprecedented combination of pressures are emerging to threaten the 
sustainability of existing social and ecological systems. The continuing population growth, 
impacts of climate change and environmental degradation that are driving the limited 
resources towards their thresholds need to be taken into consideration in the development of 
sustainable production techniques. 
This article discusses the challenges of meeting the food security needs in a 
sustainable way. Given that sustainable development is a concept that includes economic, 
social and ecological dimensions of conservation, we argue that the dual goals of ensuring 
food security and promoting sustainable production are achievable in the African context only 
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with the right policy mix. We use organic farming as one example for a sustainable 
development strategy for African agriculture and nutrition. Its big advantage is its involvement 
of all three sustainability criteria, but due to its complexity it has weaknesses, especially in 
implementation. 
The study by Pretty and Hine (2001) which analyzed some projects involved in 
sustainable intensification showed that, provided there is a political and economic domestic 
recognition that agriculture matters, then food production can be increased without doing 
harm to the environment and increasing the flow of beneficial environmental services. In 
principle, organic farming is one possible approach to create a more sustainable agriculture. 
However, further studies on individual motifs and conditions of transition to organic farming 
are necessary. Under certain circumstances agricultural productivity can also be improved by 
organic farming, but more intensive and context-specific research to better utilization of its 
productive potential is needed.  
On the market of ideas organic agriculture has to stand up to other strategies for 
action that promote their sustainability and come with other advantages and disadvantages. 
In a given political and institutional situation various strategies appear attractive in different 
ways. However, there are general principles that we consider important to recognize when 
selecting between alternatives. First, no strategy should work against food security, that is, 
the sufficient production of and access to food. Second, natural resources, a clean 
environment, human health and social justice are basic aspects for a functioning agriculture 
as well as for social and ecological sustainability. In the past, the development of the 
agriculture often focused singularly on increasing productivity. Third, future strategies have to 
acknowledge the multifunctionality of agriculture and take into account the complexity of 
agricultural systems within different socio-economic and ecological situations. Farmers are 
not just producers but also managers of ecosystems. The incentive systems for all actors in 
the agricultural sector and for consumers have to be changed in a way that they address this 
multifunctionality. In the sense of social sustainability, activities have to be geared more 
towards previously disadvantaged social strata such as farmers with limited resources. 
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To choose the right strategy mix, all possible economic, social and ecological 
consequences should be evaluated and used as basis for decisions. The weighting of 
individual advantages and disadvantages is necessarily a subjective one and depends on the 
institutional, political, societal and natural context. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 2.1: Difference in Exports and Imports in Trade of Agricultural Goods in Africa 
1961- 2009 
 
Source: own representation, statistics from FAOSTAT 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Comparative Nitrogen Oxide Emissions from Agriculture 
 
Source: own representation, data from the World Bank: World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 2.3: Development of Organic Certified Area Worldwide  
(In hectares and percentage of the total agricultural land) 
 
Source: own illustration using data from the Research Institute of Organic Agriculture FiBL and 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements IFOAM (2011). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.2.1: Energy and Protein Consumption per Person  
(Extremes, means, and Germany for reference; data from 2005) 
  Min Average Max Germany 
Energy  
(Mcal/person/day) 
1.5 
(DR Kongo) 3.0 
3.9 
(USA) 3.5 
Part from Animal Origins 
(% of total) 
1.4 
(DR Kongo) 12.9 
32.6 
(Island) 20.0 
Protein from Animal Origins 
(g/ person/day) 
1.7 
(Burundi) 23.9 
69.0  
(USA) 52.8 
Eggs 
(kg/ person/day) 
0.1 
(Burundi,  
Central. Afr.-Rep.) 
9.0 20.2 (China) 11.8 
Milk  
(kg/ person/day) 
3.1 
(DR Kongo) 82.1 
367.7 
(Sweden) 248.7 
Source: adapted from Flachwoski (2011). 
 
 
Notes 
1 The MDGs consist of eight goals, each with one or more sub goals that have been established in 2000 by 
several international organizations to be achieved by 2015. MDG 1 stands for the halving of extreme poverty and 
hunger, MDG 7 concerns ecological sustainability, MDGs 4, 5 and 6, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality and 
the combating of major diseases, such as AIDS and malaria. 
2 The WHI is based on three values: the proportion of undernourished in the population, the proportion of 
underweight children under five years old and the mortality rate among children under five years of age. 
3 Food security is defined as a state where an individual has at any time physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, affordable, safe and nutritious food. Undernourishment is an aspect of food security measured as a 
state where the human intake of energy from food is below the minimum energy requirement of the body. This 
requirement is defined by the amount of energy necessary to achieve an acceptable size by weight ratio (‘’weight 
for attained height’’) and perform light physical activity. 
Malnutrition is a broad term that includes all forms of malnutrition. It can have many different causes, including 
infections, and nutritional, and socio-cultural factors. Malnourishment encompasses both the concepts of 
undernourishment and of obesity (definition from the UNSCN, 2010). 
4 The quantity of food needed to achieve individual food security, the number of humans and their average dietary 
energy requirements can be used to determine the total amount of food needed. 
5 The estimates can be found for instance on the website www.phlosses.net  
6 Nitrogen compounds generate the environmentally harmful substances ammoniac, nitrate and laughing gas 
(nitrous oxide). 
7 Other sustainability standards like fair trade also yield positive results.  
8 This is true for the export market in general due to its strict requirements. In addition, certifications such as 
GLOBALGAP for conventional produce are almost universally in demand in the export of fresh agricultural 
produce from Africa. For example, 76% of all fruits and vegetables in the European market are GLOBALGAP 
certified (PIP, 2009). 
9 Even compensation payments that are regularly used in Latin America for carbon sinks have made little 
difference. Problems with the correct measurement of environmental services by agriculture add to the difficulties. 
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Knowing Where Organic Markets Move Next - 
An Analysis of Developing Countries in the Pineapple Market 
 
 
 
Abstract  
As consumers’ demand for organic products grows, selling organic products potentially 
opens up profitable market participation options for farmers in developing countries. This 
paper studies two aspects of profitability for the producers. It uses hedonic demand theory 
and empirical analysis to examine the relation between conventional and organic markets 
using the strongly growing pineapple market as an example. Our analysis confirms a 
nonlinear dependence of the organic market on the conventional one and a non-declining 
premium. We conclude that there is a larger potential of the organic market and hence the 
number of farmers in developing countries who can potentially benefit from growing organic 
products.  
 
Keywords: price transmission, private voluntary standards, organic agriculture, organic 
markets 
JEL classification: F14, L11, L15, O13, Q13, Q17 
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1 Introduction  
Organic market growth rates are around 10%, far higher than those of conventional markets 
and supermarkets have started offering organic food as part of their usual range of products. 
Consumer demand for organic products is concentrated in North America and Europe; these 
two regions comprise 97% of global revenues (Willer and Kilcher, 2009). Organically grown 
pineapple has also become more popular among consumers. Like other tropical fruit, it is 
grown almost exclusively in developing countries and like other organic products, organic 
pineapple earns a premium price on the market compared to conventional varieties. Hence, 
the shift from conventional to organic production might be an opportunity for small and 
middle-sized farmers to reap higher returns from their investments. Since this change, 
however, requires costly adjustments of production techniques as well as considerable costs 
for certification, several aspects of organic production need to be considered when trying to 
determine its profitability. Another important aspect of profitability that has been disregarded 
in the previous literature so far is the relation between the organic market and the 
conventional one and its likely future development. Besides a price premium for the organic 
product this includes the co-movement of the two prices. In this paper we restrict our focus to 
this price dimension of the profitability of organic production.  
The willingness to pay (WTP) a higher price for organic food based on perceived 
desirable characteristics has been well-documented. The academic literature has shown the 
existence of a, quite variable, price premium for organic food products (e.g. Boland and 
Schroeder, 2002; Huang, 1996; Loureiro and Hine, 2002; Thompson, 1998). We take a 
different approach and deduct dynamic characteristics of the demand functions from price 
behavior over time. Thereby we are able to provide more general results than by using 
survey based methods that use cross-section data based on choice experiments rather than 
on actual buying behavior over time (Huang and Lin, 2007 is an exception). Although our 
method is indirect it has the advantage of measuring what consumers are actually buying 
and paying in the marketplace when they have a choice between organic and conventional 
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produce. Despite its importance for the further promotion of organic certification in 
developing countries, this has not been studied before.  
Applying state of the art time series methods, we analyze spatial price transmission 
between conventional and organic pineapple on the European market by looking at prices for 
pineapple from Africa and Latin America respectively. Our observations not only confirm the 
existence of a non-declining price premium for organic products, the analysis also shows that 
the conventional market seems to act as a price leader for the organic market while being 
unaffected by organic price behavior. However, organic prices do not follow conventional 
prices one by one. Our results show the existence of lags and thresholds below which 
organic prices are unaffected by conventional price changes. These thresholds and the 
corresponding price adjustment behavior do not change over time, even while the organic 
niche market expands. Theoretically, this observation can be explained when the core 
demand for organic products expands faster than supply. Hence, one important implication of 
our analysis is the potential for the scalability of the organic market.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, an introduction to the market for 
pineapple is given. Then, a theoretical background for the study is presented. Afterwards, the 
price data for conventional and organic pineapple is described and spatial price transmission 
between the organic and conventional markets is analyzed using time series techniques 
such as co-integration and vector error correction models. The paper ends with a conclusion.  
 
2 The Market for Pineapple 
Pineapple is well suited for this analysis because it is a relatively homogeneous good, 
compared to, for instance coffee, where a lot of different varieties and quality grades prevail. 
This homogeneity is relevant in trade and exists because it is difficult to control for quality of 
single pineapple at low transaction costs. In the definition of Nelson (1970) pineapple can be 
seen as an experience good. 
The world market for fresh and dried pineapple1 is dominated by one variety (although 
this variety may change from time to time) and kilogram prices are relatively uniform across 
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fruit sizes and qualities. In addition, the fresh pineapple market has been recording 
exceptional growth rates: the European market for fresh and dried pineapple has grown on 
average by 19% between 2003 and 2007 (FruiTrop, 2008)2, where world pineapple 
production totals nearly 16 million metric tons. In 2007, the main consumers of fresh 
pineapples were the US (2.5 kg per capita per year), followed by the EU (2.1 kg per capita 
per year) and Japan (1.3 kg per capita per year) (FruiTrop, 2008). Measured by volume and 
value of net imports, the European Union (EU 27) is the world’s largest consumer. Fresh 
pineapple in Europe comes mainly from Latin America (around 80%) and Africa (10 - 15%, 
Figure A.3.1). The market in the United States is completely dominated by Latin American 
pineapple, complemented by some domestic production. In order to study the price 
developments of pineapple produced in various world regions, we have therefore chosen the 
European market as a case study.  
Africa had been Europe's major supplier of fresh pineapples until it was replaced by 
Central America. Up to the late 1990s, the EU market was dominated by pineapples from 
West Africa, especially from Côte d’Ivoire. Costa Rica, which was almost absent from the 
world market in the late 1980s, is now by far the largest fresh pineapple exporter to Europe 
and North America. Whereas in 2000, with 24%, Costa Rica held a lower market share in 
Europe than Côte d’Ivoire with 29%, its share of the European market for fresh pineapple has 
grown from 44% in 2003 to 73% in 2009 (Figure A.3.1). Exports from Côte d’Ivoire have 
meanwhile developed the opposite way. Being the European market leader in the 1970s, 
Côte d’Ivoire’s market share has been constantly declining since then and was around 6% in 
2009 (Figure A.3.1). Ghana is the second largest African pineapple exporter to Europe after 
Côte d’Ivoire and is expected to increase its market share. 
The rise of Costa Rica as a market leader for fresh pineapple in Europe is strongly 
linked to a new pineapple variety called MD2 that was introduced by the company Fresh Del 
Monte Produce in 1996. This variety, grown exclusively in Latin America at that time, rapidly 
took over the US market. The success of MD2 has been explained by a combination of the 
characteristics of this variety and commercial strategy (for example Fold and Gough, 2008). 
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In the early 2000s, the wave swept to Europe. The resulting brisk upward trend in MD2 
pineapple supply induced a price fall for the MD2 variety (Faure et al., 2009). By today, the 
price premium on MD2 which was up to 100% at market entry is almost non-existent. The 
formerly dominant variety, Smooth Cayenne lost market share from over 90% at the end of 
the 1980s to almost nonexistence today (Loeillet, 2004). The MD2-variety has become the 
standard variety consumed in the EU.  
The most globally traded conventional fresh tropical fruits (bananas and pineapples) 
are primarily produce in large-scale plantations owned by transnational companies who also 
engage in contractual arrangements with local producers. A few large multinational 
companies mostly control the supply of pineapples to the large retailers within a tightly 
structured supply chain. This might lead to high entry barriers for small farmer market 
participation as indicated by many researchers (e.g. Minten et al., 2009). By contrast, organic 
produce is mostly produced by smallholders and does not yet rely as much on vertically 
integrated supply chains. For developing countries with a significant share of smallholders in 
production such as Ghana, the support for diversification of exports towards niche markets 
(for example organic markets) could therefore increase the profitability of production. In niche 
markets, which tend to be smaller by definition, farmers can exercise more bargaining power 
whilst at the same time meeting the latest requirements on quality, traceability, packaging, 
and standards such as GLOBALGAP3 or organic might hold the key to good profits (Minot 
and Ngigi, 2004).  
Most organic pineapples for the EU market are produced in Ghana with an increasing 
amount coming from Costa Rica (CBI Market Survey, 2008). Unfortunately, there are no 
official trade statistics on organic products and there is no data available that shows the 
development of volumes and values of the world pineapple market divided according to 
conventional and organic products. However, it is estimated that up to 40% of total pineapple 
exports from Ghana are organic and/or fair-trade certified.  
Trade in organic food products differs from trade in other food commodities due to the 
organic certification requirement. Certification according to regulation (EC) 834/2007 and 
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(EC) 889/2008 is a prerequisite for any producer wishing to export organic produce to the 
European market. Organic certification requires producers to adopt certain environmental 
standards, most importantly to refrain from using synthetic inputs. The rapid growth of the 
organic food sector with an average growth rate of 13% between 2002 and 2006 creates 
niche market opportunities. The market value was estimated at US$46 billion in 2007 (double 
the value of 2000), and is expected to increase to US$67 billion by 2012 (UNCTAD, 2008; 
Willer et al., 2008). In the EU, it is now estimated between 2.5 and 4.5% of total food sales. 
For organic pineapples market growth has been even larger. It is assumed that the 
permission to use ethylene for flower induction in organic production in 2005 played an 
important role in the high growth rates in the organic pineapple market. Taken as a whole, 
Europe is the largest market for organic products, and although available data is very 
imprecise and often out-dated, it is assumed that this holds also for the organic pineapple 
market. According to estimations by the Sustainable Markets Intelligence Centre (CIMS), the 
European market for organic pineapple was about five times the size of the US market in 
20044. 
However, not only the growing demand makes organic cultivation attractive for 
producers. Some studies explain the growing interest in organic agriculture in developing 
countries also by the fact that it requires less financial input and places more reliance on the 
natural and human resources available (Willer et al., 2008 amongst others). Hence, it is 
worthwhile to analyse if switching from conventional to organic production might indeed 
result in higher profits for farmers. As a starting point, integration of the two markets is 
evaluated by looking at the price developments for organic compared to conventional 
pineapple. 
 
3 Theoretical Background  
Consumers who buy organic products do so because of their perceived superior attributes. 
Hedonic demand theory can help to formalize the relation between conventional and organic 
prices in order to provide an analytical framework for the interpretation of empirical results. 
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The hedonic approach disaggregates commodities into characteristics and estimates implicit 
values for units of the characteristics. The hedonic price function ݌ሺݖሻ specifies how the 
market price (݌ሻ of the commodity varies as its characteristics (z) vary (Ladd and Suvannunt, 
1976). The simple assumption behind this theory is that utility is derived from the properties 
or characteristics of goods. We focus on one attribute of interest only, the organic nature of a 
product which is assumed to be otherwise homogeneous.  
Standard maximization of a consumers’ utility function U(z, x; ߙ) subject to a budget 
constraint, where x is the commodity, and ࢻ is a vector of parameters characterizing the 
individual consumer, gives rise to a vector of demand functions for the characteristics of the 
good: 
݌ࢠ ൌ 	 ܷࢠሺࢠ, ݕ െ ݌
ሺࢠሻ; ࢻሻ
ܷ௫ሺࢠ, ݕ െ ݌ሺࢠሻ; ࢻሻ ൌ ܨ௭ሺࢠ, ݕ െ ݌ሺࢠሻ; ࢻሻ (3.1)
݌௭ denotes the vector of first derivatives of a hedonic price function with respect to its 
arguments, i.e. the vector of implicit prices of each property. If the distribution of ࢻ and z is 
known, then the hedonic price function can also be written as a function of these arguments, 
and hence the price function depends on the parameters that characterize the distribution of 
preferences and supply (Epple, 1987)5.  
Our case is a simple hedonic model, where the number of characteristics is fixed and 
z has only two values; let z = 1 if a product is organic and z = 0 otherwise. We add a time 
dimension in which the price when z=1 in time t depends on past prices of the good in both 
states (organic and conventional) and other hedonic characteristics of the good. We assume 
that the other hedonic characteristics are time invariant. Hence if organic pineapple is on 
average yellower from the outside in time t=1, we assume that this is also the case in all 
other periods. In addition, if information is imperfect, rational consumers gather information 
about a characteristic if the marginal cost of obtaining the information is smaller than or equal 
to the marginal utility it generates (Combris et al., 1997). For most consumers, it is not easy 
to judge the taste from the outside of a pineapple. Accordingly consumers may decide to 
make their choice primarily on the basis of the easily accessible characteristics, for instance 
size and certification status. This limits the number of relevant characteristics. Hence, if the 
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status of z is valuable and easy to assess, ignoring other product characteristics may not be 
a problem. These simplifications make it easier to estimate the value of the organic attribute, 
which can then be approximated by the price difference between organic and conventional 
pineapple. Furthermore, we ignore the household budget constraint because, by focusing on 
the organic pineapple price premium, we touch such a tiny part of the overall household 
budget that we can safely assume the constraint to be non-binding. Hence, we refer to the 
case in which households have identical incomes and characteristics, and different tastes. 
We do not estimate a (reduced form) hedonic model, but use it to understand the 
empirical results from the estimation of the dynamic relationship between the conventional 
and organic prices. For this purpose we derive a number of hypotheses from the above 
described hedonic price theory that can be investigated with our price transmission analysis. 
Hypothesis 1: The organic price moves along with the conventional price, but with a lag.  
This phenomenon can be explained with imperfect information. In Rosen's original 
framework, consumers and producers make their decisions on the basis of perfect 
information. This assumption is in reality often not met. In our simple example the consumer 
might not observe the prices for z=1 and z=0 at the same time and might consider it too 
costly to look for the reference product in another shop as long as the price stays within a 
certain range that is perceived as “normal”. On the other side, assuming that the wholesaler 
estimates the size of the WTP for an organic premium, he will use the conventional prices as 
reference. But he might only have knowledge about yesterday’s pineapple prices not about 
pineapple sold at the same time. FOB (free on board) prices may also be pre-fixed with the 
supplier for a certain shipload (which takes between 10 and 15 days). These two 
considerations would lead to lags in the dynamic relationship between the observed prices. 
Hypothesis 2: Cross-price elasticities are low within a certain range of price changes, and 
high when crossing a certain threshold. 
This can be represented by two related demand curves that are connected by cross-price 
elasticities. Imagine the price for the good where z=0 falls, while the price stays constant for 
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z=1. Then we assume that there is a tolerance range in which consumers do not react to this 
price change. This range exists due to imperfect information about the price difference 
between the two regimes and sluggish demand response which can be explained by habits. 
Since pineapple is a perishable non-staple food product, small price ranges will not switch, 
postpone or anticipate buying decisions. This causes low cross-price elasticities within this 
tolerance range of price changes and considerably higher ones when crossing the tolerance 
threshold. This threshold cannot be expected to be the same for all consumers, but again 
falls within a certain range, and hence a (fuzzy) jump in the elasticity is expected. Because 
markets for perishable products have to adjust fast to changes, this hypothesis should be 
reflected in prices changes. 
Hypothesis 3: The organic premium and hence the WTP for organic products depends on 
the relative size of the two markets in a non-linear way.  
When the organic market is expanding at a different speed than the conventional market, the 
premium is likely not constant over time. The demand curves shift with changing consumer 
preferences. The supply curves move to the right as more farmers start to produce 
pineapple, and the movements of the curves are interrelated, but not perfectly collinear. 
Changes in preferences affect both demand curves, but the size and timing of the effect may 
differ. We expect the demand for organic pineapple to shift faster than the demand for 
conventional pineapple, since the former market is in an earlier stage of the product life 
cycle. This may trigger several countervailing effects. 
On the one hand, the WTP for the organic attribute may decrease when the size 
difference between the two markets decreases. This would be in line with observations in 
marketing research, that the price difference between a standard product and a specialty 
product decreases when the latter becomes less rare, and therefore less special. This also 
makes sense when we separate the hedonic demand into consumer groups with different 
marginal monetary values of the organic characteristic (Ladd and Suvannunt, 1976) and 
assume that the relative WTP between groups is constant. The first consumer group that 
buys organic products is the one with the highest WTP, the second group has the second 
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highest WTP, and so on. When the market grows beyond the core market (the first consumer 
group), it can do so only by expanding into consumer groups with lower WTP for organic. 
Hence, as the organic pineapple market expands, prices for organic pineapple might drop.  
On the supply side economies of scale in production, transport (which are included 
and comprise up to 50% of import prices), distribution and marketing could also lead to 
decreasing premia due to decreasing costs that affect the supply curve.  
On the other hand, if consumer preferences for organic expand fast enough, they 
might absorb the increasing supply. When the core market for the organic attribute increases 
against an inelastic short run supply, the premium rises. In the longer run more producers 
can start producing organically and the premium will be adjusted downwards. Since 
conversion to organic takes several years, where preferences can change very rapidly, shifts 
in the supply curve occur much slower than they may in the demand curve.6  
In sum, we can derive information about the hedonic demand forces at work by 
studying the transmission between organic and conventional prices over time. The 
interaction between demand and supply for the organic attribute will determine the 
development of the organic relative to the conventional price. We have described three 
different effects: lagged response, a threshold effect, and demand and supply shifts.  
 
4 Descriptive Analysis of Price Data 
4.1 Prices for Conventional Pineapple 
Average monthly wholesale market prices in € per kg from Europe7 are used in our empirical 
analysis. As data on organic pineapple prices are neither publicly recorded, nor readily 
available from the parties involved in the trade, the data collection process was tedious, and 
we had to use a number of data sources. The data is taken from International Trade Centre’s 
market news service and from several European fruit trading companies. We distinguish 
between organic and conventional and focus on sea transported pineapple, hence exclude 
air transported pineapple8. We limit ourselves to the currently dominant MD2 variety. By 
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doing so, we deliberately exclude a number of hedonic characteristics (such as the variety) 
that might otherwise bias our results.  
The data could be obtained from the two dominant regions of origin for fresh and 
dried pineapple in Europe, Latin America (in our dataset - as in reality - mainly Costa Rica 
and less dominant Ecuador) and West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo). Due to severe 
gaps in the data for single destination countries, the monthly prices for conventional 
pineapple were averaged over all destination countries for each of the two regions of origin. 
Through this averaging, a conventional time series over the period January 2001 to July 
2011 could be obtained. The data for organic pineapple prices covers the period September 
2007 to August 2011. In this section, the time series for organic and conventional prices is 
analyzed using descriptive and graphical methods separately and jointly. Whenever we 
examine both prices jointly, we restrict ourselves to the shorter period (2007 – 2011). 
Nevertheless showing the longer time series for conventional pineapple allows us to explain 
some general trends.  
The evolution of prices over the last 10 years for conventional pineapple from the 
three sample countries is shown in Figures 3.1-3.3. There is a general trend towards lower 
pineapple prices observed in the market. The widening gap between volumes and values of 
EU pineapple imports in Figure 3.1 makes the fall in prices in general for pineapple clear. 
Whereas the volume of pineapple imports has more than doubled since 2003, the value of 
pineapple imports has increased only by about 50%. 
We then look at the prices in more detail. Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of prices 
over the last 10 years for conventional pineapple from the two major origins. The graph, 
which includes only sea-freight MD2 pineapple, shows clearly the strong downward trend in 
its price until 20059. The price development for both regions of origin is similar. However, up 
to 2007 the price for African pineapple was consistently lower than for Latin American 
pineapple. According to information obtained through interviews with experts in Europe in 
September 2009 and Ghanaian producers, this fact is attributed this to the initial difficulties 
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with the cultivation, and thus the quality, of the MD2 variety in West Africa. In addition, Costa 
Rica had a first mover advantage.  
Figure 3.3 shows the development of organic pineapple prices. The graph right of the 
vertical line in Figure 3.2 corresponds to the period that organic pineapple data was available 
data for. During this period the price for conventional pineapple stabilized around a mean of 
0.83 (0.15) €/kg for African and 0.79 (0.13) for Latin American pineapple and 1.34 (0.23) €/kg 
for African organic and 1.29 (0.19) for Latin American organic pineapple. Standard deviations 
are in parenthesis and the differences between the origins are not statistically significant. 
There are seasonal fluctuations in pineapple prices with usually low prices early in the year 
and in (European) summer and high prices around Christmas and Easter.  
 
4.2 Organic Premia 
Organic certification is a value-addition method. In fact, organic products are usually sold at 
significantly higher prices than conventional products. According to CBI (2008) organic 
products generally fetch price premia of between 15 and 25% and numerous scientific 
studies have also shown the existence of price premiums for organic products (e.g. Teisl et 
al., 2002; Nimon and Beghin, 1999; Bjorner et al., 2004). 
With regard to the potential benefits of organic farming for producers, an important 
question is if such price premia can be sustained in the long run or if they will vanish, as in 
the case of the MD2 variety. The recent developments in typical agricultural commodities like 
wheat or milk show that the price premium for organic products seems to be relatively 
constant10. Whether this is a temporary development or a long-term trend depends on 
changes in supply characteristics and in consumers’ perception about the value added by the 
organic certification label (hypothesis 3). 
The data shows that, for the period from September 2007 to July 2011, price premia 
have fluctuated between €0.14 and €1.02 with mean (standard deviation) of €0.51 (0.20) 
respectively on average (Figure 3.4)11. A declining trend cannot be observed over this period. 
This might tell us which forces are at work with respect to hypothesis 312. The comparison of 
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the price behavior in Figure 3.4 also shows that the premium is far from stable over the 
observed time period. Obviously the two curves are interdependent. In this context we should 
take note of a particularity of the pineapple market. The supply of conventional pineapple is 
highly dependent on harvests in Latin America, especially in Costa Rica (see section 2 
above), whereas organic pineapples are reported to come from a variety of source countries. 
Hence, for instance weather conditions or new plant diseases in Latin America would 
influence the two markets differently. This is unobservable without information about such 
supply shocks. However apart from this, there are potentially market inherent explanations 
for these fluctuations, which will be studied in the next section, the econometric study of price 
transmission. 
 
5 Econometric Analysis of Spatial Price Transmission 
The notion of price transmission is used in different contexts in the literature. First of all, 
some authors test for price transmission within the value chain of a product. For example, it 
is analyzed if the world market price of a commodity is transmitted to domestic producers. 
Other authors are interested in the difference of prices between different markets within one 
country, the so-called spatial price transmission. In this paper however, we study spatial 
price transmission between the markets for organic and conventional pineapple from Latin 
America and Africa in the European market. We do not use panel data methods, since there 
are only two regions for which data are available, which can arguably be hardly called a 
panel. As a result there is no information loss from analyzing the two regions separately. 
We test the hypothesis that prices in the organic market are dependent on prices in 
the conventional market due to its dominance in size (hypothesis 1). Secondly, we analyze if 
small and large price changes have different effects on the respective other price (hypothesis 
2). Finally, we explore if such a possible integration between the two markets decreases or 
increases over time as a result of the growth of the organic market and possible supply and 
demand shifts (hypothesis 3).  
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When analyzing price transmission, different price series are usually regressed on 
each other in order to find a possible relationship between them. However, if the time series 
are non-stationary, it might be the case that a relationship is established even though the 
series are independent from each other as shown by Granger and Newbold (1974). In order 
to avoid these spurious regressions in case of non-stationarity, many authors have used 
cointegration techniques to study price transmission and long-run relations between different 
prices (for example Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004 and Abdulai, 2000). 
Rapsomanikis et al. (2003) also use cointegration methods and error-correction models, and 
develop a comprehensive framework to test for the price transmission between local coffee 
markets of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda and the international market.  
 
5.1 Unit Root Tests  
As in Rapsomanikis et al.’s framework, we start our analysis by testing prices in the organic 
and conventional markets for unit roots. As explained above, this is important in order to 
avoid spurious regressions when studying spatial price transmission. The time series of the 
two regions of origin are tested separately.  
For the individual time series unit root tests, the traditionally employed Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) test has been used. However, it has recently been documented that this 
test performs badly in the presence of small samples as the ones used in this paper. In 
addition, the ADF test has low power in distinguishing highly persistent stationary processes 
from non-stationary processes and the power of these unit root tests diminishes as 
deterministic terms are added to the test regressions. Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) 
have proposed an alternative test that addresses the above shortcomings and that has also 
been used to test for unit roots in the variables. For this DF-GLS test the data is first de-
trended using generalized least squares. In order to employ the tests, it is necessary to 
determine the optimal number of lags of the prices to be included. One approach often 
employed is to use the Schwartz or the AIC criterion. However, as shown by Ng and Perron 
(2001), in the presence of large negative moving-average components of the error term, 
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these information criteria usually choose a lag length that is too short. This in turn leads to 
size distortions and hence overrejection of the null hypothesis. Ng and Perron (2001) 
propose a modified version of the AIC (MAIC) that improves on these problems. In the 
analysis below both the Schwartz criterion as well as the MAIC are employed.  
As is visible from Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2, the time series for the prices of 
conventional pineapple from Latin America are clearly I(1). This is largely supported by both 
the standard ADF test as well as the modified DF-GLS test. For African conventional 
pineapple the case is less clear. Only when using the MAIC criterion for lag length selection 
the time series might be I(1), but the results of the tests point generally toward stationarity13.  
The unit root test results for organic prices are similar but clearer. Latin American 
pineapple prices have one unit root and African pineapple prices seem to be stationary. 
Hence, we test Latin American pineapple for cointegration next. Since African pineapple 
prices are presumably stationary there is no need to test for cointegration.  
 
5.2 Analysis of Cointegration and Price Dynamics between Markets  
Since both Latin American price series are integrated of order one we test for cointegration. If 
the linear combination of the two time series is stationary, it would describe the long-run 
relation between the two variables. The number of cointegrating vectors in the system is 
determined using the Johansen test. We consider the cases without a constant or trend and 
with a constant in the cointegrating relationship because the series do not exhibit an 
apparent trend when plotted in levels (over the period 2007 to 2011, see Figure 3.4). The 
results are illustrated in Table A.3.5. There is clearly one cointegrating vector. We then test 
for granger causality. Table A.3.6 shows that Latin American conventional prices granger 
cause organic prices, that is lags of conventional prices improve the forecast of organic 
prices but not vice versa. We expected the conventional market to act as a leader due to its 
dominance in size; hence this result confirms our a priori expectations. The results on 
cointegration mean that there exists a long-run relation between the conventional and 
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organic Latin American pineapple prices and a linear combination of the two prices that is 
stationary. 
For African pineapple prices, since they are stationary, we do not test for 
cointegration. Even though we would be able to analyze the data on African pineapple in 
levels, for reasons of comparability we use the same models as for Latin American 
pineapple. 
Let p = (pc po) where pc and po are the conventional and organic prices respectively. 
Then there exists β such that βp is stationary. Then, the long-run relation between the two 
prices has to be taken into account by a cointegrated version of the VAR. Therefore, the 
following vector error correction model (VEC) has been applied in our analysis: 
 
(3.2) 
 
∆ is the difference operator, c indicates a constant, pct-i and pot-i indicate the ith lag of pct, and 
pot, i describes the short-run relation among pt and the ith lag, and =β, where β is the 
cointegrating vector defined above and  measures the speed of adjustment of the two 
prices to deviations from their long-run relation. All variables are transformed into natural 
logarithms. In order to employ this approach, the optimal lag length for the differenced price 
vector has to be determined. Akaike and Schwarz’s Bayesian and Hannan and Quinn 
information criteria were used to determine the optimal number of lags to include in the 
cointegrated VAR. All of them suggested that estimating the model by using one lag was 
optimal. Therefore, the model above with only one lag has been estimated. Results are 
reported in Table 3.1. The cointegration equation for Latin American prices is given by: 
co pp 089.0273.0   (3.3)
This represents the long-run relation between the two Latin American prices. 
Estimating the VEC model indicates that a price increase in the conventional market, which 
generates a deviation from this long-run relation between the two prices, generates a price 
increase in the organic market, whereas an equivalent price increase in the organic market 
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produces no significant change in the price for conventional pineapple. We see differential 
responses to price changes between the two markets in the sense that organic prices do not 
respond in the same way to changes in conventional prices as conventional prices to 
changes in organic prices14. 
Considering the short-run dynamics, 1 cp  has significant effects on both cp  and 
op . The cross-price elasticity of current organic prices with respect to lagged conventional 
prices is 0.36 for Latin America and 0.38 for Africa (i.e. a one percentage change in 
conventional prices changes organic prices by 0.38%). This effect is larger than the effect of 
the organic price AR term (0.28 in Africa, not significant in Latin America). The highest and 
most significant effect is of lagged on current conventional prices. On the other hand, lagged 
organic prices do not have a significant effect on conventional prices. Hence, both the 
adjustments to deviations from the long-run equilibrium as well as the short-run adjustments 
suggest that organic prices are strongly influenced by conventional price movements, 
whereas this is not true in the opposite direction. This confirms our hypothesis 1 that the 
conventional market acts as a price leader for the organic one. 
Although our results suggest that organic prices follow prices in the conventional 
market, there is no reason to believe that this relation is linear. Niche markets might change 
at a different speed than the main market for various reasons (see hypothesis 3). Hence, the 
following section investigates the possibility of a non-linear relation with a threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) model and thereby tests hypotheses 2 and 3.  
 
5.3 Testing for Nonlinear Price Dynamics between Conventional and Organic 
  Markets  
Previous studies explained non-linearities by transaction costs of spatially separated markets 
for the same good (e.g. Baulch, 1997; Fafchamps, 1992; Sexton et al., 1991). Unlike in these 
studies, in our example transaction costs are not the result of costs and risks associated with 
trade between such separated markets and the speed of adjustment is not necessarily 
dependent on the traders’ access to market information. At the wholesale level information 
about prices in conventional markets is readily available. And we have found out that organic 
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prices follow the price in the main market (that is the conventional market) and not vice 
versa.  
In our case, thresholds may exist when consumers see conventional and organic 
pineapple as two different products. This may happen when there is a physical separation - 
still a considerable part of organic pineapple is traded by way of organic specialty markets as 
opposed to mainstream food multinationals - or when marketing and branding efforts of 
companies are successful. A threshold also exists due to the switching behavior of 
consumers: when the price difference between the organic and the conventional pineapple 
increases beyond the willingness to pay for an organic pineapple, then the consumer may 
switch and buy a conventional pineapple instead, and vice versa.  
The organic premium is not constant over time (Figure 3.2). If hypothesis 2 is correct, 
it is possible that due to a certain willingness to pay for organic products relative to 
conventional goods, organic prices only respond to movements in conventional prices when 
the difference between these two prices exceeds a certain threshold. On the supply side, 
both thresholds and non-immediate adjustment can be caused by differences in competitive 
structures: a small number of fiercely competing food multinationals in the conventional 
market versus a larger number of smaller competitors and limited possibilities consumers to 
compare prices in the niche market. In addition, if conventional prices vary as a result of 
changing supply conditions from Costa Rica, organic prices might not adjust or not as much. 
The possibility of a threshold would in this case be owed to menu costs and competitive 
structures.  
In addition, the size of thresholds themselves may vary over time with the relative 
WTP of consumers for organic over conventional products. As stated in hypothesis 3, the 
threshold may vary when cross-price elasticities change over time.  
In this paper, we follow the analysis by Van Campenhout (2007) who uses a 
threshold autoregressive model to test for integration of several Tanzanian maize markets 
over time. As explained by the author, the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model can be 
preferred over a parity bounds model (PBM) because the TAR model allows separating the 
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two market components of transaction costs and speed of adjustment of prices. Moreover, it 
allows for time-varying thresholds. To analyze possible non-linearities in the relation between 
organic and conventional prices, we estimate the following TAR model: 
 
 out mt-1 + t mt-1  > θ 
 ∆mt =  in mt-1 + t - θ ≤ mt-1 ≤ θ 
 out mt-1 + t mt-1 < -θ 
(3.4)
 
where mt = pc,t – po,t is the difference between the conventional and the organic price 
in period t, t ~ N (0, ²). in  and out measure the adjustment speed, the change in the price 
difference as result of the previous difference itself, within the band created by the threshold 
θ and outside this band respectively. If the hypothesis of a threshold was wrong, these two 
parameters should be the same.  
It is possible that the threshold is not constant but changing over time. To incorporate 
this possibility, the threshold θ can be modeled as a function of time: 
 
(3.5) 
where t ϵ (0,T). 
In addition, we will allow for a time trend in the adjustment parameters in  and out.  
These two extensions can be expressed by the following second model: 
 
 out mt-1 + ´out t mt-1 + t mt-1  > θt 
 ∆mt =  in mt-1 + ´in t mt-1 + t - θt ≤ mt-1 ≤ θt 
 out mt-1 + ´out t mt-1 + t mt-1 < -θt 
(3.6)
 
To estimate these two models, the data was converted into first differences. Data in 
this form was stationary for all the time series. To determine the threshold parameters θ, θo 
and θT, a grid search over all possible values has been performed. Furthermore, according to 
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the hypothesis that prices only respond if the difference between them is large enough, in is 
set to zero in the analysis.  
The results are shown in Table 3.2. The threshold is at 63% (Latin America) and 53% 
(Africa) of the average differenced price in the simple TAR model, confirming hypothesis 2. 
This number is quite high, but one should remember that the price changes are rather small 
compared to the absolute value of the price. When including time trends, thresholds for Latin 
American pineapple stay the same and thresholds for African pineapple increase from 46% 
to 61%. On the other hand, above the thresholds, adjustment speeds (ρ) are almost 
unaffected by the inclusion of a trend and the coefficients that measure the interaction 
between adjustment and time are not statistically significantly different from zero. The 
adjustment speeds in the model without time trends outside the band formed by theta are -
0.335 (Latin America) and -0.479 (Africa), which imply a half-life of 1-2 months. In the model 
with time trends the adjustment speeds outside the band are -0.365 (Latin America) and -
0.350 (Africa), which imply a half-life of 1.350 (Latin America) and 1.609 (Africa) months, not 
very different from the regression without trend. Hence, there is no evidence for an 
overestimation of half-lives and underestimation of adjustment speeds by simple TAR 
models as stated by Van Campenhout (2007). The results indicate that over time there is not 
much change in thresholds below which no adjustment of organic prices to conventional 
price changes takes place. This implies that these markets do not become more integrated 
and cross-price elasticities remain indeed constant over time. Adjustment speeds also 
remain unchanged, which suggests that neither market information nor competitive 
structures change. Hence, hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed.  
There is also no indication that the premium on organic pineapple is bound to 
decrease. However, since our database covers only four years, this rather indicates that 
more research should be done to answer this question when more data is available than a 
strong rejection of the hypothesis. Still, overall these results indicate thresholds in price 
responses that did not change significantly over the past four years, and there is also no 
difference in regions of origin. These results may help farmers, traders, retailers, and 
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agencies promoting organic certification to better understand the market and predict future 
price movements. The availability of more data over time will improve the results. 
 
6 Conclusions 
As the demand for organic products is growing, this paper has tried to shed light on the 
longer-term profitability of organic production. Taking hedonic demand theory as basis, we 
empirically analyzed spatial price transmission between organic and conventional pineapple 
on the world’s largest organic market Europe as a case study. The analysis is set up with a 
development perspective since organic products in general and organic pineapple in 
particular are niche markets that exhibit premium prices. As a result, organic production is 
currently promoted as a valuable agricultural alternative for developing countries. Our results 
imply that the conventional market acts as a price leader for the organic one. While prices for 
conventional pineapple are independent of organic prices, organic price movements are 
responding to their conventional counterparts. However, threshold analysis indicates that 
organic prices only react to changes in conventional prices if these changes are sufficiently 
large. In addition, this threshold does not change over time. Hence, despite an expanding 
organic niche, market integration does not increase. Our observations also do not show an 
upward or downward trend for the organic price premium in the pineapple market. When 
there is neither more integration, nor a declining price premium to be observed, while the 
organic market is expanding faster than the main market, this happens, according to theory, 
only when the core market expands faster than supply. One important implication of this 
observation is the potential for the scalability of the organic market. Accordingly, these 
results suggest that organic production can indeed be a profitable alternative for small 
farmers in developing countries, and it is likely to remain so in the near future. Furthermore, 
being founded in hedonic demand theory allows this analysis to be applied to other similar 
niche-main market situations. Other environmental or ethical certifications such as Fair trade 
may provide a very similar context.  
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However, some questions remain to be analyzed. In order to understand price premia 
and their behavior in more detail, future research might investigate what part of the price 
premium can be attributed to the organic nature and what part to other product 
characteristics such as quality using hedonic demand models. We have deliberately chosen 
a relatively homogeneous experience good for our analysis, assuming that it is relevant for 
search goods as well. However this remains to be shown. In addition, longer time series data 
would help to strengthen the analysis of the sustainability of the organic premium on the 
producer and retail level and may be able to show when the current dynamics of demand 
and supply shifts are likely to change in the future. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 3.1: Volumes and values of EU pineapple imports 
 
Source: Eurostat Comext 06/06/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Wholesale prices for conventional pineapple from different origins 
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Figure 3.3: Wholesale prices for organic pineapple from different origins 
 
Source: International Trade Centre’s market news service and European fruit trading 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: The price premium for organic pineapple  
 
Notes: Prices are average monthly European wholesale prices in €/kg. 
Source: International Trade Centre’s market news service and European fruit trading 
companies. 
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Table 3.1: Estimation Results for VEC  
 LATIN AMERICA AFRICA 
 
cp  op  cp  op  
1 cp  -1.191*** (0.153) 0.361*** (0.153) -1.07*** (0.16) 0.382** (0.196) 
1 op  -0.084 (0.149) -0.084 (0.149) 0.120 (0.215) 0.283* (0.155) 
c -0.001  
(0.025) 
0.005  
(0.025) 
0.001 
(0.029) 
0.003  
(0.035)   -0.580*** (0.172) 0.073 (0.323) -0.497*** (0.197) 0.150 (0.236) 
     
Test results     
R² 0.428 0.174 0.428 0.174 
F-statistic 6.988** 3.181* 6.988** 3.181* 
Log Likelihood 30.87  16.57 
LM-Test (p-values) for 
autocorrelation, lag 1 0.252 0.511 
                         lag 2 0.413 0.508 
Notes: pc is the conventional price, po is the organic price in natural logarithms. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Estimation results for TAR model and TAR model with trend 
 LATIN AMERICA AFRICA 
 TAR model TAR model with 
trend 
TAR model TAR model with 
trend 
  0.630  0.530  
)1( t   0.630  0.460 
)34( t   0.630  0.610   -0.335*** 
(0.095) 
-0.365* 
(0.197) 
-0.479*** 
(0.102) 
-0.350* 
(0.194) 
t*    -0.012 
(0.008) 
 -0.007 
(0.008) 
half-live 1.697 1.350 1.064 1.609 
N 46 46 46 46 
R² 0.217  0.258  0.330 0.352  
F-statistic 12.47*** 7.65*** 22.13*** 11.93*** 
Notes: Dependent variable is the change between two periods in the price difference between the two market 
prices. All models are estimated without a constant. Rho (  ) denotes the adjustment parameter on the lagged 
price difference expressed as the percentage of mean price in the two markets, theta ( ) is the threshold 
expressed again as the percentage of mean price in the two markets and t is a time trend. The TAR models are 
three regime symmetric models with unit root behavior imposed within the band formed by the thresholds. The 
thresholds are identified through a grid search over candidate thresholds with as model selection criterion the 
minimal sum of squared residuals. As starting values for the thresholds, at least 20% of the observations were 
either within or outside the band formed by the thresholds. Half-lives are expressed in months and in brackets 
when they are based on a coefficient that was estimated not significantly different from zero. Standard errors are 
in brackets. *, ** and *** denote parameter estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance, respectively. N is the number of observations used in the estimation.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure A.3.1: European Market Shares in Fresh and Dried Pineapple 2003 and 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat Comext 
Notes:  Classification: pineapple fresh or dried, 90percent sea, 10 percent air freight, 
Varieties: Smooth Cayenne, MD2, Victoria 
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Table A.3.1: T-statistics of ADF-test for conventional prices 
  Lags by Schwartz criterion  Lags by MAIC  
   no trend trend no trend trend  
 Levels         
Latin America (1/11)a -2.476 -3.922** -1.558 0.224 
Africa (1/11) -3.617*** -4.787*** -3.501** -3.031* 
First Differences     
Latin America (1/6)a -11.056*** -11.047*** -6.300*** -6.433*** 
Africa (3/3) -9.856*** -9.878*** -9.856*** -9.878*** 
Note: (***) indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level, (**) at the 5% 
significance level, (*) at the 10% significance level. a In brackets are the number of lags by Schwartz/ 
MAIC criterion. 
 
 
 
Table A.3.2: Test statistics of DF-GLS test for conventional prices a 
 Lags by Schwartz criterion  Lags by MAIC  
Levels        
Latin America (1/11) b  -2.927   -0.378  
Africa (1/11) -4.455***  -1.420  
First Differences     
Latin America (1/6) b -8.662***  -2.543*  
Africa (3/3) -3.174**  -3.174**  
Note: (***) indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level, 
(**) at the 5% significance level, (*) at the 10% significance level. 
a By default, the test includes a trend.  b In brackets are the number of lags by 
Schwartz/ MAIC criterion. 
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Table A.3.3: T-statistics of ADF-test for organic prices 
  Lags by Schwartz criterion  Lags by MAIC  
   no trend trend no trend trend  
 Levels         
Latin America (1/3)a -2.915* -3.272* -1.954 -2.389 
Africa (1/1) -4.502*** -4.545*** -4.502*** -4.545*** 
First Differences     
Latin America (1/1)a -6.743*** -6.740*** -6.743*** -6.740*** 
Africa (1/1) -7.570*** -7.535*** -7.570*** -7.535*** 
Note: (***) indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level, (**) at the 5% 
significance level, (*) at the 10% significance level. a In brackets are the number of lags by Schwartz/ 
MAIC criterion. 
 
 
Table A.3.4: Test statistics of DF-GLS test for organic prices a 
 Lags by Schwartz criterion  Lags by MAIC  
Levels        
Latin America (1/3)b -2.685  -1.911  
Africa (1/1)  -3.990***  -3.990***  
First Differences     
Latin America (1/1)b -6.080***  -6.080***  
Africa (1/1) -6.843***  -6.843***  
Note: (***) indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level, 
(**) at the 5% significance level, (*) at the 10% significance level. 
a By default, the test includes a trend.  b In brackets are the number of lags by 
Schwartz/ MAIC criterion. 
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Table A.3.5: Johannsen Cointegration Test for Latin American prices 
rank  Trace statistic (5% critical value) Max. eigenvalue (5% critical value) 
    No intercept, no trend No intercept, no trend 
0  33.51 (12.53) 33.34 (11.44) 
1  0.17*** (3.84) 0.17*** (3.84) 
  Intercept                               Intercept 
0  50.62 (19.96) 41.83 (15.67) 
1  8.80** (9.24) 8.80** (9.24) 
Note: ** indicates the rank selected by a trace statistics test at 5% level. 
            *** indicates the rank selected by maximum eigenvalue statistic test at 5% level. 
 
 
 
Table A.3.6: Granger Causality Test (p-values) for Latin American prices 
cp   0.67 
op  0.07 
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Notes 
                                                     
1 Since in market statistics fresh and dried pineapple are generally grouped together, we do so too in this paper. 
2 Because the analysis is concerned with prices for fresh pineapple only, figures for processed pineapple are 
omitted here.  
3 GLOBALGAP is a private standard founded in 1997 as EurepGAP by European retailers. It is a business-to-
business standard with the aim to establish one standard for Good Agricultural Practices (GAP).Many of the large 
European retail and food service chains, producers/suppliers are members (www.globalgap.org).  
4 The US National Organic Program allowed the use of ethylene gas for flower induction in pineapple in 2002, the 
EU only in 2005. It is therefore expected that this difference is even larger today. 
5 Rosen (1974) provides a theoretical framework in which ݌ሺݖሻ is endogenously determined by the interaction 
between suppliers and demanders of the commodity. Since, without information on quantities and consumer 
characteristics, we cannot use the full model for our example, we refrain from describing it here. 
6 The production cycle for pineapple is between 11 and 18 months. Conversion to organic production takes on 
average three years. 
7 The countries included in the analysis are the following: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Holland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
8 Transport costs constitute an important factor for pineapple pricing in Europe. They account for up to 50% of the 
price for both sea and air transport (€0.38 and €0.83 respectively). Consequently, the prices for sea- and air-
transported pineapple differ greatly and are hardly comparable. Since the majority of pineapple is transported by 
sea, we focus on pineapple transported by sea. Surprisingly, sea transport costs do not differ greatly between 
Latin America and West Africa even though the former is further away from European harbors (e.g. Achuonjei, 
2003). The difference is negligible in per kilo prices and conventional and organic fruit can be transported in the 
same container. 
9 Compared to other pineapple varieties MD2 had the highest start and the strongest downward development in 
prices (see section 2). By today, the difference in prices between varieties has vanished according to International 
Trade Centre’s market news service. 
10 Information from AMI for Germany: http://www.ami-informiert.de/.  
11 Means and standard deviations for Africa are 0.50 (0.31) and for Latin America 0.50 (0.22) respectively.  
12 However, since the available time series is short and we do not have sufficient data about the development of 
the size of the two markets, our conclusions have to be taken with care. 
13 This result might reflect the problem of overrejection of the null hypothesis when using the Schwartz criterion, 
as explained above. The larger number of lags is also able to account for seasonality in the price data. On the 
other hand the large number of lags might reduce the significance of the results. 
14 We could extend the model to incorporate asymmetries in the transmission of positive price changes in contrast 
to negative ones. Apart from data constraints (short time series), this is also questionable for other reasons in this 
case. Since it would mean that price increases in conventional prices are transmitted more rapidly or slowly to 
organic prices than price decreases, the rationale behind different adjustment speeds for price increases and 
price decreases are according literature usually market power. In our case this would mean that wholesalers in 
the organic market would have the market power to asymmetrically transmit prices changes in the conventional 
pineapple market to their customers (retailers and specialty shops). As retailers often also engage in wholesales, 
this is not very plausible on aggregate level. Alternatively exporters in developing countries would have the 
market power to asymmetrically adjust organic prices when conventional ones change. This is even more unlikely 
because pineapple is a perishable fruit so exporters are dependent on selling fast. In such cases actors at the 
beginning of the value chain usually have relatively little power. The second possibility would be information 
asymmetries, that is exporters or importers having different information about market prices than wholesalers and 
retailers, which is quite unlikely in this case at least when regarding monthly data. It might be more relevant with 
price data of higher frequency. 
77
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Organic Farming in Ghana - A Good Choice for Smallholders? 
 
 
Linda Kleemann° 
February 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
° Contact: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Hindenburgufer 66, 24105 Kiel, Email: 
linda.kleemann@ifw-kiel.de.  
I would like to thank the Poverty Reduction, Equity and Growth Network (PEGNet), Gregor Louisoder 
Umweltstiftung and GTZ-MOAP Ghana for the financial support in data collection. My thanks also go 
to all interviewees for their time and to all the farmers, company representatives, and market experts 
for their constructive feedback to earlier versions of this paper. 
78
 
Organic Farming in Ghana - A Good Choice for Smallholders? 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The rapid growth of the high value certified food and drinks sector, far higher than that of the 
conventional market, creates niche market opportunities. Since organic food in general, and 
organic pineapple in particular, are strongly growing niche products that earn a premium 
price on the market compared to conventional varieties, organic certification is increasingly 
promoted in many developing countries as a valuable alternative for smallholders, as well as 
a solution to environmental and health problems related to chemical input use. Using the 
case of the pineapple sector in Ghana as an example, this paper sheds light on the feasibility 
and profitability of organic small-scale production for the farmer. In addition we study the use 
of organic and soil fertility enhancing production methods among conventional and organic 
smallholders. We find that, even though smallholders tend to have quality problems with their 
fruit and large farms benefit from economies of scale, production for the export market is a 
realistic option for both organic and conventional smallholders. The results suggest a positive 
effect of switching from conventional to organic production when competing on the global 
market for pineapple and farmers collect a fair share of the price premium on the retail level. 
Even more, from a theoretical perspective, organic farmers should also be more likely to get 
into contractual relations with exporters. However, due to a lot of variation in the use of 
organic production methods, it is less clear if environmental problems can be solved by 
promoting organic production for smallholders. The results are set into perspective with 
relation to the debates on small versus large farms, and the selection effect of private 
voluntary standards. 
 
Keywords: private voluntary standards, organic agriculture, trade in organic products, 
GLOBALGAP, value chain analysis 
JEL classification: F14, L11, L15, O13, Q13, Q17 
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1 Introduction 
The rapid growth of the organic food and drinks sector with an average growth rate of 13% 
between 2002 and 2006, far higher than that of the conventional market, creates niche 
market opportunities for farmers. More specialized stores for organic products are opening 
up and supermarkets started offering organic food as part of their normal range of products. 
Consumer demand for organic products is concentrated in North America and Europe; these 
two regions comprise 97% of global revenues (Willer and Kilcher, 2009). Within this sector, 
pineapple is a case in point for our study, because fresh pineapple, like other tropical fruit, is 
grown mainly in developing countries, where two thirds of rural people live on small-scale 
farms of less than two hectares (IFPRI, 2005). Organically grown pineapple is becoming 
more popular among consumers and certified organic pineapple exports are rapidly 
increasing since 2005.  
Pineapple is well suited for this analysis because it is a homogeneous high value 
crop, compared to, for instance, coffee where a lot of different varieties and quality grades 
prevail. Nevertheless, production of conventional pineapple is mostly dominated by big 
transnational companies that own large-scale plantations. As a consequence, it is difficult for 
small farmers to participate profitably in the market. The market for organic pineapple is still a 
niche market, which is not yet controlled by a few big companies. Like other organic 
products, organic pineapple earns a premium price on the market compared to conventional 
varieties. Hence, the shift from conventional to organic production might be an opportunity for 
small-scale farmers to reap higher returns from their investments. If viable this is interesting 
for development actors, as smallholders include the majority of the absolute poor in 
developing countries.  
Since the switch from conventional to organic production technologies requires costly 
adjustments of the land, for example, several aspects of the market need to be considered 
when trying to determine its profitability. One aspect is the size of the price premium and if it 
can persist over time. A second important aspect when studying the profitability of organic 
production is what percentage of the organic price premium received by retailers is actually 
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passed on to the producers themselves and if costs differ for the two production techniques. 
In this paper we focus on the second aspect. In doing so, it is important to fully understand 
the value chain of organic pineapple and how it differs from conventional fruit. Ghana is a 
case in point because pineapple is one of its most important non-traditional export crops and 
it is a leading supplier of organic pineapple to the European market.  
A few studies have recently found that certified organic agriculture is more profitable 
than conventional agriculture in developing countries, due to the higher price farmers receive 
for their product (e.g. Bolwig et al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Rieple and Singh 
(2010) have shown that organic production adds value throughout the production and 
processing of cotton. Other studies have explained the size of the premium and the 
willingness to pay a premium for organic products (e.g. Teisl et al., 2002; Nimon and Beghin, 
1999; Bjorner et al., 2004). We provide the missing link between these two strands of 
research by showing how the premium for organic produce at the farm level is formed and 
how it develops along the value chain.  
The paper also sets a focus to the specific conditions in Ghana. Fold and Gough 
(2008) illustrate that the export pineapple industry did provide benefits for significant 
numbers of smallholders in the South of Ghana between 1983 and 2005. Yet, since the 
introduction of a new variety a lot of smallholders have been excluded from the export 
pineapple value chain due to perceived high smallholder production costs and frequent 
contract breaching. Several cooperatives disappeared and the surviving ones were 
weakened (Fold and Gough, 2008). With regard to donor efforts to bring back smallholders 
into export production, it is central to know if this is a viable possibility. The evidence on the 
ability of smallholder cooperatives to compete in high-value international supply chains is 
mixed (see e.g. Markelova et al. 2009; Roy and Thorat, 2008; Wollni and Zellner, 2007 for 
positive and negative examples). By investigating the complete fresh pineapple value chain, 
we aim to find out if smallholders have a chance to be reintegrated into the exporter value 
chain. In addition, within the export value chain and in line with our focus on organic 
production, we investigate if it makes more sense for small farmers to invest in niche 
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markets. This analysis informs us on the efficiency and efficacy of using certifications to 
further environmental protection or producer welfare. This aspect has not been studied 
before from both the production and market perspective, despite its importance for the 
growing promotion of organic certification in developing countries. To be able to evaluate the 
profitability of organic production for smallholders, we calculate the costs and revenues of 
production for these farmers and compare them with those for conventional smallholders and 
large farms. Our results demonstrate that, contrary to a widely held opinion in Ghana, both 
organic and conventional smallholders can potentially and profitably participate in the export 
market. Among smallholder farms, organic production is more advantageous than 
conventional production, and our findings suggest that in percentage terms organic price 
premia are fully passed from retail level to Ghanaian farmers. From a theoretical perspective 
organic farmers should also be more likely to get into contractual relations with exporters.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly describe 
pineapple market trends in the world and Ghana and price developments on the conventional 
and organic market. In section 3 all stages of the value chain, from production to 
supermarket, are discussed in detail. Section 4 discusses the results with respect to three 
current debates: small versus large farms, the link to environmental effects and the selection 
effect of standards. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 The Market for Fresh Pineapple 
2.1 World Market Trends 
The world market for fresh pineapple is dominated by one variety and kilogram prices are 
relatively uniform across fruit sizes and qualities. The fresh pineapple market has been 
recording exceptional growth rates: the share of fresh pineapple in the whole pineapple 
market has risen from 12.5% in the early 1960s to 26% in 2005 (FruiTrop, 2008). In 2007, 
the main consumers of fresh pineapples were the US (2.5 kg per capita per year), followed 
by the EU (2.1 kg per capita per year) and Japan (1.3 kg per capita per year) (FruiTrop, 
2008). Fresh and dried pineapple in Europe comes mainly from Latin America (around 80%) 
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and Africa (10 - 15%, Figure 4.1). Africa had been Europe's major supplier of fresh 
pineapples until it was taken over by Central America by way of the introduction of a new 
pineapple variety called MD2. Meanwhile, the formerly dominant variety, Smooth Cayenne 
(SC henceforth), slipped to the bottom of the price spectrum for fresh pineapple and lost 
market share from over 90% at the end of the 1980s to almost nonexistence today (Loeillet, 
2004). More than 75% of all pineapple sold in the EU are now of the MD2 variety (Pay, 
2009).  
As one of the two most globally traded fresh tropical fruits (bananas being the other), 
conventional pineapples are primarily produced in large-scale plantations owned by large 
multinational food companies who also engage in contractual arrangements with local 
producers. These companies control not only the market but also the supply of pineapples to 
the large retailers within a tightly structured supply chain1. This is not yet the case for organic 
produce, which is mostly produced by smallholders and does not rely as much on vertically 
integrated supply chains. For developing countries with a significant share of smallholders in 
production such as Ghana, the support for diversification of exports towards niche markets 
(e.g. organic markets) could therefore increase the profitability of production. In niche 
markets, which tend to be smaller by definition, farmers can exercise more bargaining power 
whilst at the same time meeting the latest requirements on quality, traceability, packaging, 
and standards such as Fairtrade or organic, which might hold the key to good profits as our 
empirical analysis below suggests.  
 
2.2 The Organic Market 
Data on the European pineapple market was collected in January and February 2009 and in 
summer 2009 through structured interviews with traders, wholesalers, and retailers and a 
pilot survey of European fruit importers. Additional data comes from Eurostat, International 
Trade Centre’s market news service, and CIRAD’s market news service. Most organic 
pineapples for the EU market are produced in Ghana with an increasing amount coming from 
Costa Rica (CBI, 2008). Taken as a whole, Europe is the largest market for organic products, 
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and although the available data is very sketchy and often outdated, it is assumed that this 
holds also for the organic pineapple market. It is estimated that up to 40% of total pineapple 
exports from Ghana are organic and/or fair trade certified2.  
 
2.3 The Pineapple Sector in Ghana 
In Ghana, the pineapple industry is the most developed horticultural sector. Pineapple is a 
non-traditional export crop grown mainly in the Greater Accra, Central, Eastern, and Volta 
regions. According to the Ghana Living Standards Survey (2009) Ghana’s pineapple 
production is estimated between 120 000-150 000 tons annually. Between 2003 and 2007 on 
average 63% of Ghana’s pineapple production was exported. The current structure of the 
Ghanaian pineapple industry is characterized by rapid changes due to changing regulations 
and the shift of international demand from the formerly dominant SC variety to the MD2 
variety. As shown in Figure 4.2, pineapple exports started in the 1980s, increased rapidly 
after 2000, and decreased after 2004 due to the slow uptake of the production of the new 
variety. Pineapples from Ghana are almost entirely directed to the EU.  
Even though the Ghanaian agricultural sector is smallholder-based, the main private 
pineapple exporters are large-scale plantations that also offer contract farming to 
smallholders (so called outgrower schemes, Fold and Gough, 2008). The shift to the MD2 
variety has driven a lot of farmers, in particular smallholder-based cooperatives, out of the 
export market due to initially high costs of investment into the new variety and prevalent 
contract breaching from both sides during the breakdown of pineapple exports. Efforts by the 
government and donors are under way trying to re-link smallholders to the export market for 
fresh and processed pineapple. 
In 2008 the share of smallholder production in exportable pineapple was estimated to 
be 40-45% (UNCTAD, 2008). According to the Sea-Freight Pineapple Exporters of Ghana 
(SPEG), today 39% of exports of pineapple are produced by smallholders.  
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5453 hectares in Ghana where planted with organic pineapple in 2008. In addition to 
smallholders, there are two relatively large farms that produce organic pineapple for fresh 
export and several processing firms.  
To understand the profitability of organic production for smallholders compared to 
conventional and large-scale farms, as a starting point, potential revenues might be 
evaluated by looking at the development of the price premium for organic pineapple. This is 
the focus of the next section. 
 
2.4 Evolution of Prices  
Numerous scientific studies have shown the existence of price premia for organic products 
(e.g. CBI, 2008; Bjorner et al., 2004; Teisl et al., 2002; Nimon and Beghin, 1999). Using 
average monthly wholesale market prices in US$ per kg from several European destination 
countries from the International Trade Centre’s market news service and several European 
fruit trading companies, we describe the price premium over the period September 2007 to 
June 2010. Figure 4.3 illustrates that, over this period, price premia have fluctuated between 
US$0.0 and US$1.17 with a mean of US$0.76.  
However, not only the growing demand and the willingness to pay a premium for the 
product make organic cultivation attractive for producers. Some studies explain the growing 
interest in organic agriculture in developing countries also by the fact that it requires less 
financial input and places more reliance on the natural and human resources available (e.g. 
Willer et al., 2008). Hence, it is worthwhile to analyze if switching from conventional to 
organic production might indeed result in higher profits for farmers. To evaluate the standing 
of organic smallholder farms in the market, an analysis of the whole value chain is 
necessary. This is done in the next sections. 
 
3 Value Chain Analysis for Ghanaian Pineapple 
Value chain analysis studies how value is added in different stages of production through 
analyzing the costs and organization of these activities (e.g. Azqueta and Sotelsek, 2007). 
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Here we use this technique to find out whether it makes sense at all to integrate smallholders 
into the pineapple export value chain and if the organic pineapple value chain is a better 
option for smallholders than the conventional one. We use value chain analysis because it 
focuses on international business organization and profitability contrary to other forms of 
agricultural production-consumption systems analyses3.  
In the literature a distinction is made between ‘buyer-driven’ and ‘producer-driven’ 
value chains. In traditional producer-driven value chains, the producers (in this case the 
farmers) dominate the industry through concentration of knowledge and capital. Agricultural 
value chains, including pineapple, are increasingly buyer-driven.4 This means that the buyer 
exercises control over the chain even in the absence of ownership (Humphrey, 2006). Buyer-
driven value chains usually have low barriers of entry in production (Gereffi, 1994). In buyer-
driven chains, the buyers, e.g. European retail chains or fruit multinationals, can dictate the 
adherence to their standards as a requirement to enter the export value chain. Certification to 
such, so-called private voluntary standards, is therefore primarily an export marketing tool 
(UNCTAD, 2006) and can be seen as a form of product upgrading. It is only worth going to 
the trouble of obtaining certification if the price obtained for the certified product exceeds any 
extra certification, production and management costs incurred compared to the local market 
price.  
 
3.1 The Post-Farm Gate Value Chain 
The data for this section was gathered from personal interviews with 26 farmers, exporters, 
exporter associations, and government agencies in Ghana in 2009 and 2010 and 14 
structured interviews with traders, wholesalers, retailers, and fruit importers in Europe. The 
data on local production and marketing was collected during two visits to Ghana in March 
2009 and from January to March 2010. Interviewees were selected for their expertise and 
knowledge of the different stages of the pineapple value chain. A semi-structured format was 
adopted, in that certain information (prices, market knowledge, farm/company size, and 
demographic and personal data) was obtained from all interviewees.  
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Figure 4.4 describes the post-farm gate value chain for Ghanaian pineapple. It is 
focused on fresh and processed export production and therefore excludes farmers that 
produce primarily for the local market. Smallholders can either sell to larger exporting 
farmers, local or exporting processors, or market women. Prices for fresh and processed 
export produce are the highest. Therefore only fruit that does not meet fresh export 
standards is sold to local processors or market women.  
The organic and conventional pineapple value chains are at first sight very similar. 
The need for certification could be assumed to be one of the main differences. However, 
more than 80% of all fresh conventional pineapples are certified under GLOBALGAP5. 
GLOBALGAP certified fresh fruit and vegetables have a 76% market share on the European 
market. In a survey of fruit and vegetable exporters, all respondent companies in Ghana 
indicated that all of their buyers had requested GLOBALGAP certification and all of them 
eventually complied with the requirement (PIP, 2009). Thus, GLOBALGAP certification has 
become a quasi-requirement for export of conventional fresh fruit. Certification under 
GLOBALGAP can therefore be considered as reactive upgrading. Contrarily, organic can be 
classified under proactive upgrading. It is a formal requirement for organic sales in Europe. 
Hence, the existence of certification does not differ between the organic and conventional 
value chains, but the nature of certification differs. The need to undergo certification and 
auditing procedures poses no disadvantage for organic producers when conventional 
farmers need to undergo comparable procedures. 
As explained above, conventional pineapples are primarily produced in large-scale 
plantations owned by a small number of transnational companies. A few multinational 
companies control the supply of pineapples to the large retailers within a tightly structured 
supply chain, such as in Costa Rica, the world market leader in fresh pineapple. This is not 
yet the case for organic produce, which is based to a larger extent on smallholders and 
medium-sized exporters. Between 11 and 40% of organic products are sold through 
specialized organic foods shops in Europe (Willer et al., 2008). The survey of the European 
market in this study confirmed the existence of two prevalent regimes. A specialty niche 
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market regime is characterized by high prices, high quality and low volumes, and comes with 
organic, fair trade, or similar certification requirements. A supermarket regime combines 
lower prices and large volumes. In this regime GLOBALGAP is a standard requirement, and 
there is certain space for organic and/or fair trade certified pineapple. Naturally this regime is 
favorable for large-scale farms. Several exporters in Ghana mentioned that organic premia 
are higher for small volumes, which supports the notion of the two regimes. The export value 
chains reflect these regimes. The majority of organic exporters from Ghana sell directly to 
organic specialty shops or supermarkets. In the conventional value chain most exporters sell 
on consignment to intermediaries (Suzuki et al., 2008), which then sell to supermarkets. This 
difference is still existent despite the trend in Europe towards direct sourcing by 
supermarkets and the increasing number of fruit multinationals that are opening up their own 
organic product lines.  
Smallholder cooperatives are linked to exporters that deal with retailers 
(supermarkets, specialty shops) and/or intermediaries. In the conventional chain a common 
set-up is one characterized by an intermediary with links to a retailer, who in turn is linked 
with a limited number of preferred suppliers (exporters). In both value chains, but more so in 
the conventional chain, the typical exporter in the developing country is also a producer for a 
fraction of his exports. The rest is bought from his contracted smallholder cooperatives or 
middle-sized farms. Some exporters do not engage in production at all, but only buy from 
producers with whom they have developed a relationship of trust. Exporters ensure that the 
product meets the private standards’ requirements and quality standards set by the 
intermediary or retailer and the volume and delivery schedule set by the foreign buyer. They 
thus have a key role in integrating small and medium-sized producers into export markets 
(Fulponi, 2007), in addition to managing volumes and guaranteeing quality and food safety. 
Because this role is central, we study exporters, in addition to producers, in more detail 
below.  
We take into account three farming models: small-scale organic, small-scale 
conventional and large-scale conventional. Small-scale farmers are supported by donors and 
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NGOs because they are assumed to be the weakest part of the chain and the one with the 
highest potential poverty impact. We therefore focus on this group. More precisely, we 
analyze if small-scale organic producers can be integrated into the international value chain 
at all and if they do better in the organic than in the conventional market in order to assess 
the potentials and intervention points for this group of farmers. For simplicity, since there are 
many types of processing, we reduce the analysis to fresh export only when studying post-
farm gate costs and prices.  
 
3.2 Production  
Pineapple production takes 12-18 months from planting to harvest, depending on the soil 
quality, water availability, and other input use. There are several factors that influence the 
production cost structure in addition to the organic or non-organic production method, in 
particular the variety planted and the size of the plantation. Therefore we distinguish between 
varieties, farm sizes, and production methods in the production cost calculations. Detailed 
calculations and explanations of the data used are in the appendix.  
First we compare different varieties and farm sizes. MD2 has higher production costs than 
SC or Sugarloaf varieties (Tables A.4.1 and A.4.2). Production on larger farms is known to 
be more input intensive, and economies of scale are evident in fixed inputs and planting 
costs. Nevertheless, overall production costs are lower on small-scale farms due to lower 
input and labor costs. 
Next we compare production costs for MD2 and SC on small farms only. Total costs 
for organic MD2 production is higher than that for conventional production, whereas for SC 
production the opposite is true. As explained above, MD2 is a relatively new variety in Ghana 
and knowledge on organic production is still largely lacking. This is very likely one reason for 
the higher cost. It is noteworthy that the production of one kilogram organic SC comes at 
almost half the cost of one kilogram conventional SC. In detail, suckers, planting, and labor 
turned out to be more costly on organic farms, whereas in particular sucker treatment, and 
fertilizers and pesticides are less expensive. 
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In a 2009 survey of Sub-Saharan fruit and vegetable exporting companies, the impact 
of private voluntary standards certifications was identified as the second most important 
factor affecting export business over the period 2000 to 2007, after freight costs (PIP, 2009). 
So far we have ignored the costs for such certifications. The costs of certification are the 
costs of implementing the standard, i.e. compliance costs, and the costs of the actual 
certification, i.e. fees and costs for certifying agencies. Developing-country products are 
mostly certified by foreign agencies that have their headquarters in the target markets. This 
is true for all prevalent certifiers in Ghana. Both organic according to EU regulation (EC) 
834/2007 and (EC) 889/2008 and GLOBALGAP have group certification options for 
organized farmer cooperatives. Nevertheless, most certifications favor large farms6. But 
because the small farms in our sample get support from donors or buyers to make up for this 
disadvantage we estimate certification costs at 1% of total production costs (Table A.4.2, see 
appendix for explanation of the estimation).  
Figure A.4.1 exemplarily compares the production costs for MD2 on small farms in 
detail. It is evident that suckers and fertilizer constitute the most important cost factors for 
MD2 production, adding up to over 40% of production cost. As expected, in organic 
production labor cost is higher than in conventional production. Overall, organic production is 
cheaper than conventional production for smallholders (on average US$0.085 per kg as 
compared to US$0.093 per kg).  
 
3.3 Yields and Sales  
We now study the variation in yields and prices achieved. Table 4.1 shows, as expected, that 
planting densities and yields are higher on large farms than on small farms regardless of the 
variety. Comparing organic and conventional small farms, Table 4.1 demonstrates that 
planting densities are lower on organic farms except for one case, where planting densities 
are the same. Yields are lower on organic farms both in absolute terms and in relation to the 
number of plants per acre, i.e. fewer plants reach the harvest stage and their weight is lower 
on average. The most common explanation for this phenomenon is that the fertilization 
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regime is better developed on conventional farms and that pest outbreaks can be dealt with 
better. Converted into metric tons (mt) per hectare (ha), conventional yields are between 76 
and 96 mt/ha for SC and between 71 and 86 mt/ha for MD2. This is within the range of 
country average estimations by the Ghanaian Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) (50-
80 mt/ha for SC and 60-72 mt/ha for MD2) and also with international standards. Yields for 
organic fruit are 16% lower with 62 mt/ha for SC and 59 mt/ha for MD2. As pineapple is a 
perishable non-staple crop, own consumption is very limited; even for very small farms it is 
usually below two percent of harvest and includes mainly slightly damaged or overripe fruit. 
Weights of pineapple are important because first exporters only take fruit above a certain 
weight (often 1.2 kg), and second prices are often paid per box and weight determines how 
many pineapple fit into one box (commonly there are 6 to 10 pineapple per box of approx. 12 
kg).  
Local and export market prices compared in Table 4.2. Farm gate prices range from 
high to low in the following order: fresh and processed fruit exporters, market women, local 
processors. The export price given in Table 4.2 is the weighted average of the fresh export 
and processers’ price7. Generally, the fruit that does not meet export quality standards is sold 
to local processors or market women. Selling to processors has the advantage that fruit in 
various stages of ripeness, size, and also bruised fruit can be sold, whereas market women 
select the best fruit and leave the rest. Therefore large farms often prefer selling to 
processors what they cannot sell on the fresh export market, despite higher prices offered by 
market women. For small-scale farmers, the opposite is true, because of close connections, 
often through family links, to the village markets. It became clear during the interviews that 
coordination of harvesting and sales with smallholder groups is frequently a problem for 
exporters, whereas the coordination of exports among larger farms is not. Therefore large 
farms can sell a bigger part of their fruit on the export market than small-scale cooperatives 
(Table 4.2). Smaller farms do not only send a lower percentage to the export market, of this 
lower percentage a considerable amount goes into processing for export. This is a clear sign 
of inferior quality of small farmers’ produce. Significantly higher prices for fresh export 
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pineapple compared to the local market can be explained by high quality requirements, the 
need for certification, and the need to avoid side-selling by contracted cooperatives. In 
addition, this difference could also be an indicator of fruit quality. Pineapples from small 
farmers often experience gaps in the cool chain, in particular at the farm level. This may 
reduce the shelf life of the fruit and thus the price that is paid on the European market which 
reflects back to the export stage. However, the price difference may be underestimated 
because exporters might offer services to their contracted cooperatives, for instance the 
payment of certification fees (e.g. GLOBALGAP or organic), degreening or harvesting of fruit 
or the provision of loans, which they deduct from the price paid for their fruit. Although we 
tried to account for these factors during the data collection, we are aware that this is not 
always successful when the value of these services is not clear or smallholders do not relate 
their fruit prices directly to these services.  
When comparing organic and conventional fruit it is evident that export prices are 
significantly higher for organic fruit, whereas prices on the local market are similar. On 
average organic export prices are 55% higher than conventional ones. Although we have 
experienced interest in and appreciation of chemical-free fruit in Ghana during our study 
period, the market for these products is based on trust, not on certification.  
Despite these disadvantages that are associated with organic production, the profit from 
organic production is more than twice as high as from conventional production due to higher 
prices and lower or similar production costs. 
 
3.4 Ghanaian Pineapple on the International Market 
Next, we look at fresh export postharvest operations depicted in Table A.4.4. The focus is on 
the exporter who buys fruit from small-scale farmers or cooperatives. In value chain analysis, 
all inputs and outputs carry forward their inherited value, in this case the price, from the 
previous stage, in this case the field production.  
Farmers sell their fruit at the farm or at the exporter’s pack house (we call this “factory 
gate”). Postharvest costs like washing, grading, and packing, do not differ for organic and 
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conventional fruit except for waxing, which is only done only on conventional fruit. 
Postharvest loss is generally low for pineapple, due to alternative uses (processing and local 
market). Times needed to port are similar for organic and conventional fruit, but the time 
span between harvest and cooling varies a lot among farmers. Most pineapple leaves the 
producing country free on board (FOB), which means the transport cost is paid by the 
European importers, which regularly dictate the FOB price (Suzuki et al., 2008). Overall 
postharvest operations amount to 74% of the FOB price for conventional fruit and to 60% of 
the FOB price for organic fruit. Hence at this stage, the part of the value added that can be 
assigned to the farmer is higher in the organic value chain.  
Freight costs and times are the same for organic and conventional fruit at 20-30% of 
the import prices8. Equally to the farm-level, profits in the organic value chain are also higher 
at postharvest levels (i.e. exporter and importer) but not at the retail level. The lower profit at 
this level could indicate a higher fruit loss due to lower turnover in this niche market or a 
highly competitive retail market. Yet, as these costs and prices are just averages reported by 
several industry experts and traders, we have to take them as an indication rather than a 
fixed number. 
 
3.5 Price Premia along the Value Chain 
In the following paragraph, we compare the organic price premium that growers receive with 
the organic premia that consumers pay and how this premium develops over the stages of 
the value chain. The prices that producers receive for their products depend on international 
commodity prices, which are known to be very volatile (e.g. Deaton and Miller, 1996). Many 
studies have documented the fact that producers typically receive a small fraction of the 
international price. The difference is often explained by high transport and transaction cost 
and monopsonic rents captured by private traders or public marketing boards (e.g. Coulter 
and Poulton, 2001; Fafchamps et al., 2003). Nevertheless, Table 4.3 demonstrates that, in 
percentage terms, price premia are fully transmitted to local producers. In absolute terms, 
mark-ups therefore build up over the value chain. As explained above, there is no local 
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market for certified organic produce. Price premia for exported fruit are between 20 and 68%. 
On the one hand they reflect costs that occur on different levels. This is clearly visible at the 
FOB level. Transport and packaging cost comprise a large part of FOB prices. On the other 
hand they are a sign of the valuation of the organic nature of a pineapple. After import, mark-
ups stay literally the same in absolute terms. We do not expect a big difference in cost 
structures from this point on, but it has to be taken into account that our data on cost 
structures of intermediaries and retailers is very limited. At the retailing stage branding or 
reputation building effects possibly have influence on the mark-up.  
 
4 Discussion of Results 
4.1 Integration of Small Farms in the Export Value Chain 
Looking at these results, the prospects for the re-integration of smallholders in the Ghanaian 
pineapple export sector look promising, in particular for organic farmers. However production 
costs are not the only relevant factor. Swinnen et al. (2010) develop a model that tries to 
explain under which conditions contracts with smallholders successfully take place and 
benefit poor farmers. According to this model, contracts are more likely to exist if the surplus 
- i.e. the buyer’s sale price minus his costs for input supply to smallholders, production and 
supervision costs - is high. Similarly to Key and Runsten (1999), we found that production 
costs are lower for smallholders than for large farms. For labor intensive crops such as 
pineapple and labor intensive production regimes such as organic agriculture, the availability 
of relatively cheap family labor is a key factor of production costs. Consequently, smallholder 
participation in the export value chain is not hindered by high production costs. The 
alternatives are own plantation or sourcing from few large suppliers. Processors and 
exporters may not like to become dependent on a small number of sources (Swinnen et al., 
2010). Besides they could buy from varying numbers of smallholders to dampen EU demand 
fluctuations (Suzuki et al., 2008). Finally insecure land rights could force foreigners to source 
from smallholders instead of establishing their own plantations. 
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Contractual relations of smallholder cooperatives with exporters are successfully 
managed in other countries and used to be common also in Ghana. During the interviews 
with exporters and large farmers we learned that contract enforcement costs are currently 
perceived as very high. In the model by Swinnen et al. (2010) this would be reflected by very 
large supervision costs that could reduce the surplus enough that contracts do not take 
place. Hence, the re-establishment of trust is necessary for successful re-generation of 
contract farming in Ghana. 
If organic certification raises the European wholesale price more than the sum of 
input, production and supervision costs, contracts with smallholders should be more likely in 
organic value chains. The model by Swinnen et al. (2010) also states that the existence of 
many alternative sales outlets for the farmer reduces the likelihood of contracts. As demand 
for certified organic produce is almost inexistent in Ghana, organic farmers count with less 
alternative sales outlets for their organic pineapple and a large price difference if they decide 
to sell it as conventional produce. Hence contracts with organic farmers should be more 
likely.  
Furthermore organic production is often claimed to be easier to learn for small-scale 
farmers in developing countries, because it is related more closely to traditional methods. 
Since, however, sophisticated organic production using positive and negative methods is 
quite demanding, further investigations into the learning processes are needed to verify this 
claim. 
 
4.2  Standards as Barriers or Catalysts 
In this study we focused on monetary effects on the pineapple farm in a static environment. 
We did not study other aspects of livelihoods such as other income sources, market risk, 
access to credit and inputs and inequality among rural households. For instance, the contract 
farming that typically comes with smallholder certification under GLOBALGAP or organic 
may raise rural inequality, because the already better-off smallholders are recruited. For 
those farmers who are certified access to inputs and credit may increase.  
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In addition, more research is needed in order to verify if production for niche markets 
in general is a more profitable alternative for small farmers in developing countries than 
producing for mainstream markets. Apart from prices and market access, certifications 
necessary for market entry are an important factor in particular for smallholders. Lack of 
access to financial as well as qualified human capital poses important barriers for upgrading. 
This is due to the high initial investment not only in buying the necessary equipment, but also 
in learning how to produce the product according to new standards.  
Due to the large coverage and therefore potential impact there is already a debate 
over the impacts of GLOBALGAP and similar mainstream standards on developing country 
producers ongoing in the literature. The increasing standards set by developed country 
importers have been described both as a hindrance and as a chance for smallholder market 
inclusion (e.g. Henson, et al., 2010; Swinnen et al., 2010; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; 
Minten, et al., 2009; Jaffee, 2003). Certification costs are often too high and investments too 
risky for smallholders with low access to credits. On the other hand standards might channel 
the development of more advanced smallholders and offer on-farm rural employment 
opportunities for the others (Swinnen et al., 2010). Undergoing the audit procedure may 
improve farming practices and use of inputs (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Fulponi, 2007; 
PIP, 2009 for Chile, Peru, Ghana and South Africa). In addition, the necessary investments 
for the certification can lead to productivity improvements and boost the adoption of new 
technologies. Certification can tie exporters to producers, because exporters invest in the 
certification and hence in the relationship. As the process of certification is similar for smaller 
niche market standards, these arguments are also valid for the latter. In our analysis we have 
assumed that the initial compliance costs and training (for GLOBALGAP and organic 
certification) are not borne by the smallholders. This is usually the case and Raynolds (2004) 
amongst others shows that under different circumstances smallholders would not be able to 
receive organic certification. Therefore the process of upgrading is dependent on assistance. 
 
96
4.3  The Link between Environmental and Monetary Effects 
Overall, our results suggest a positive financial effect of switching from conventional to 
organic production when competing on the global market for pineapple. However, evidence 
is so far scarce on the question if organic small-scale farming is environmentally sustainable 
in a developing country-small farm context. If farmers do not maintain soil fertility using 
organic production techniques, then organic production might be more environmental friendly 
in terms of chemical use but less sustainable in terms of soil fertility levels. This is reinforced 
if there is a selection bias where small-scale farmers that are already producing in a low input 
organic way by default are more likely to apply for certification. Anecdotic evidence indicates 
this risk in several African and Latin American countries for smallholder farms. For coffee in 
Costa Rica Blackman and Naranjo (2010) show what many suspect, namely that negative 
practices such as the use of herbicides are reduced, but the effect on positive practices such 
as the use of organic fertilizer is very limited. On the other hand wider environmental benefits 
have been shown to exist for instance in Fließbach et al. (2007), but the conditions under 
which they occur are not researched well yet. The use of positive organic methods may 
affect production costs. However, since our data does not include information on the use of 
production practices we cannot report on the sustainability of the farms with the cost 
structure presented here.  
 
5 Conclusions  
As the demand for organic products is growing, this paper has tried to shed light on the 
profitability of organic small-scale production in the pineapple sector using Ghana as a case 
study. The analysis is set up with a development perspective. Since organic food in general, 
and organic pineapple in particular, are strongly growing niche products with value chains 
that are not yet dominated by large multinationals, organic production might be a valuable 
alternative for developing countries with many smallholders.  
In Ghana, many small-scale farmers, both conventional and organic, have been 
excluded from the export pineapple value chain during past world market changes. Hence, in 
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a first step we analyzed if these farmers could be re-integrated in the Ghanaian pineapple 
export sector. Even though they tend to have quality problems with their fruit and large farms 
have advantages compared to smallholder cooperatives due to economies of scale, 
production for the export market is feasible for both organic and conventional smallholders 
irrespective of the variety produced. Contrary to initial expectations, production costs are 
generally lower for smallholders. Consequently the re-integration of smallholders into the 
export value chain is not hindered by high smallholder production costs. Besides, contractual 
relations of smallholder cooperatives with exporters are successfully managed in other 
countries. In Ghana, the re-establishment of trust and closer coordination between exporters 
and smallholders are assumed to be necessary for successful re-integration. Then, both 
organic and conventional small farms as well as exporters could benefit from a higher 
percentage of export sales.  
Second, our results demonstrate that, in comparison with conventional smallholders, 
certified organic production is more profitable for smallholders and in percentage terms price 
premia on the retail level are fully passed on to farmers. Even more, organic pineapple can 
add value at each stage of the value chain, both to farmers and further up the chain. In detail, 
for smallholder production of SC pineapple, the profitability of organic production is superior 
both in terms of production costs and the price premium received. For organic production of 
MD2, the profitability depends entirely on the price premium received. Overall, our results 
suggest a positive effect of switching from conventional to organic production when 
competing on the global market for pineapple. 
The analysis has focused on monetary effects in a static environment. It is therefore 
not possible to judge on social and environmental factors from this paper. Moreover, it has 
introduced the vertical dimension of the price transmission in the organic pineapple market. 
While the results tell us already what part of the premium is forwarded to producers, it has 
not been possible to investigate how changes in prices at the retail level are translated into 
changes in farm gate prices and if prices are transmitted symmetrically or asymmetrically. 
Future research might also focus on this question.  
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In the light of the variations in the organic premium along the value chain, it would 
also be interesting to investigate in further research what part of the premium can be 
attributed to the organic nature, what part to other product characteristics such as quality, 
and if unobserved transaction costs play a role in the premium in order to fully understand 
the dynamics in this value chain. This would also help to make predictions about the 
development of the organic premium on the producer level in the future and hence its 
sustainability over time. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 4.1: European Market Shares in Fresh and Dried Pineapple 2003 and 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat Comext 
Notes:  Classification: pineapple fresh or dried, 90percent sea, 10% air freight, 
Varieties: Smooth Cayenne, MD2, Victoria 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Volume and Value of Pineapple Exports from Ghana 1987-2008 
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Source: Data from sea-Freight Pineapple Exporters of Ghana (SPEG) 
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Figure 4.3: The Price Premium for Organic Pineapple and the Prices for Organic and 
Conventional Pineapple 
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Notes: Prices are average monthly European wholesale prices per kilogram. 
Source: International Trade Centre’s market news service and European fruit trading 
companies. 
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Figure 4.4: The Value Chain for Ghanaian Pineapple 
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Table 4.1: Pineapple Yields per Acre 
  
conv. 
MD2 
(large) 
conv. SC 
(large) 
conv. 
MD2 
(small I) 
conv. 
MD2 
(small II) 
conv. SC 
(small) 
organic 
SC  
(small) 
organic 
MD2 
(small) 
Plant population (#) 24000 24000 20000 24000 20900 20000 20000 
Total yield of 
suckers planted (kg)  35000 38884 30000 33000 30760 25261.6 23800 
Av. fruit weight (kg) 1.5 1.62 2 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 
Yield % of planted 97.2 % 100.0%  75.0% 91.7%  92% 90.2% 85.0% 
Abbreviations:  #= number; SC= Smooth Cayenne variety. 
Sources: Interviews with medium or large-scale producers and data from prior studies. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Sales and Farm Gate Profits 
 
conv. 
MD2 
(large) 
conv. SC 
(large) 
conv. 
MD2 
(small I) 
conv. 
MD2 
(small II) 
conv. SC 
(small) 
organic 
SC  
(small) 
organic 
MD2 
(small) 
Total cost (US$/kg) 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.12 
Cost excl. sucker 
cost (US$/kg) 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.09 
Export price farm 
gate (US$/kg) 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.23 
Local price farm 
gate (US$/kg) 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Export sales (%) 80% 80% 80% 70% 50% 50% 60% 
Local sales (%) 20% 20% 20% 30% 50% 50% 40% 
Av. return (average 
price US$/kg) 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.17 
Profit incl. sucker 
cost (US$/kg) -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.05 
Profit excl. sucker 
cost (US$/kg) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.09 
Notes: The term “export sales” here includes selling to a fresh exporter as well as selling to an 
exporting processor.  
Source: Interviews with medium or large-scale producer-exporters and cooperatives and data from 
existing studies. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Price Premia along the Value Chain 
 % US$ 
Av.farmgate export price 68% 0.079 
Av. farmgate local price 5% 0.013 
FOB price  20% 0.100 
Price at import 49% 0.520 
Wholesale price 59% 0.590 
Retail price 33% 0.560 
Source: own calculations 
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Appendix 
Detailed production and postharvest cost analysis 
Organic production can take the same time or longer than conventional production. This 
depends on the variety, water and fertilizing regime. Many organic smallholders in Ghana 
use no or very little organic fertilizer and no organic pesticides. Weeding is then mostly done 
by hand. For the local Sugarloaf variety a field trial has shown that organic fertilizers such as 
cocoa husk or compost give better results in terms of ripeness after a certain number of 
months, levels of PH and acidity, crown size and fruit weight. This might not be true for other 
varieties, but shows that production is not necessarily faster and more efficient when using 
chemical inputs9.  
When the fruit is almost ripe, each fruit is inspected by the buyer for its Brix value10, 
shape, color, and size. If it satisfies the quality standard, the fruit is harvested. Conventional 
pineapple is degreened shortly before harvesting using a chemical to achieve uniform color 
of the fruit. Degreening is not allowed in organic production. Harvest takes places all year 
round. Pineapple is an off-season fruit on the European market with peak seasons for 
exports from October to December and from February to April/May and low exports and low 
prices in the rest of the year.  
Multiple data sources were used for the study of production costs. It consists of both 
secondary data from 11 prior studies that document data from one or several smallholder 
cooperatives or large farms and primary data that were gathered during interviews with 10 
producers during two visits to Ghana in March 2009 and from January to March 2010. Of 
these producers 20 cultivated MD2, 8 SC, 8 were considered large and 20 small. 11 
produced organic certified pineapple and 17 conventionally. From the remaining 3 studies 
only non-production data was taken, such as postharvest costs. The data on costs and 
prices was averaged over categories. Most interviews were in person and a small number 
were conducted over the phone.  
In general MD2 has higher production costs than SC or Sugarloaf varieties (Tables 
4.1 and 4.2). Sugarloaf, the variety that is traditionally produced in Ghana, is not included in 
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the calculations because it is very rarely exported fresh. In particular costs for suckers, 
sucker treatment, fixed inputs, and labor are lower in SC production. In addition, MD2 has 
been found to be a more sensitive crop that is more susceptible to pests and diseases 
compared to SC. In order to achieve the same yield MD2 is fertilized up to twice the number 
of times as other varieties. Farmers perceive SC (and Sugarloaf) to be easier to produce, 
because these varieties have been produced in Ghana for many years and therefore there is 
ample local knowledge on production. Nowadays SC is often processed into juice, fresh cut 
or dried before exporting. The switch from the SC to the MD2 variety caused major structural 
transformations in the pineapple sector in Ghana (see section 2). Even the farmers that 
successfully managed the change had initial difficulties. Exportable yields were lower and 
investment costs very high. When the MD2 variety was first introduced in Ghana, costs for 
MD2 suckers were up to 70% of production cost. Today the prices for MD2 suckers have 
decreased and vary around 20-30% of production cost. It is only necessary to buy suckers in 
the first year. Afterwards they can be extracted from the existing plants, but with decreasing 
quality of the planting material over time. Therefore costs that include costs for suckers can 
be interpreted as initial costs, whereas all other costs occur every planting period11. 
In Table A.4.1 we compare small and large-scale production for MD2 and SC. For 
simplicity of exposition, we use only data from conventional farms in this table. There are two 
columns for conventional MD2 production. This is because the data comes from two very 
differently managed cooperatives. Therefore, we did not want to average over two such 
different production management systems. Also, there are only two relatively large organic 
MD2 pineapple farms in Ghana. Of both data is very erratic. This is however not a big issue 
as our main interest is in small farms. In this table, we are interested in the possible 
advantages large-scale production due to economies of scale (bulk purchasing of inputs, 
mechanization, etc.) and modern, professional farm management. On the other hand, family 
labor, which is typically employed on small farms, is habitually characterized through higher 
intrinsic motivation and dependability and may be cheaper to employ (Swinnen et al., 2010). 
We assume that this applies in the same way to both organic and conventional farms. 
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Production on larger farms is known to be more input intensive, whereas smallholders often 
practice low-input production. This is reflected in considerably higher costs for chemical 
inputs (i.e. fertilizer, pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides). Economies of scale are evident 
in fixed inputs and planting costs. Nevertheless, overall production costs are lower on small-
scale farms due to lower input and supervision costs and cheap and easily available family 
labor12. 
 
Table A.4.1: Production Cost Comparison of Large versus Small-Scale Production 
Production cost (US$/kg) 
conv. MD2 
(large) 
conv. MD2 
(small I) 
conv. MD2 
(small II) 
conv. SC 
(large) 
conv. SC 
(small) 
Land lease  0.0005 0.0003   0.0015 
Suckers 0.0229 0.0241 0.0336 0.0132 0.0122 
Sucker treatment 0.0010 0.0010 0.0031 0.0010 0.0000 
Land preparation 0.0315 0.0084 0.0061 0.0053 0.0108 
Planting 0.0017 0.0019 0.0011 0.0012 0.0061 
Chemical & organic inputs 0.0532 0.0322 0.0320 0.0666 0.0316 
Labor cost  0.0205 0.0236 0.0096 0.0055 0.0042 
Fixed inputs  0.0110 0.0149 0.0110 0.0078 0.0096 
Certification 0.0014 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 0.0008 
Total cost  0.1432 0.1077 0.0978 0.1016 0.0768 
Cost less sucker cost 0.1204 0.0836 0.0642 0.0883 0.0647 
Notes: There is no data for land lease for large farms, because all of these plantations in our sample 
were owned by the farmer and we did not get data on the depreciation of the purchase price. 
Sources: Interviews with medium or large-scale producers and cooperatives and data from prior 
studies. 
 
Table A.4.2 contains production costs for MD2 and SC on small farms only. We can see that 
the total costs for organic MD2 production is higher than that for conventional production, 
whereas for SC production the opposite is true.  
Suckers, planting, and labor are more costly, whereas sucker treatment, and 
fertilizers and pesticides are less expensive on organic farms. All of the organic cooperatives 
covered in the survey use some organic fertilizer, but we are aware that there are organic-
certified farmers that do not use any organic inputs. Generally organic fertilizer use is less 
costly than synthetic fertilizer13. Ghana imports all its synthetic fertilizer, which raises the 
price compared to organic fertilizer that can be sourced locally. Consequently, the high cost 
of fertilizer is owed to the high international and domestic transports costs. Own compost and 
manure, processed organic fertilizer or debris from local processing of agricultural products, 
such as cocoa husk, is used in organic production. As large amounts may be needed, 
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transport is often the biggest cost. Currently the use of leftovers from processing is a popular 
option. However, if more and more farms switch to organic, it remains to be seen if enough 
organic material for widespread organic production is available in the country.  
Costs of certification to private voluntary standards are estimated from certifier and 
farm level data. The costs of certification are the costs of implementing the standard, i.e. 
compliance costs, and the costs of the actual certification, i.e. fees and costs for certifying 
agencies. The differences in (recurring) actual certification costs are minimal between 
GLOBALGAP and organic certification. They vary depending on the size of the group and/or 
the farmland to be certified, the crop, the certifier, and the country where the certification is 
conducted. According to Fulponi (2007) the recurrent costs borne by the producer vary 
between one and four, in some cases up to 15% of the farm gate price received (1% in Chile 
and Ghana, 4% in South Africa and between 4 and 15% in Peru). The non-recurring initial 
costs of compliance depend on the initial situation of the farm. According to Asfaw et al. 
(2009), the non-recurring investment cost for GLOBALGAP certification borne by individual 
farmers account for approximately 30% of their total annual crop income. 90% of this is the 
cost for initial compliance, e.g. infrastructure and equipment that farmers must have as a pre-
condition for implementing standards.  
As donors frequently support the initial certification, we assume that the farmer only 
has to pay for the recurrent costs14. Everything else is assumed to be borne by a donor or 
exporter. As for the yearly certification fees, there are two dominant models. Either the 
smallholder group itself pays for the renewal of the certification or the exporter pays for it and 
deducts his costs from the fruit price that is given to the farmers. As we do not know exactly 
how much the farmers in our sample had to invest in certification, we try to approximate. 
Taking the results from Fulponi (2007), we estimate these costs at 1% of total production 
costs (Table A.4.2). 
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Table A.4.2: Production Cost Comparison of Conventional and Organic Small-Scale 
Production 
Production cost (US$/kg) 
conv. MD2 
(small I) 
conv. MD2 
(small II) 
organic 
MD2 (small) 
conv. SC 
(small) 
organic SC 
(small) 
Land lease 0.0005 0.0003 0.0009 0.0015 0.0013 
Suckers 0.0241 0.0336 0.0343 0.0122 0.0132 
Sucker treatment 0.0010 0.0031 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 
Land preparation 0.0084 0.0061 0.0077 0.0108 0.0070 
Planting 0.0019 0.0011 0.0075 0.0061 0.0066 
Chemical & organic inputs 0.0322 0.0320 0.0238 0.0316 0.0008 
Labor cost  0.0236 0.0096 0.0277 0.0042 0.0160 
Fixed inputs  0.0149 0.0110 0.0185 0.0096 0.0028 
Certification  0.0011 0.0010 0.0012 0.0008 0.0005 
Total cost 0.1077 0.0978 0.1225 0.0768 0.0482 
Cost less sucker cost 0.0836 0.0642 0.0882 0.0647 0.0351 
Sources: Interviews with cooperatives and data from prior studies. 
 
SC and large farms are not included for reasons of space. The Figure displays the 
percentage contributions of detailed production cost factors to the total cost of production. 
Besides the most important cost factors for MD2 production, suckers and fertilizer, other 
important cost factors include plastic mulch, which is generally used for MD2 but not always 
for SC production. The reason for this seems to be historical. Irrigation costs are very low as 
pineapple in Ghana is rarely irrigated and only some of the organic farms have reported 
some cost for dry season irrigation. Labor for fertilizer and insecticide application are also 
considerable cost factors. In organic production labor need for weeding is high, as expected, 
in particular in the rainy season. Another minor difference between conventional and organic 
production is the cost of the substance used for flower induction. Organic regulation currently 
allows only calcium carbide, whereas ethylene gas is usually used in conventional 
production. Calcium carbide is considered to be more expensive. However, as Figure A.4.1 
illustrates this difference is minimal (about 2%) in relation to the total cost. The spraying of 
chemicals for uniform color shortly before the harvest (degreening) is also not allowed in 
organic production. For conventional production it was repeatedly reported to be quite 
expensive due to its labor intensive nature. Unfortunately, we cannot show this using Figure 
A.4.1, because only the cost of the chemical itself and labor in general is reported. Moreover 
the decision to degreen depends on importer requirements and exporters frequently do that 
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on behalf of small farmers. Therefore the costs for degreening might have been 
underreported when collecting data from the cooperatives. 
 
 
Figure A.4.1: Production Cost Details 
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Sources: Interviews with cooperatives and data  
from prior studies (details of data in Table A.4.2). 
 
 
Finally, Fairtrade minimum prices are interesting for comparison, because they are 
cost-based, with the price being calculated on the basis of estimated costs (on average in a 
given country) of production and processing according to Fairtrade standards. For Ghanaian 
pineapple these are currently US$0.205 per kg (excluding the Fairtrade premium of US$0.03 
per kg) for conventional pineapple for processing and US$0.285 per kg for organic fruit 
(Table A.4.3).  
Next, we look at fresh export postharvest operations depicted in Table A.4.4. For 
simplicity and because post-harvest operations do differ between varieties, we now restrict 
our analysis to the dominant variety on the world market, MD2. We do not include possible 
own production of the exporter here, because we are interested in the role of the smallholder. 
If the exporter would have his own (large) farm, he would be able to buy MD2 from 
smallholders at a cheaper price than his own production cost. For SC, the prices would be 
the same as his production cost. Of course this disregards supply conditions and transaction 
costs.  
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Table A.4.3: Fairtrade Prices for Ghanaian Pineapple 
Product Specification Price level 
Fairtrade minimum 
price 
US$/kg 
Fairtrade premium 
US$/kg 
Pineapples (conventional, fresh) factory gate* 0.50 0.05 
Pineapples (conventional, for 
processing) farm gate 0.205 0.03 
Pineapples (organic, fresh) factory gate* 0.65 0.05 
Pineapples (organic, for processing) Farm gate 0.285 0.03 
Pineapples (conventional, fresh) FOB 0.60 0.05 
Pineapples (organic, fresh) FOB 0.75 0.05 
Notes:  *Prices for fresh fruit are at “at the exit of the pack house”, i.e. stored, cleaned, packed, and 
refrigerated. Prices for pineapple for processing are shown because these were the only ones 
for which farm gate prices were available.  
Source: Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO) website; Fairtrade price announcement of January 27, 
2010. 
 
Farmers sell their fruit at the farm or at the exporter’s pack house (we call this “factory 
gate”). Some large exporting farms have a fully integrated supply chain with cooling and 
packing facilities on site. Other small and medium-sized farms either sell their fruit to these 
large farms (factory gate), or, in case medium-sized farms have packing but no cooling 
facilities, send their packed produce to the harbor for pre-cooling. The average cost for the 
transport to the exporter that was reported by farmers corresponds to the average price 
difference between farm and factory gate prices. Therefore we do not distinguish between 
the two options and assume that the exporter buys all fruit at the farm gate. The fact that 
market margins are the same as the cost of transporting the fruit from one place to another 
also indicates market efficiency at this stage. At the pack house, the fruit is washed, graded 
according to sizes, waxed, and packed. Postharvest costs do not differ for organic and 
conventional fruit except for waxing, which is only done on conventional fruit. Imported 
packaging material - cardboard boxes fitting approximately 12 kg of pineapple - are 
expensive in Ghana. Currently no qualitatively satisfactory local supply exists. The actual 
postharvest loss is on average very low, because fruit with inferior quality is sold to the local 
market or for processing at a lower price. As we do not have exact numbers, we assume on 
average 5% postharvest loss. 
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Table A.4.4: Post-Farm Gate Operations 
 conv. MD2 organic MD2 
Av. farm gate price 0.116 0.195 
Transport to exporter 0.020 0.020 
Sorting, grading, packaging 0.001 0.001 
Packaging material 0.115 0.115 
Waxing 0.008 0.000 
Cooling 0.019 0.019 
Postharvest loss 0.006 0.010 
Transport to harbor 0.020 0.020 
Port handling 0.006 0.006 
Administrative costs1 0.170 0.170 
Total cost at port  0.482 0.557 
FOB price² 0.490 0.590 
Exporter profit (FOB) 0.008 0.033 
Shipping 0.302 0.302 
Price at import 1.070 1.590 
Local transport 0.018 0.018 
Marketing  0.130 0.130 
Wholesale price 1.300 1.890 
Estimated profit for importer 0.082 0.153 
Marketing at retail 0.310 0.310 
Retail price 1.680 2.240 
Estimated profit for retailer 0.070 0.040 
Notes:  Average costs and prices are reported.  
1 Administrative costs cover all costs at port except the handling of the good, e.g. 
phytosantiary checks. ²FOB (Free on Board) is the price of traded goods at the port of 
origin, excluding the cost of sea-freight and insurance. It includes transport to the harbor, 
customs’ costs, export administrative costs, and unloading at the port.  
Sources: Interviews with medium or large-scale producer-exporters; shipping cost 
estimates are estimates from exporters, SPEG, and prior studies; wholesale prices are 
from International Trade Centre; costs at destination country are from interviews with 
importers, traders, wholesalers and retailers; retail prices are from interviews with retailers 
and the author’s own study in supermarkets between January and August 2009. 
 
Times needed to port are generally the same for organic and conventional fruit, but 
the time span between harvest and cooling varies a lot among smallholders, from harvesting 
directly into a vehicle to be sent to the pack house up to leaving the fruit one day on the side 
of the field. The transport from the smallholder to the exporter is in most cases done in small 
pickups or non-cooled trucks. This transport adds to the time that the fruit spends before 
entering the cool chain and is therefore likely to deteriorate the quality of the fruit. Hence, we 
have to be aware small farmers, have higher postharvest loss due to storage and transport 
problems, but this happens usually at the farm and hence before the factory gate stage and 
has been taken account of in the previous section.  
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Handling at port and export bureaucracy is done by the Sea Freight Pineapple 
Exporters of Ghana (SPEG) or another professional agent. Most pineapple leaves the 
producing country free on board (FOB), which means the transport cost is paid by the 
European importers. The EU importers normally have the power to decide the FOB price 
(Suzuki et al., 2008). Overall postharvest operations amount to 74% of the FOB price for 
conventional fruit and to 60% of the FOB price for organic fruit. Hence at this stage, the part 
of the value added that can be assigned to the farmer is higher in the organic value chain. 
For comparison, farm gate Fairtrade prices are on average 76% (conventional) and 52% 
(organic) higher than in our examples. Fairtrade FOB prices are 22% (conventional) and 27% 
(organic) higher than our average prices (Table A.4.3). 
Sea- and air-freight costs are the same for organic and conventional fruit, because 
they can be transported in the same vessel, and even the same container. Costs for shipping 
comprise 20-30% of the import prices. Freight times to Europe are again the same for all; 10-
12 days to Antwerp and 9-10 days to France. Airfreight is an alternative, although the 
proportion of air freighted pineapple from Ghana has been decreasing over the last 20 years 
and is now around 10%. Ghana has competitive airfreight rates of about US$1.1 per kg. To 
this add US$0.057 per kg for transport to the airport. The prices for sea- and air-transported 
pineapple differ greatly and hence following stages of the value chain are hard to compare. 
Furthermore, the market for air-freight pineapple is limited and the majority of pineapple is 
transported by sea (see section 2.3). We therefore focus on sea-freight pineapple. Because 
pineapples are seen as part of an export diversification strategy, there are no export 
restrictions on exports of both organic and conventional pineapple from the Ghanaian side 
and no tariff barriers on the European side except the food safety and health requirements.  
Equally to the farm-level, profits in the organic value chain are also higher at 
postharvest levels (i.e. exporter and importer) but not at the retail level.  
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Notes 
1 In 2005 five multinationals (Chiquita, Dole, Del Monte, Noboa, and Fyffees) all integrated backwards into 
transport and in most cases production controlled about 40% of all globally traded fruit. For bananas, this share 
was even 84% (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). 
2 This figure includes fresh, fresh-cut, and dried pineapple, as well as pineapple juice. The Ghanaian pineapple 
producer and processor Blue Skies was the first exporter of organic cut pineapple to the United Kingdom in 1998. 
Later, Waitrose became the first retailer in the United Kingdom to sell whole organic pineapples, supplied by Blue 
Skies, in 2005 (Pay, 2009). 
3 Commodity systems analysis focuses on national labor organization and relations, commodity chain analysis 
focuses on worldwide temporal and spatial relations, and filiere analysis focuses on national political regulation 
and institutions (Raynolds, 2004). 
4 The governance structure of the fresh pineapple value chain is analyzed in more detail in Faure et al. (2009). 
5 GLOBALGAP is a private standard founded in 1997 as EurepGAP by European retailers. It is a business-to-
business standard with the aim to establish one standard for Good Agricultural Practices (GAP). Many of the large 
European retail and food service chains, producers and suppliers are members (www.globalgap.org). 
6 The bureaucratic conventions imposed may be more difficult to install and follow on traditional small farms and 
economies of scale in certification fees and indirect costs for investments that are necessary (Raynolds, 2004). 
Empirical results show that resource poor farmers with limited access to information and services are less likely to 
adopt standards and are potentially marginalised in the export market.  
7 SC is almost exclusively grown for processing; hence SC export prices reflect exporting processors’ prices, 
whereas MD2 is usually sold fresh with only rejects sold to processors. 
8 However, there are economies of scale in shipping for Ghanaian pineapple as a whole. Larger volumes 
exported from Ghana would make the sea-freight cheaper and faster, giving Ghana a competitive edge over the 
world market leader Costa Rica, due to its proximity to Europe.  
9 The same is true for pests and diseases. As an example, due to the use of ethylene instead of calcium carbide 
for flower induction, the PH-level of the soil on organic fields is less favourable for a common root rot called 
phytophtora. 
10 The Brix value measures the percent of sugar solids in a product, providing an approximate measure of sugar 
content. It gives an indirect estimate of the degree of fruit ripeness. 
11 Land preparation costs are also higher in the first year of a plantation, if virgin land has to be converted into 
farmland. However, since this also happens when a plantation is extended or shifted we cannot assign this cost 
clearly to the initial investment cost. 
12 If labor for farm activities and supervision would be measured at market rates, small farms may have higher 
production cost. This is the case in a recent study for Ghana, which states that the production costs of large farms 
are 38% lower than those of small farms (Natural Resources Institute, 2010). 
13 In one example a conventional cooperative has reduced the cost of fertilizer inputs by US$175 per acre by 
replacing chemical fertilisers partly with organic fertiliser purchased from a local processing factory (Natural 
Resources Institute, 2010). 
14 In an example from Kenya, Graffham et al. (2009) show that farmers in the horticultural sector pay on average 
36% of nonrecurring and 14% recurrent costs.  
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Is Organic Farming Worth its Investment? 
The Adoption and Impact of Certified Pineapple Farming in Ghana 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Global food markets demand the adoption of food standards by small-scale farmers in 
developing countries to assure their access to international markets. While certification with 
GlobalGAP is a market entry condition for conventional food, especially for horticultural 
products, organic certification is required for the increasing organic food market that is 
usually associated with higher prices. Aiming to analyze whether organic certified farming is 
worth its investment, this paper examines the impact of organic certification on the return on 
investment (ROI) of small-scale pineapple farming in Ghana. Using GlobalGAP certified 
farmers as control group, we are able to single out the effect of certification vis-à-vis contract 
farming and exporting. Data of 359 Ghanaian pineapple farmers obtained over one 
production cycle are evaluated using an endogenous switching regression model. The results 
indicate that farmers with either certification gain on average a positive ROI. However, 
organic certified farming yields a significantly larger ROI than GlobalGAP farmers mainly due 
to price premiums on the organic market. Thus, organic certification is found to be the more 
profitable.  
 
Keywords: return on investment, impact assessment, organic agriculture, GlobalGAP 
certification, contract farming 
JEL codes: O13, Q13, Q17, Q56 
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 1 Introduction 
Three trends make our research question an interesting one. First, in recent years, the 
restructuring of global food value chains and the increasing importance of private voluntary 
standards (PVS) have led to the marginalization of developing country producers, in 
particular small-scale farmers, which form the majority of the rural population in developing 
countries, and favored large scale plantations (e.g. Jaffee et al., 2011). In Ghana, it is 
estimated that about 90% of all farmers are smallholders (MOFA, 2010). Since several PVS 
such as organic and GlobalGAP have introduced group certification options for small farmers, 
it is critical to know if this helps smallholders to integrate in the global food market.  
Second, during the same period of time, a horticulture industry in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) has emerged facilitated by diversification policies and the demand for tropical 
vegetables and fruit all year round by industrialized country consumers. These policies are 
part of an agricultural modernization effort in Africa. Within the agricultural sector, horticulture 
may provide an opportunity for small-scale farmers, because of it labor intensity and high 
production value per unit. 
Third, agriculture is responsible for environmental damage such as underground 
water depletion, land degradation, soil erosion water and soil pollution and health problems, 
loss of biodiversity, deforestation, and global climate change. Crops that are produced for 
export are usually strongly treated with pesticides to assure the required quality. However, 
today, more and more consumers demand healthy, non-genetically modified, environmental 
friendly produced food. With this comes an increasing demand for organic certified products 
in the global market, which provides an opportunity for developing countries. Organic certified 
food usually achieves a price premium and gives access to new fast growing high-end 
markets and attracts new classes of investors (UNEP, 2007). Thus, there is a chance that 
organic certification serves to reduce poverty fostering smallholders who are engaged in the 
agricultural sector and it may additionally be more environmental friendly than conventional 
agriculture. 
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 These three trends lead to the question whether sustainable agriculture approaches 
for small-scale farmers can provide an alternative development model for specific definable 
parts of the rural population, and if yes which parts of the rural population they favor. Only to 
the degree that it improves livelihoods of the rural poor, such an approach should be 
supported by development aid and local governments. 
Despite its important role in diminishing poverty in developing countries, the 
agricultural sector in most African countries including in Ghana is characterized by low levels 
of technology and productivity as well as low international competitiveness in production, 
processing and distribution (Breisinger et al., 2008; Government of Ghana, 2010) and the 
expansion of this sector is constrained by access to technology and capital. Additionally, 
Ghana faces environmental pressure due to population growth and already highly degraded 
soils (Diao and Sarpong, 2007). 
Therefore, the Ghanaian government emphasizes the necessity to modernize the 
agricultural sector to improve its performance in its “Ghana shared growth and development 
agenda” as part of an export-led growth strategy in agriculture (Government of Ghana, 2010). 
At the same, the government wants to address the problem of declining yields through 
environmental protection (Government of Ghana, 2010) and has established an organic 
agriculture desk in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA). 
One approach to enhance agricultural export activities in the food sector is the 
certification of food producers with internationally approved food labels. This is driven by the 
recent trend towards stricter food safety and traceability standards in the major importing 
countries (Henson et al., 2011; Suzuki et al., 2011). A well-known example is the GlobalGAP 
certification. Retailers usually require that their suppliers are GlobalGAP certified (Henson et 
al., 2011), which makes it a quasi-precondition for export (to Europe and North America) of 
horticultural produce. By contrast, organic certification meets the rising demand for natural 
products and also acts as substitute for GlobalGAP certification. 
Several studies have analyzed the impact of these certifications for small-scale 
farmers in developing countries. Most of this literature concentrates on organic, GlobalGAP 
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 and Fairtrade certifications, a large amount of studies deal with coffee, and often Fairtrade 
and organic overlap.1 Most researchers find modest positive impacts of different certifications 
on farmer welfare or household income using different measures (see e.g. literature reviews 
by Blackman and Rivera, 2010; ITC, 2011; and papers by Asfaw et al., 2009; Valkila, 2009; 
Bolwig et al., 2009; Fort and Ruben, 2009); Henson et al., 2011; Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009), while some researchers are skeptical about the ability of organic and Fairtrade to help 
poor farmers (Valkila, 2009; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Lynbæk et al., 2001) because of 
access barriers, ambiguous yield or productivity impacts, or price premiums that may be too 
small to compensate for investment costs. Although the yield potential is estimated to be high 
on non-ideal tropical soils (Kassie et al., 2008; and others), in fact yields are often lower on 
organic farms in these countries (Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Lynbæk et al., 2001; Valikila, 
2009) and the reduced dependence on potentially expensive external inputs from ill 
functioning markets is replaced by a reliance on the export market for price premia (Lynbæk 
et al., 2001).  
However, the methods used are not undisputed. Few of the above mentioned studies 
use sound analytical methods, in particular in terms of finding credible counterfactuals and 
controlling for selection bias. Even if the effort is made, the analysis regularly lacks external 
validity because the data used comes from a case study of one project, Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) or exporter which makes it impossible to distinguish between the effects 
of the management of this particular initiative or exporter and the effect of certification per se. 
In addition, we doubt that using non-certified, non-exporting farmers as counterfactual is a 
good idea, because the effects measured will be a mixture between certification, contract 
farming, and export effects. Finally, with the exception of organic and Fairtrade different 
certifications have not been compared. Since nowadays on the export market GlobalGAP is 
commonplace, a relevant question is if other certifications, like organic, can outperform it. 
This and the weakness of the evidence base on the impact of certifications in general 
motivates this paper that is based on treatment and control groups that use two different 
export-market oriented certifications, organic and GlobalGAP. 
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 Hence, we take a new approach and select our sample to provide a representative 
picture of one sector, take certification costs into account and use a more credible 
counterfactual, which makes it possible to disentangle the effects of being under contract, 
exporting and certification. We explicitly address the problem that has been identified 
amongst others by Bolwig et al. (2009), of distinguishing between the effect of contract 
farming and of certifications. Existing studies essentially mix up contract farming, exporting 
and organic farming because the treatment group usually consists of certified exporting 
contract farmers, whereas the reference group consists of non-contracted uncertified non-
exporting farmers. However, farmers that target the local market are different in range of 
ways: they have different networks, produce different quality, and are often not under 
contract, unlike exporting smallholders. Therefore, they can hardly be compared to organic 
farmers that produce under contract for the European market. Any effects measured would 
mingle up the effects of export market participation, contracting and organic production, and 
in fact all existing studies seem to suggest that the export market channel is very relevant for 
any positive impact.  
We single out the effect of certification by choosing a reference group that also 
produces under contract and for the export market. Because export market requirements are 
more costly to meet than local market requirements, we can safely assume that farmers do 
not easily and quickly switch from export back to local market production. From a 
development perspective this analysis answers the question whether organic certified 
farming offers new possibilities to farmers in contrast to export oriented GlobalGAP certified 
farming.  
Moreover, while impact assessments of food standards in developing countries 
usually concentrate on the effect on different welfare-indicators like the productivity, revenue 
and household income (Bolwig et al., 2009; Kassie et al., 2008; etc.), we focus on the return 
on investment (ROI), an impact measure that has only been used in this context so far by 
Asfaw et al. (2009) and Barham and Weber (2012). The ROI is a simple instrument that sees 
farmers as entrepreneurs. It takes into account that the challenge of an entrepreneur is not 
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 only to concentrate on improving his net income, but also to invest most profitable. A related 
ratio was in this context so far only used by Udry and Anagol (2006) aiming to provide 
evidence about rates of return to capital in Ghana.  
As the underlying treatment is not a development program but a longer term initiative 
of the private sector (certification processes take up to three years), it is very unlikely to 
convince the private sector to agree to randomization and in addition without disturbing 
behavioral effects. In addition randomization over which households participate in which 
certification would be difficult to realize due to likely issues with voluntariness of take-up from 
both sides, farmers and buyers, as well as questionable external validity (as with contract 
farming described in Bellemare, 2012 and Barrett et al., 2012). Hence we have to rely on 
regression techniques. We use an endogenous switching regression model (ESR) to control 
for selection bias based on observables and unobservables. Since we find no significant 
influence of unobservables we also use propensity score matching to verify the results.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the 
development of the pineapple sector in Ghana to clarify the challenges and the potentials of 
conventional and organic production. It is followed by an overview of the data on which the 
impact evaluation of organic certification is based on and the presentation of the 
corresponding descriptive statistics. Subsequently, section 3 derives the theoretical and 
empirical framework of this paper. The empirical strategy to estimate the effect of organic 
certification is then exposed and leads to the analysis of the regression results. The paper 
concludes with a discussion and policy recommendations in section 4. 
 
2 Background and Data 
2.1 Background  
Development of the Pineapple Sector in Ghana 
The agricultural sector in Ghana amounts for about 30% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
and employs over 50% of the Ghanaian working population (WDI, 2011). In recent years 
non-traditional exports of horticultural products experienced a large growth. Exports of fresh 
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 fruits and vegetables, especially to Europe, are now the most important growth sector in 
Ghana’s agriculture. 
Ghanaian pineapple farmers produce the varieties MD2, Smooth Cayenne, Sugar 
Loaf and Queen Victoria, where Sugar Loaf is mainly produced to sell fresh on the local 
market or for processing and Queen Victoria plays a minor role as a high-priced specialty 
product. Pineapples were the first non-traditional export crop which Ghana started to cultivate 
in small quantities in the 1980ies. Since then, the amount of pineapple exports increased 
rapidly until 2004 (Figure 5.1; UNCTAD, 2008), when about 95% of the pineapples exported 
from Ghana were Smooth Cayenne (FAO, 2009). Subsequently exports decreased due to a 
change in the pineapple variety demanded on global markets as can be seen in Figure 5.1. 
The market share of Ghanaian pineapple on the European market fell from 10.5% in 2003 to 
5.2% in 2006. Many farms stopped producing pineapple or went bankrupt, others switched to 
MD2 production.2 Subsequently, alternative pineapple industry strategies rose in importance 
such as processing of Smooth Cayenne and Sugar Loaf. It is estimated that 40.000 tons of 
pineapple were exported from Ghana in 2010 (Figure 5.1). Note that these numbers should 
be taken as approximations, the Sea Freight Pineapple Exporters Association of Ghana 
(SPEG), cites different numbers. 
Pineapple farming in Ghana is mainly located in a radius of 100 km north-west of the 
capital Accra in the regions of Greater Accra, and the Central and Eastern Region (Danielou 
and Ravry, 2005). There are two dominant actors, on the one hand there are a few 
large/medium-sized producers, and on the other hand there is a large amount of small-scale 
farmers, who sell their fruits on the local market or as outgrowers to an exporter, processor or 
large farm for export. The latter are the farmers we focus on in this paper. Pineapple export in 
Ghana is predominantly organized by export companies which mostly also have own farm 
production.  
The Pineapple Market 
At maximum 40% of all exported pineapples come from smallholders (UNCTAD, 
2008; personal information given in interviews with GEPC and SPEG). The relationship 
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 between exporter and smallholder is usually oral or written contract based (Suzuki et al., 
2011). Exporters may additionally provide farm inputs like pesticides and herbicides, 
extension services or credit. 
Exporting has several advantages and disadvantages for small-scale farmers. On the 
upside, export markets prices are usually higher, and depending on the form of the contract, 
sales may be guaranteed up-front and access to inputs and training may improve. On the 
downside, information constrained small-scale farmers become dependent on unknown 
volatile international markets, which may increase perceived risk or lower trust in exporters 
(Schipmann and Qaim, 2011).  
In addition, to assure high food safety and traceability standards most European food 
retailers demand GlobalGAP certification for horticultural products. In 2009 already 80% of all 
exported fresh conventional pineapples were GlobalGAP certified in order to satisfy this 
demand (PIP, 2009). GlobalGAP includes detailed regulations concerning food safety, 
hygienic and environmental standards. In Ghana, group certification schemes are supported 
by international development programs, namely the Trade and Investment Programme for 
Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) funded by USAID, the Pesticide Initiative Program 
(PIP) funded by the EU and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ). 
Particularities of the Organic Market 
According to a report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD, 2008), the worldwide organic food markets expanded by 10-15% in the last ten 
years, whereas conventional markets only grew by 2-4%. In Europe, the market has grown 
from 10.8 billion to 18.4 billion Euros between 2004 and 2009 (FiBL, 2009).  
Requirements of organic certification concentrate on guaranteeing consumers that the 
products they buy fulfill organic production standards. In the EU the regulations (EC) 
834/2007 and (EC) 889/2008 control the production, processing and trade of organic 
products. 
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 Organic certified pineapples from Africa receive a positive price premium on the 
European market, which is passed on to the producers (Kleemann, 2011a and 2011b). The 
organic specialty market offers a possibility to sell other varieties than MD2 internationally, 
such as airfreighted Sugar Loaf. As with GlobaGAP certification, several organizations 
support organic agriculture aiming to aid small-scale farmers. For instance GIZ, Agro 
Eco/Louis Bolk, West African Fair Fruit (WAFF), but also the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MOFA) promote organic farming in Ghana. About 0.19% of the agricultural land in Ghana is 
organic certified, with a presumably higher part in pineapples3. Next, the survey methodology 
and data is presented. 
 
2.2 Data  
A farm household survey was conducted from January to March 2010 in six different districts 
(Ajumako Enyan Esiam, Akuapem South, Ewutu-Efutu-Senya, Ga, Kwahu South and 
Mfantseman) of the Central, Eastern and Greater Accra regions in southern Ghana, where 
pineapple cultivation is mostly located. Stratified random sampling in three stages was used. 
First, districts with significant amounts of commercial smallholder pineapple production were 
selected, using information from SPEG. Next, lists of all pineapple farmer groups in the 
selected districts that are GlobalGAP or organic certified were obtained. Finally, in each 
group a percentage of farmers proportional to the total number of farmers in the group was 
selected randomly from the lists. The farmer, which corresponded in over 95% to the 
household head, answered a detailed questionnaire on the household’s management of the 
pineapple farm, inputs into the pineapple production, harvesting and marketing of the 
pineapples, the certification process, and relations with exporters. Besides, information on 
household characteristics, social capital and land disposition were requested as well as data 
concerning non-income wealth indicators and perceptions of different statements about 
environmental values, organic farming techniques and the use of fertilizers and pesticides4. 
The dataset includes 386 households from 75 villages with either GlobalGAP or 
organic certification for their pineapple farms. In total, 185 organic farmers and 201 
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 GlobalGAP certified farmers were interviewed. 39 of the organic certified farmers were also 
GlobalGAP certified, but since the organic certification is stricter, those were counted as 
organic certified. All organic farmers sold part of their produce as organic certified to 
exporters or processors and part of it on the local market without reference to the 
certification. Respectively all conventional farmers sold their produce as GlobalGAP certified 
to exporters or processors and on the local market without reference to GlobalGAP. In 
theory, there could be one-directional overlaps. This means that organic certified farmers 
could sell as organic certified (which has the highest price) as first preference, as 
conventional export produce as second preference and on the local market as last option. 
However this is not the case in our sample. The opposite, i.e. conventional farmers trying to 
sell on the organic export market, is not possible. Organic farmers belong to 9 different 
farmer associations, GlobalGAP certified farmers to 14. Some of these groups were 
encouraged by exporters, but most existed before being in contact with an exporter. Organic 
certification refers to the European standards according to EU regulation (EC) 834/2007 and 
(EC) 889/2008. Due to the fact that all conventional farmers are GlobalGAP certified in our 
sample, the expressions GlobalGAP certified farmers and conventional farmers are used 
interchangeable in the following. 
 
2.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive Statistics of Sociodemographic Variables 
All sociodemographic variables that are included in the estimations are presented in Table 
5.1. The typical pineapple farmer in our sample irrespective of the type of certification is 
native to the region, male and Christian. His household has a similar income compared to the 
average in Ghana (country average 88.83 GHS per month, survey average: highest density 
in income groups 51-150 GHS per month), and a higher income share from agriculture 
(47.8% versus 67%; data from Ghana Living Standards Survey 5). Organic farming 
households have on average more often a female household head (HHH) and their 
household heads are older and less educated than in conventional farm households. 
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 However, the average organic HHH stated a higher willingness to take risks in order to 
achieve successes and a greater openness to innovation and also received credit more often 
during the last five years. In addition, organic households have smaller farms, but these are 
more specialized in pineapple farming, 39% of the whole organic farm including the 
homestead and 16% of the conventional farm are occupied with pineapple. With higher labor 
costs in production, organic farmers more often recruit their workers from the family, which is 
reflected in the lower proportion of the production cost they spend on hired labor. 
The land variables are likely to be subject to reporting error. Therefore we included 
several checks in the questionnaire like asking for the farm size as well as for field sizes for 
each crop and checked on the farm or verified with GPS data likely to be considerably 
smaller than reported5. Even though organic farming is more management intensive, organic 
farmers did not receive more training for improving farming techniques. The most likely 
reason is the lack of opportunities resulting from niche position of organic agriculture.  
Concerning location specific variables organic farmers own a larger share of their land 
and grow pineapple on different soil types compared to conventional farmers. The soil 
variable confirms studies from developed countries in that organic production is often taking 
place on different soils6. There is also a difference concerning the variety of pineapples 
planted: Organic farmers prefer Sugar Loaf, whereas conventional farmers favor Smooth 
Cayenne or MD2. To our knowledge the reason are buyer preferences. Of relevance to the 
adoption mechanism is the fact that organic farmers seem to have a stronger link to the local 
government and visit the capital more frequently. They are also more likely to have learned 
pineapple farming from friends or family members compared to in training courses or as 
laborers on other farms. Moreover, their certification process is more often organized by the 
farmer organization, compared to GlobalGAP certified farmers. Note that this variable 
indicates who the farmers perceived as the ones organizing this process, which is not 
necessarily the same that financially supported it. This variable is therefore different from 
what Kersting and Wollni (2012) measure. The majority of farmers of both groups have been 
certified within the last two years and about 40 % have a written contract with an exporter, all 
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 other have an oral contract. The number of years that the farmers have been certified is 
slightly longer for organic farmers. Organic certification was introduced much earlier than 
GlobalGAP, which was called EurepGAP before. We tried to make the equivalence between 
GlobalGAP and EurepGAP clear in the interviews, but nevertheless we need to treat this 
variable with caution. 
Descriptive Statistics of Production and Certification Costs 
The total costs of production do not differ significantly between organic and conventional 
farming, but the structure of the production costs is quite different. The total production costs 
that are considered to generate the ROI are constructed by adding up the values of: 
 costs for the agricultural equipment and inputs 
 costs for the yearly renewal of certification 
 costs for the farming land on which the pineapples are planted 
 costs for hired workers and household labor. 
Household labor is taken into account with 4 GHS per day and person to include its 
opportunity costs. 4 GHS/day approximately corresponds to the Ghanaian minimum wage at 
the time of the survey and was approximately actually paid for manual farm labor. The exact 
minimum wage in February 2010 was 3.11 GHS/day and was incremented to 3.73 GHS/day 
recently. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 5.2 show the average costs of pineapple production 
per Kg pineapples. The different cost composition of organic and conventional production 
costs becomes obvious in columns (2) and (4) of Table 5.2, which summarize the 
percentages attributed to each cost category. 
Whereas we did not find differences in costs for land, there are large differences in 
the labor costs per Kg and the input costs per Kg between organic and conventional 
pineapple production. While organic farmers spend much more on labor hired workers as 
well as household labor conventional pineapple production is more input and equipment 
intensive. Organic farmers use no chemicals and hardly any organic fertilizers but rely on 
manual removing of weeds and more often produce their own planting material or exchange 
it with other farmers. Expenses for inputs like inorganic fertilizers, herbicides, fungicides and 
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 pesticides, as well as suckers (seedlings), are hence much higher for conventional farmers. 
In addition, they use chemicals to induce flowering more frequently (90% of conventional and 
30% of organic farmers) and spend more for plastic foil and safety equipment for their farm, 
the latter forms part of the GlobalGAP requirements. However, those costs are still 
comparable small, because a large part of the cost is often paid for by the exporter or a 
donor or NGO.  
On average, both initial and yearly certification costs are higher for conventional 
farmers (Table 5.2). This result should however not be seen as actual costs, but the part the 
farmers themselves cover. As Kersting and Wollni (2012) show, this fraction can be quite low, 
in their case four to five percent. Initial certification costs play an important role for the 
participation decision. Therefore, it is of particular interest how fast initial certification costs 
amortize. It should be noted that all farmers of this survey are taking part in a group 
certification; the costs for individual certification would be much higher. In addition, a large 
part of certification costs is covered by supporting organizations, donors or exporters (see 
also above and Kersting and Wollni, 2012). 
In addition to actual certification costs, the initial certification costs include 
investments in equipment and training that are required. Time spent in training is taken into 
account with 4 GHS/day, as done with household labor. The percentage of initial costs for 
training is much higher for organic farmers, namely 59%, while it is 25% for conventional 
farmers. A detailed composition of initial certification costs is shown in Table A.5.2. 
Initial certification costs are on average much higher than renewal costs (Table 5.2). 
The mean amortization times are displayed in Table 5.2. Based on the profit of one 
production cycle, it is about 3.5 times higher for conventional farmers, amounting to one third 
of the first production cycle’s profits, than for organic farmers, where it is less than one tenth7.  
Descriptive Statistics of ROI Components 
Out of the 386 farmers, 311 gave complete information on their sales activities, which 
is the precondition for the evaluation of the ROI. The remaining 75 farmers made incomplete 
statements about their production costs or sales, did not remember important parts of their 
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 sales data for instance the quantity of their last sales, or had not sold any pineapples since 
they got certified for the first time. This number is high, because we were very cautious in 
using only correct and complete information and because, even though it is requested for 
most certifications, the keeping of farm records was the exception rather than the norm. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the mean values of variables which determine the ROI of one 
production cycle. Note that the production cycle on organic farms is on average longer than 
the one on conventional farms, namely 18.72 month instead of 15.46 month. The different 
lengths of the production cycles do not impair the informative value of the ROI, but obviously 
affect other key figures such as yearly income from pineapple farming. It should be noted that 
the data are calculated on the basis of per kilogram (Kg) instead of pieces to control for the 
fact that organic fruits are on average 0.18 Kg lighter than conventional fruits. 
The quantity of pineapples considered for the ROI is the amount of sold pineapples 
adjusted for a proportionate part of the total harvest that was wasted on the field (4.85% for 
conventional and 3.19% for organic farmers respectively) and excludes the amount of 
pineapples that were self-consumed, self-processed or given away as a gift, on average 
2.78% and 3.86% for organic and conventional farmers respectively. This separation is 
necessary for being able to calculate a sensible ROI that compares relevant investments with 
profits, since only the investment in pineapples later meant to be sold leads to a return. 
Table 5.2 shows that conventional farmers sold 1.5 times as many pineapples as 
organic farmers a result of larger areas planted and higher yields. As expected, export prices 
were in general higher than local prices for both groups. But organic pineapple achieved a 
price premium on both local and export markets, even though they were not marketed as 
organic certified locally, pointing towards different marketing strategies by organic farmers 
which seem to better match local preferences, a presumption for which we however do not 
have further information for verification. One hint is that the Sugar Loaf variety yielded the 
highest prices on the local (and export) market and was produced more frequently by organic 
than by conventional farmers. Conventional pineapple farmers sold mostly Smooth Cayenne 
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 and MD2. Smooth Cayenne had the lowest price for either certification on the local market. 
For an overview of the prices for each variety see Table A.5.1. 
Hence, organic farmers benefited from producing Sugar Loaf on both, the local and 
the export market. Conventional farmers produced mainly pineapple varieties which are more 
specialized on the mass export market, and also sold a greater fraction of their harvest to 
exporters. It should be noted that, independent of certification, farmers who got a higher price 
than the average price on the export market also sold a larger part of their pineapples on this 
market. However, as a consequence of the higher prices, the average revenue per Kg for 
organic pineapples exceeds the one of conventional pineapples. And since there is no 
significant difference in production costs per Kg, the average profit per Kg is significant 
higher for organic pineapples. This results in a larger mean ROI of organic farming. One 
should also point out that the ROI is on average positive for both certifications and similar in 
size to Udry and Anagol (2006) who find an internal rate of return of pineapple farming in 
Ghana around 250 to 300% per year (not considering any certifications). The framework for 
the evaluation of the impact on ROI is described in the next section. 
 
3 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Specification 
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
The individual decision to become organic certified can be modeled in a random utility 
framework, which is widely used to analyze adoption under uncertainty (Feder et al. 1985). 
Organic certification is a binary choice in which the producer weighs up the expected net 
utility from organic certification against the one of conventional certification. Because the 
farmer needs at minimum one of the two certifications to enter or remain in the export market, 
the situation can be seen as a two-stage decision process, where the first stage decision 
whether to produce for the export or local market has been taken already in favor of the 
export market. We now exclude all farmers that have decided for the local market in the first 
stage. The second stage that remains is the question among the group of exporters which 
export market to target, conventional or niche market. This approach reduces the variance, 
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 increases the statistical power and solves the problem of distinguishing between export 
market participation, contract farming and organic certification effects. 
The adoption decision can then be viewed as a standard binary choice problem that is 
based on the maximization of an underlying utility function. Let ܦଵ௜∗  denote the expected utility 
of getting organic certification (adoption), and ܦ଴௜∗  denote the expected utility of getting 
GlobalGAP certification (non-adoption) of an individual iሺi ൌ 1, . . . , Nሻ of an observed 
population of size N. The differences between the expected utilities of the two certifications is 
ܦ௜∗ ൌ ܦଵ௜∗ െ ܦ଴௜∗ . When ܦ௜∗ is greater than zero adoption of organic certification occurs. Since 
GlobalGAP adoption will form the reference group, we follow standard denominations and 
refer to it as non-adoption in the following paragraphs. The actual level of utility of each 
farmer cannot be observed, but can be represented by a latent variable whose value can be 
represented by the observed choice ܦ௜ where ܦ௜ሺܦ௜ ∈ ሼ0, 1ሽሻ is a dummy with ܦ௜ ൌ 1 being 
attributed to the treatment, i.e. adoption and ܦ௜ ൌ 0 to non-adoption. The adoption decision 
can then be modeled as an index function model: 
ܦ௜∗ ൌ ܼ௜ᇱߙ ൅ ߳஽೔
ܦ௜ ൌ 1				if				ܦ௜∗ ൐ 0	
ܦ௜ ൌ 0 if ܦ௜∗ ൑ 0 
(5.1)
where ܦ௜∗ depends on a vector of observable variables Z and an error term ߳஽, with 
mean zero variance ߪ஽ଶ . The error term includes errors in measurement and unobserved 
factors. 
The probability of adoption can then be expressed by: 
ܲݎ	ሺܦ௜ ൌ 1|ܼ௜ሻ ൌ ܲݎሺܦଵ௜∗ ൐ ܦ଴௜∗ ሻ
ൌ ܲݎ	ሺܦ௜∗ ൐ 0ሻ	
ൌ ܲݎ	ሺܼ௜ᇱߙ ൅ ߳஽೔ ൐ 0ሻ	
ൌ ܲݎ	ሺ߳஽೔ ൐ െܼ௜ᇱߙሻ	
ൌ ܨሺܼ௜ᇱߙሻ 
(5.2)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of ߳஽.  
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 Based on this theoretical framework, the empirical strategy applied to evaluate the 
impact of organic certification on the ROI is presented in the next section. 
 
3.2 Empirical Specification 
The outcome variable is the return on investment (ROI), a widely used relative profitability 
performance measure. The ROI of a single investment is: 
ROI= 
Profit
Investment
 
The advantage of the ROI compared to other measures such as net income is that it 
relates the profit to the farmer’s investment decision and consequently indicates how well the 
available assets have been used. The ROI presents the results of one period, in our case 
one crop cycle, a well-defined timeframe with clear costs and revenues. Since the ROI is 
measured ex post without the farmers’ ex-ante knowledge, the usual concerns against the 
use of ROI such as an induced focus on short term profit maximization is of no concern here. 
We are however aware that using longer time periods (e.g. three years, which is the usual 
length of the conversion period to organic) could change the results8. 
We assume that the status of D influences the outcome variable Y, in this case ROI. 
This is plausible because D opens up new marketing opportunities and requires different 
production methods. We strive to reduce selection bias by careful selection of treatment and 
control group and appropriate estimation strategies. We are aware that measurement errors 
are frequent in measuring agricultural inputs and outputs in developing countries. However, 
when farmers in both groups are sufficiently similar in their sociodemographic characteristics 
we can assume that measurement errors do not significantly differ between the two groups. 
When the status of D influences Y this can be expressed in the relationship between 
Y, a set of exogenous variables X and the certification dummy D as: 
௜ܻ ൌ ݂ሺ ௜ܺ; ܦ௜ሻ (5.3)
When ஽ܻ೔ is the outcome variable of individual i as a function of the adoption status D, 
Y can take two forms, ଵܻ௜ and ଴ܻ௜. One of the biggest challenges in impact evaluations is 
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 finding an adequate control group. To illustrate this, defining ߬௜ as the treatment effect, a 
simple comparison of the outcome dependent on the adoption status: 
߬௜ ൌ ଵܻ௜ െ ଴ܻ௜ (5.4)
This will likely lead to biased results, because it is impossible to observe ଵܻ௜ and ଴ܻ௜ 
for the same individual. This implies first that it is necessary to use a counterfactual outcome 
instead and second that not the individual treatment effect, but only average treatments 
effect (ATE) in the population can be estimated. When treatment is non-random untreated 
individuals may differ systematically because of self-selection into treatment. Non-random 
assignment implies the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as the effect of interest. 
The ATT can be defined by the following equation (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008): 
߬஺்் ൌ ܧሺ߬|ܦ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ܧሾ ଵܻ|ܦ ൌ 1ሿ െ ܧሾ ଴ܻ|ܦ ൌ 1ሿ (5.5)
where τ denotes the treatment effect, in this case the ATT and Eሾ. ሿ represents an 
expected value operator. 
A popular approach to avoid biased results is to randomize treatment. Because 
randomization is not possible in our case, we have to solve the problem of finding a credible 
counterfactual and choosing the appropriate quasi-experimental techniques to correct for 
selection bias when estimating treatment effects. Selection bias caused by observables (e.g. 
farm size) can be controlled for using regression techniques. When the selection is based on 
unobservables that simultaneously influence the adoption decision as well as the outcome 
variable (e.g. ability, risk aversion, trust) or discrimination by firms or NGOs as argued in 
Bellemare (2012) and Barrett et al. (2012) this will lead an omitted variables problem. We can 
account for these points when the data is sufficiently rich. For instance, firms are likely to 
discriminate on the basis of observables that are potentially also available to the researcher. 
We conducted interviews with most of the exporting firms and farmer organizations to verify 
that selection is based on available data such as farm size. In addition, selection criteria did 
not differ between organic and conventional firms. We carefully choose our reference group 
among exporting, non-organic smallholders to minimize the influence of unobservables on 
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 our results. Many of the unobservables mentioned in the literature are assumed to apply in 
the same or a very similar way to both groups, such as entrepreneurship, risk preferences, 
and trustworthiness (Barrett et al., 2012; Blackman and Rivera, 2010). 
Among the relevant methods treatment effect models e.g. instrumental variable (IV) or 
Heckman selection models are quite restrictive, because they assume that the estimated 
outcome functions differ only by a constant and other potentially suitable methods such as a 
regression discontinuity design cannot be used due to the lack of a suitable threshold 
variable. Based on these observations with regards to the available data and with respect to 
taking into account the influence of unobservables, we rely on an endogenous switching 
regression model (ESR henceforth) for our analysis.  
The endogenous switching model (Lee, 1978 and Maddala, 1983) is a parametric 
approach that uses two different estimation equations for organic and GlobalGAP certified 
farmers while controlling for the selection process by adding the inverse Mills ratio that is 
calculated via a selection equation in a first step. Thus, outcome equations are disposed 
differently for each regime, conditional on the adoption decision, which is estimated by a 
probit model. Previous impact evaluations as for example Fuglie and Bosch (1995), Alene 
and Manyong (2007) and Kassie et al. (2008) have used an endogenous switching 
regression model to estimate the effect of different technology adoptions in agriculture. 
In the endogenous switching model, the adoption decision is modeled like in the 
previous section with ܦ௜∗ ൌ 	ܼ௜ᇱߙ ൅ ߳஽೔ (equation (5.1)). ܻ ൌ ݂ሺܺሻ representing the relationship 
between the outcome variable of interest and a set of exogenous variables ܺ.		 ଴ܻ, ଵܻ define 
the outcomes of interest separately for the two regimes of adopting and of not adopting the 
technology, and ߳଴௜, ߳ଵ௜ are the error terms. 
଴ܻ௜ ൌ ௜ܺᇱߚ଴ ൅ ߳଴௜ if ܦ௜ ൌ 0 (5.6)
ଵܻ௜ ൌ ௜ܺᇱߚଵ ൅ ߳ଵ௜ if ܦ௜ ൌ 1 (5.7)
Self-selection based on observables is thereby taken into account but unobservable 
factors could create a correlation between ߳஽ and ߳଴, ߳ଵ. To solve this problem, in an 
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 endogenous switching regression model the sample selectivity is treated as a missing value 
problem. The error terms are assumed to have a joint-normal distribution with a variance-
covariance structure as follows: 
ܿ݋ݒሺ߳଴, ߳ଵ, ߳஽ሻ ൌ ቌ
ߪ଴ଶ ߪ଴ଵ ߪ଴஽
ߪ଴ଵ ߪଵଶ ߪଵ஽
ߪ଴஽ ߪ଴ଵ ߪ஽ଶ
ቍ  (5.8)
With ߪ଴ଶ ൌ ݒܽݎሺ߳଴ሻ, ߪଵଶ ൌ ݒܽݎሺ߳ଵሻ, ߪ஽ଶ ൌ ݒܽݎሺ߳஽ሻ, ߪ଴ଵ ൌ ܿ݋ݒሺ߳଴, ߳ଵሻ, ߪ଴஽ ൌ ܿ݋ݒሺ߳଴, ߳஽ሻ, 
ߪଵ஽ ൌ ܿ݋ݒሺ߳ଵ, ߳஽ሻ. ߪ஽ଶ is assumed to be one as α is estimable only up to a scalar. 
Furthermore, ߪ଴ଵ ൌ 0 because one cannot observe ଵܻ௜ and ଴ܻ௜ at the same time. The 
expected values of the truncated error terms ܧሺ߳ଵ|ܦ ൌ 1ሻ and ܧሺ߳଴|ܦ ൌ 0ሻ can then be 
expressed by: 
ܧሺ߳ଵ௜|ܦ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ܧ൫߳ଵ௜ห߳஽೔ ൐ െܼᇱߙ௜൯ ൌ ߪଵ஽
߶ሺܼᇱߙ௜ ߪ⁄ ሻ
Φሺܼᇱߙ௜ ߪ⁄ ሻ ≡ ߪଵ஽ߣଵ௜ (5.9)
ܧሺ߳଴௜|ܦ௜ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ ܧ൫߳଴௜ห߳஽೔ ൐ െܼᇱߙ௜൯ ൌ ߪ଴஽
߶ሺܼᇱߙ௜ ߪ⁄ ሻ
Φሺܼᇱߙ௜ ߪ⁄ ሻ ≡ ߪ଴஽ߣ଴௜ (5.10)
with ߶ denoting the probability density and Ф the cumulative distribution function of 
the standard normal distribution. The ratio of ߶ and Ф evaluated at ܼᇱߙ௜ ߪ⁄  is the inverse Mills 
ratio (ߣ଴ and ߣଵ in equations (5.9) and (5.10). ߣ଴ and ߣଵ are seen as missing values in 
equations (5.6) and (5.7). Thus, after having estimated a probit model in the first stage and 
having derived the Mills ratios ߣ଴ and ߣଵ, the second stage can be run using the following 
specification: 
ଵܻ௜ ൌ ௜ܺᇱߚଵ ൅ ߪଵ஽ߣଵ௜ ൅ ݑଵ௜ if ܦ௜ ൌ 1 (5.11)
଴ܻ௜ ൌ ௜ܺᇱߚ଴ ൅ ߪ଴஽ߣ଴௜ ൅ ݑ଴௜ if ܦ௜ ൌ 0. (5.12)
In these equations the error terms ݑ଴௜ and ݑଵ௜ have conditional zero means. Following 
Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) we use the full information maximum likelihood method (FIML) to 
estimate this model, i.e. the selection (probit) equation and the outcome equations are 
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 estimated simultaneously. The logarithmic likelihood function to solve equations (5.11) and 
(5.12) via this method is specified as: 
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(5.13)
where ߱௜ denotes an optional weight for observation ݅ , ߩ଴஽ ൌ ߪ଴஽ ߪ଴ߪ஽⁄  is the 
correlation coefficient of ߳଴, and ߳஽ and ߩଵ஽ ൌ ߪଵ஽ ߪଵߪ஽⁄  is the correlation coefficient of ߳ଵ and 
߳஽ . 
When ߩ଴஽ and ߩଵ஽ are significant, the model has an endogenous switch. The signs of 
ߩ଴஽ and ߩଵ஽ can also be interpreted economically. Alternate signs signal that the individuals 
have adopted the technology according to their comparative advantages. When ߩ଴஽ and ߩଵ஽ 
have the same sign this implies “hierarchical sorting”, i.e. adopters have an above-average 
return compared to the non-adopters independent of the adoption decision (Fuglie and 
Bosch, 1995; Alene and Manyong, 2007; Maddala, 1983). 
The ATT ߬஺்்ாௌோ in this case is: 
߬஺்்ாௌோ ൌ ܧሺ ଵܻ|ܦ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܧሺ ଴ܻ|ܦ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ܺᇱሺߚଵ െ ߚ଴ሻ ൅ ሺߪଵ஽ െ ߪ଴஽ሻߣଵ. (5.14)
We now give a short overview of the specification of the endogenous switching 
regression model thereby presenting the underlying hypothesis drawn from previous 
literature and the nature of the respective standards. In total, complete data for 359 farmers 
(184 GlobalGAP certified and 175 organic certified) exists and the estimations are based on 
these 359 farmers9.  
The vast literature on technology adoption offers only limited guidance to derive 
hypotheses on the influence that certain variables may have on farmers’ adoption decisions 
for one or the other certification, because this paper differs from most previous analyses 
because it compares two different certifications. Hence, while previous studies have shown 
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 that exporting farmers and certified farmers alike are younger, more innovative, better 
educated, better connected, wealthier and have larger farms, we try to distinguish differences 
within this group according to farming type.  
The farmers’ decision to enter the export market is the precondition for each of the 
two certifications and we are thus left with characteristics that differ in their influence on the 
decision to apply for organic or GlobalGAP certification respectively. To start with, the 
selection equation includes covariates covering GENDER and AGE as in most of the existing 
literature. Our prior is that, if anything, older female farmers are likely to choose organic 
production. This assumption is based on the literature about the participation in innovations 
(Bellemare, 2012; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Wollni and Zeller, 2007; etc.) as well as 
literature from developed countries that shows that females are more sensible towards 
environmental friendly production. In addition, organic production is supposedly more similar 
to traditional production methods, which in turn are practiced to a larger extent by older 
farmers. 
Next, the variable RISK is constructed from a factor analysis of several questions 
asking the farmer directly for his or her willing to take farming risks, to make use of new 
farming techniques, and the necessity to take a risk to achieve success. We assume that 
organic farming may generally be perceived as the riskier choice, because pests and 
diseases can potentially not as easily be dealt with. On the other hand and specifically to 
Ghana, a lot of conventional farmers have made negative experiences with the volatility of 
the conventional export market (see section 2). A larger household (HHSIZE) may generally 
be more beneficial for organic farming with its higher labor requirements. However in our 
case we expect this effect to be minimal if existing at all, because manual labor is readily 
available in the region under scrutiny. On the contrary and in accordance with Fort and 
Ruben (2009) a higher level of education (EDUC) is expected to be negatively correlated with 
the organic choice because requirements, especially in traceability and record keeping, are 
more sophisticated in the GlobalGAP standard. The variable used here is the maximal 
number of years of formal education (schooling) present in the household. 
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 Since GlobalGAP requires a larger investment than organic certification (see Table 
5.2) and a larger part of it is in equipment, which potentially leads to economies of scale, 
larger farms (FSIZE) are expected to be more likely to invest in GlobalGAP certification 
beyond the decision to export (Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Kassie et al., 2008). Along the 
same lines wealthier farmers could be more likely to invest in GlobalGAP certification 
(WEALTH). Security of tenure rights is expected to be more important for organic farmers, 
which we measure directly through the share of the total farmland owned (OWNLAND) and 
indirectly through the connection to the local government and local authorities (GOVERN), 
similar to Goldstein and Udry (2008)10. Another proxy that covers a different aspect of tenure 
security is the length of the stay in the same village, which we approximate by a dummy on 
whether or not someone is native to the community (NATIVE). For similar reasons specific 
soil characteristics (SOIL) may be more or less suitable for one or the other production 
technique. In addition, certain crop varieties might be preferable for organic and conventional 
production respectively. However, in our case it was consistently reported by all farmers that 
the decision to produce under a specific certification is taken simultaneously with the varietal 
decision. 
Usually a farmer group does not organize the certification process alone. It is aided by 
the exporter, government, an NGO or international donor to varying extents. If these groups 
give different measures and degrees of support (which we cannot observe) and different 
groups support different certifications (which we know is the case) they may thereby 
influence the certification process in different ways. We try to capture this by the dummy 
ORGA. In our sample, farmers have generally been part of their respective farmer 
organizations for considerably more time than they are certified. Thus, the variable ORGA 
captures group effects that are present independent of the decision to certify. In the same 
way, personal networks to other farmers, neighbors and family may be conducive for both 
certifications in a different manner (e.g. Conley and Udry, 2005). A strong personal link is 
where or from whom pineapple farming was learned (LEARN1 and LEARN2). This could 
impact on the openness towards one or the other production method by way of the attitudes 
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 that the teachers display towards certain practices. More directly the variable ENV captures 
the stated level of importance that farmers attribute towards preserving the natural 
environment and thus an implicit preference for or against environmental friendly 
certifications. Since organic cannot only be regarded as a technology, but also as an 
ideological question, the attitudes of farmers towards environmental protection and chemical 
use may play a significant role in the choice. 
Distance to major markets is usually a relevant factor for certification (e.g. Fort and 
Ruben, 2009; Kassie et al., 2008). Since in our case all farmers export through Accra airport 
or Tema harbor, distance to alternative local markets, represented by the variable DIST, may 
be more relevant. 
Finally, ENV captures the implicit preference for or against environmental friendly 
production standards. This makes it a suitable candidate for the exclusion restriction, 
because it is correlated with the certification decision but has certainly no influence on the 
ROI. The selection equation of the endogenous switching regression model needs an 
exclusion restriction to avoid collinearity, because the covariates included in the selection 
equation enter the second stage estimation twice, non-linear through the inverse Mills ratio 
and linear as a coefficient for the ROI. Since most of the observations lie in a quasi-linear 
range of the inverse Mills ratio the model would lead to weak results due to collinearity. To 
reduce this problem one or more exclusion restrictions are needed, that are not added to the 
regression equation of the ROI. ACCRA, the frequency of visits to the capital, is a second 
potential exclusion restriction. This variable measures private (as opposed to farm-related) 
visits to the capital and therefore forms part of the social environment of the farmer, which in 
turn shapes his beliefs. These beliefs in turn influence the adoption decision, but should be of 
minor importance for the ROI. We captured farming related information exchange in the 
variables covering training, inspection, and contacts to other farmers. We hence report the 
results when using ACCRA as exclusion restriction in Table A.5.3. 
Some of the variables used in the selection equation are potentially relevant for our 
outcome variable as well. For instance, following Bellemare (2012) a higher education is 
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 expected to lead to a higher return to better productivity. Age may have a nonlinear effect on 
productivity (Abdulai and Binder, 2006) and the distance to the next market may have an 
effect through lower transport costs or better access to inputs and information. 
The following variables are added in the outcome equation: the number of farm 
inspections and trainings conducted by the exporter or extension services (INSPECT). In 
addition, whether farmers have a written (as opposed to oral) contract with an exporter 
(CONTR) and whether they have access to credit (CREDIT) is included, which may both 
affect agricultural productivity (e.g. Abdulai and Binder, 2006). Since conventional farming is 
more capital intensive, while organic production is more labor intensive, the productivity of 
household or hired labor could have a disparate effect on the performance of organic and 
GlobalGAP farmers. The ratio of costs for hired workers to the total labor costs (HIRED) is 
added in the model. BANK is used as a proxy for savings, assuming that the decision to open 
a bank account and invest in savings is not directly related to this year’s ROI. 
Moreover, whether or farmers produce the modern world-market variety 
(VARIETYMD2) could be relevant since it is considered to be harder and more expensive to 
grow, but also achieving relatively high export prices. Finally the number of years that a 
farmer has been certified (here represented by the variable (CERTIFYEARS) may have an 
effect on the agricultural income as farmers may be able to increase their returns over time.  
 
3.3 Results 
The results of the endogenous switching regression model are presented in Table 5.3. 
Columns (1) and (2) present the estimated coefficients and standard errors of the selection 
equation (equation (5.1). Columns (3) to (5) due the same for the outcome equations 
(equations (5.11) and (5.12)). 
From the selection equation we can confirm that younger, higher educated, wealthier 
but more risk averse farmers with larger farms but a lower share of own land tend to opt 
against organic and for GlobalGAP certification. Whereas experience does not play a 
significant role, how it was learned does. This is likely so, because the decision to produce 
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 organically is at least partly a question of belief and farming values are also transmitted 
during the learning process. Learning from the family almost surely means to learn more 
traditional ways of farming. 
When the farmer organization organized the certification process organic certification 
is more likely. GlobalGAP certification is more often NGO induced, organic certification is 
more often farmer group supported. Organization by the farmer group may allow less 
educated farmers to participate in the standard adoption, reducing the influence of 
education11.  
Surprisingly, being less concerned about the environment makes farmers more likely 
to choose organic production (ENV). This is at first sight counterintuitive. However judging 
from the training material and discussions with farmers, GlobalGAP certification is presented 
to the farmers as particularly environmental friendly, whereas organic is simply presented as 
organic. As expected OWNLAND is positive and highly significant indicating that farmers that 
own their land are more likely to invest in long-term measures, i.e. organic certification. 
However, NATIVE does not have the expected sign. Our possible explanation is specific to 
Ghana. The tenure system in Ghana has been reformed recently. The region around Accra is 
an immigration area for people from the rest of the country. Thereby people moving to the 
Accra region may acquire land under the new tenure system, which could imply that they feel 
that their land is safer than land still managed under the old system. The significance of the 
variable NATIVE in the outcome equations confirms this supposition. Finally, GENDER, 
DIST, HHSIZE and GOVERN are insignificant, which shows that variables that have 
repeatedly been shown as highly important determinants of adoption of any standard may be 
not so relevant for the choice between different standards. 
Those variables that have the same sign in both outcome estimations matter in the 
same way for both groups’ ROI, such as age, household size, access to credit, years of 
certification, whereas those that have alternating signs like NATIVE and EXPER, exert a 
positive influence on one and a negative influence on the other group. The latter include 
WEALTH and savings (BANK), which exert a positive influence on GlobalGAP and a 
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 negative influence on organic farmers. The positive sign is expected, since production 
according to GlobalGAP standards requires higher capital investments savings will help to 
realize them. The negative sign for organic farmers is not so clear. Smaller farms are not only 
more likely to become organic certified; they are also more successful than organic farmers 
with larger farms, whereas the farm size has no significant influence on GlobalGAP farm ROI. 
This may be a hint for confirmation of the occasional claim that smaller farms may be more 
suitable for organic production. It also supports the theory of an inverse farm-size productivity 
relationship for organic farmers, but not for GlobalGAP ones. 
VARIETYMD2 also has alternating signs. In the expert interviews prior to the survey 
we repeatedly heard that ”MD2 is too difficult to produce organically”. Further discussions 
with tropical fruit experts in Germany revealed that it may rather be experience in Ghana with 
this relatively new variety that is lacking. Therefore those who try might not be successful 
(yet). While for both groups receiving more farm inspections increases the ROI, organic 
farms are better off spending a larger part of their production cost on labor, whereas 
GlobalGAP farms should rather buy labor saving inputs, which clearly reveal the proclaimed 
comparative advantages of the two production techniques.12 
Previous studies have found that women are less productive in farming and this result 
is confirmed here in the outcome equation with respect to organic farms. We must however 
note that the overall number of women farmers is very small in our sample. Education loses 
its significance in the outcome equations, meaning that while education selects farmers into 
certain innovation groups, it are not relevant for their success. It is further found that the 
larger the distance from the farm to the local market the greater the ROI of GlobalGAP 
farmers. One possible explanation is that distance to the exporter-buyer, not the local market 
is relevant. Farmers that are far away from local markets, but along the main road, may 
benefit from better accessibility and lower land costs.  
Finally, we studied the contract variable more closely. Farmers with written contracts 
are found to have significantly higher equipment and certification costs (per kg). This does 
not necessarily mean that farmers with a less formal contract do not invest, but rather that 
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 they only invest if they find support from a donor or NGO to finance their investment. This is 
true unless we assume that farmers with a formal contract overinvest. Organic farming does 
not require large investments, hence here the positive effects of a having a more secure 
contract dominate. 
The correlation coefficients ߩ଴஽ and ߩଵ஽ of the endogenous switching regression 
model are not significantly different from zero (last row of Table 5.3) and the Wald test of 
independent equations provides that there is no significant correlation between the error 
terms of the selection and the regression equations. Therefore, impacts of certification can be 
calculated correctly, given observed characteristics (Alene and Manyong, 2007), i.e. there is 
no endogenous switch and unobservables do not influence the certification decision 
significantly.  
Having estimated the coefficients that determine the ROI of organic and GlobalGAP 
farmers, it is possible to predict the potential outcomes of adopters and non-adopters. The 
results are presented in 4. The ESR results in a significant positive impact of organic 
certification on the ROI of the small-scale pineapple farmers. Their ROI is on average 0.6 
larger than it would be if they were GlobalGAP certified instead. The results illustrate that, 
while both organic and GlobalGAP certified pineapples farmers achieve a positive ROI, it is 
higher for organic farming. This is evidence in favor of organic farming being worth its 
investment. In line with the conclusions of previous studies, the underlying data indicates that 
the reason is the price premium received for organic certified products and not lower 
production costs. 
 
3.4 Robustness Checks 
First, the robustness of the ESR is checked by using different exclusion restrictions. The first 
one is using ACCRA instead of ENV, reported in detail in Table A.5.3. Further the following 
variations are made: using all possible combinations of ENV, WEALTH and ACCRA. The 
estimated ATTs then vary between 0.651 (when using ACCRA and ENV) and 0.986 (when 
using only WEALTH), i.e. the results are quite robust to changes in the exclusion restriction. 
146
 Second, because we find no significant influence of unobservables, we additionally 
test the robustness of the results using a non-parametric technique that accounts for 
observables only, i.e. propensity score matching (PSM henceforth). Since there is no 
endogenous switch, the results should not change. PSM assumes selection on observables 
only which is manifested in the conditional independence assumption (CIA), i.e. that potential 
outcomes are independent of the technology choice conditional on covariates ܼ. If this is so, 
they are also independent of the technology choice conditional on the propensity score ܲ	ሺܼሻ. 
ܲሺܼ௜ሻ ൌ ܲݎሺܦ௜ ൌ 1|ܼ௜ሻ ൌ ܨሺܼ௜ᇱߙሻ gives the probability of an individual adopting a technology 
depending on the observed covariates ܼ. Given this, the ATT can be generated by 
comparing treated and untreated individuals with similar propensity scores.  
The results are very similar to the ones of the ESR explained above and will not be 
discussed in detail. The matching algorithms used are kernel matching with a bandwidth of 
0.4, radius matching with a caliper of 0.05 and nearest-neighbor matching with different 
amounts of neighbors (the tables only display the results for four neighbors and kernel). The 
balancing property is satisfied with the underlying probit model used to generate the 
propensity scores (Table A.5.4). We use several methods to test the matching quality.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest that the differences in the means of the 
covariates between the two groups should vanish after matching. Table A.5.5 shows that t-
tests result are insignificant after matching for all covariates except FSIZE. Next, the 
standardized bias before and after matching is shown in Table A.5.6. It is reduced by 70% 
from 27.67 to 8.19 when using the kernel algorithm. A reduction of the mean bias by 3-5% is 
considered as sufficient in most empirical studies (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). As a further 
indicator for matching quality, the pseudo-R2 reports how well the probit model explains the 
participation probability. After the matching procedure it should be very low to indicate that 
there are no significant differences between adopters and non-adopters that are used for 
matching. With 0.03-0.05 depending on the matching algorithm this is the case. The same 
idea is used when testing likelihood ratio of joint significance. While the p-value of the 
likelihood ratio should be significant before matching it should be insignificant afterwards, 
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 which is the case for all applied matching algorithms. Since the balancing tests hold for the 
specified probit model, the ATT can be generated. It is reported in Table 5.5. Taking the 
common support assumption into account, 12 organic farmers are not considered in the 
calculation because the propensity score of those farmers are larger than the maximum of 
the propensity scores of the GlobalGAP farmers (Figure A.5.1). 
The results of the ATT for the PSM are shown in Table 5.5. They are slightly higher 
than the ATT generated by the ESR; they differ between 0.914 and 0.958 depending on the 
matching algorithm that was used13. We also perform several robustness checks for the 
PSM. To test the sensitivity of the results vis-à-vis unobservables Rosenbaum bounds were 
calculated (Rosenbaum, 2002). The critical values of ߁ሺ߁∗ሻ =1.3 (kernel) and 1.4 (nearest 
neighbor) indicate that the ATT would still be significant even if matched pairs differ in their 
odds of certification by the factor 1.3 or 1.4 respectively, showing a moderate sensitivity to 
the influence of unobservables. However, since the ESR indicates that there is no 
endogenous switch, we do not need to be very worried. In addition, higher ordered variables 
were included in the base probit model (Dehejia, 2005). Exemplary results using squared 
FSIZE, EDUC, and HHSIZE are in Table A.5.7. The results appear robust to small changes 
in the underlying probit model. 
Then, we also used a weighted least squares regression (WLS) using the inverse of 
the propensity score as weighting scheme as proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2001), which 
again results in similar values for the ATT and similar values of the coefficients shown in 
Table A.5.9. Finally, we also conduct an OLS estimation of the two equations (5.6) and (5.7), 
which also does not change most coefficients significantly compared to the ESR (not shown).  
Table 5.5 summarizes the estimated ATTs of PSM, ESR, WLS and OLS. One can 
see that, via WLS and OLS the ATT is estimated to be a little bit larger than the other 
approaches indicate, which indicates that these methods tend to overestimate the ATT 
slightly. The most conservative estimate comes from our main model and still results in a 
significant positive impact. 
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 4 Conclusions and Discussion 
In order to expand and diversify agricultural export activities, policies promote the 
participation of small-scale farmers in developing countries in international markets. These 
markets require certification with internationally approved food labels. We have measured the 
returns to the investment in organic and GlobalGAP certification in this paper. Both are worth 
their investment because they achieve on average a positive ROI, however organic 
certification is the more profitable option, i.e. the one with a higher ROI. The reason lies in 
higher prices for organic fruit which overcompensate for lower yields on organic farms, 86% 
of the yield of GlobalGAP farms based on the number of pineapples harvested and 73% on 
kilogram basis. Employment effects are also likely to be higher for organic production, 
because this method is more labor intensive. This result is valid when we control for selection 
bias and single out the effect of certification vis-à-vis contract farming and exporting.  
We are able to see from the adoption pattern that relatively poorer, less educated 
households are more likely to produce organically. Whether they are more attracted by this 
form of production or whether this reflects how exporters and NGOs target farmers cannot be 
determined. Nevertheless, it implies that organic certification has the potential to reduce 
poverty and inequality. This is a twofold positive result, because at the same time the 
demand for organic products is increasing faster than the demand for conventional food. 
However, the production cycle on organic farms is on average longer than the production 
cycle on GlobalGAP farms. When boiled down to the same period, e.g. one year, the income 
from farming is about the same for organic and GlobalGAP farms, so that the starting point of 
being less wealthy than conventional farmers is not reversed. 
Not being able to measure risks of certification for instance by collecting information 
about survival rates is a limitation of our analysis. We also did not take into account long-term 
externalities of organic certified farming, such as the effects of increased rural labor demand 
and environmental effects, such as whether organic farming is able to diminish the problem 
of declining soil fertility in Ghana and whether there is a trade-off between environmental and 
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 economic objectives. There is hence ample opportunity for further research, in particular 
using panel data. 
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Figure 5.1: Volume and Value of Pineapple Exports from Ghana 
 
Source: SPEG 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in the Estimations 
Definition Variable Organic 
Farmers 
(N=185) 
Convent. 
Farmers 
(N=201) 
t-Stat.
Gender of household head (HHH) 
1 if HHH is male, 0 otherwise 
GENDER 0.891 0. 982 -3.51*** 
Age of HHH AGE 46.313 42.970 2.82*** 
Household size (persons living in household) HHSIZE 5.230 5.917 -2.35** 
Fraction of adults (older than 15) in household ADULT 0.684 0.665 0.75
Being native in community (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) NATIVE 0.738 0.738 -0.01
Maximal educational level in household (years) EDUC 9.470 10.195 -3.19*** 
Farm size (acre) FSIZE 10.35 18.720 -5.02*** 
Share of land owned OWNLAND  0.549 0.204 7.628*** 
Pineapple land (acre) PINLAND 4.014 3.066 2.07** 
Access to credit during the last 5 years 
1 if yes, 0 otherwise 
CREDIT 0.317 0.232 1.78* 
Bank account with more than 200 GHS 
1 if yes, 0 otherwise 
BANK  0.339 0.512 -3.21*** 
Number of durable goods owned WEALTH  4.765 8.481 -10.875*** 
Relation to the local government 
1=none, 
2=HHH knows someone in the local government, 
3=HHH has friends in the local government, 
4=strong relation/politically active 
GOVERN 2.257 1.774 4.27*** 
Self-stated openness to innovation and risk (factor 
analysis: the stronger the agreement, the larger) 
RISK 0.152 -0.166 3.01*** 
Years of experience in pineapple farming EXPER 11.557 11.595 -0.05
How pineapple farming was learned    
 from family members and friends 
 (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
LEARN 1 0.863 0.501 7.97*** 
 as a laborer on a farm or from 
 (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
LEARN 2 0.071 0.286 -5.51*** 
Frequency of being in Accra 
1=never, 2=once, 3=at least once a year, 
…, 6=at least once a week 
ACCRA 3.661 1.976 11.07*** 
Importance of preserving the environment 
1= very important, ..., 4= not important 
ENV 1.775 1.281 6.91*** 
Number of years being certified CERTIFYEARS 3.165 2.032 3.875*** 
Distance to the closest local market (hours) DIST 0.698 0.804 -1.59
Soil characteristics 
1=red or black sandy, 2=white sandy, 3=white 
rocky, 4=rocky red or black, 5=sandy or rocky clay, 
6=clay, 7=other 
SOIL 2.781 2.304 2.13** 
 Variety Smooth Cayenne (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) SC 0.098 0.351 -5.99*** 
 Variety Sugar Loaf (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) SL 0.634 0.036 15.06*** 
Share of labor cost for hired workers HIRED 0.484 0.607 -3.13*** 
Assistance or training for farming received during last 
5 years (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
ASSIST 0.732 0.708 0.50
Number of farm inspection during the last 5 years INSPECT 1.913 2.619 -0.94
Written contract with exporter (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) CONTR 0.410 0.417 -0.13
Organizer of the certification process 
1 if farmer organization, 0 otherwise 
ORGA 0.508 0.143 7.84*** 
Significance levels:   *: 10%   **: 5%   ***: 1% 
We use a conversion factor of 1 GHS = 0.46 Euros (calculated on the basis of the exchange rate on January 12, 
2010). 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of Economic Variables 
Variable Organic 
Farmers 
 
Conventional 
Farmers 
t-Stat.  
Agricultural equipment 0.002 0.009 -2.77 *** 
Agricultural inputs 0.011 0.077 -5.97 *** 
Renewal of certification 0.000 0.006 -4.27 *** 
Land used for pineapple 0.004 0.004 -0.004  
Hired workers 0.037 0.019 3.77 *** 
Household labor 0.034 0.009 5.68 *** 
Yield (pineapple per acre) 15780 18259 -4.11 *** 
Quantity sold (in Kg) 23486 36235 -2.81 *** 
Average local price (GHS per Kg) 0.210 0.131 8.50 *** 
Average export price (GHS per Kg) 0.251 0.196 5.40 *** 
Share sold on local market 0.495 0.354 3.00 *** 
Revenue (GHS per Kg) 0.219 0.170 5.80 *** 
Production costs (GHS per Kg) 0.105 0.118 -0.94  
Profits (GHS per Kg) 0.114 0.052 4.01 *** 
ROI 2.760 1.800 3.11 *** 
Initial certification costs (GHS) 70.497 444.116 -12.18*** 
Renewal of certification (GHS) 0.732 93.089 -6.16*** 
Amortization (years) 0.083 0.283 -3.28*** 
We use a conversion factor of 1 Ghana Cedi (GHS)=0.46 Euros. The t-statistic belongs 
to the mean difference test between column (2) and (3). Significance levels: *:10% 
**:5%  ***:1% 
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 Table 5.3: Estimation Results of ESR 
 Selection Eq. Organic farmers Convent. farmers 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GENDER -0.410 0.487 0.921** 0.452 -0.147 0.695
AGE 0.039** 0.014 0.004 0.015 0.057 0.023
NATIVE -0.009 0.298 -0.424*** 0.047 0.253 0.401
RISK 0.310** 0.111 0.130 0.207 -0.423* 0.242
HHSIZE -0.044 0.045 -0.004 0.079 -0.025 0.065
EDUC -0.414*** 0.143 -0.218 0.164 -0.177 0.152
FSIZE -0.018** 0.010 -0.048*** 0.010 0.007 0.013
OWNLAND 0.764*** 0.266 -0.061 0.387 0.712 0.639
GOVERN 0.177 0.128 0.198 0.185 -0.234 0.180
EXPER -0.006 0.017 0.004 0.021 -0.048 0.031
LEARN1 0.297 0.415 -0.536 0.471 -0.088 0.514
LEARN2 -0.979*** 0.488 -1.147 0.838 -1.025** 0.496
DIST -0.266 0.221 0.069 0.195 0.859** 0.394
SOIL 0.168*** 0.044 -0.052 0.075 0.099 0.112
ORGA 1.243*** 0.341 -0.231 0.487 -0.856 0.697
WEALTH -0.411*** 0.087 -0.245* 0.113 0.097 0.056
ENV 0.502** 0.213
BANK -0.770** 0.354 0.807** 0.401
CREDIT -0.193 0.354 -0.420 0.424
VARIETYMD2 -2.143*** 0.775 0.208 0.528
HIRED 0.512 0.524 -2.234*** 0.464
INSPECT 0.054*** 0.014 0.050** 0.024
CONTR 0.405** 0.219 -1.150*** 0.436
CERTIFYEARSNO -0.010 0.057 -0.287 0.248
INTERCEPT 2.899*** 1.065 2.659** 1.327 2.712* 1.523
ߩଵ஽  -0.405 0.972
݈݊ߪଵ  0.584*** 0.081
ߩ଴஽  0.438 0.419
݈݊ߪ଴  0.517*** 0.112
Log-Likelihood:                                                    -595.538 
Wald test of indep. eqns.:                                  ߯ଶሺ2ሻ = 16.21*** 
Significance levels:   *: 10%   **: 5% ***: 1% 
 
 
 
Table 5.4: ATT Measured by the ESM 
 Predicted 
ROI 
of adopt. 
(mean) 
Predicted 
ROI 
of non-
adopt. 
(mean) 
ATT t-Statistic 
Organic farmers 2.412 1.732 0.680 3.37*** 
Conventional farmers -0.140 1.996
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 Table 5.5: Summary of Results ATT 
Method Predicted ROI 
of adopt. 
Predicted ROI 
of non-adopt. 
ATT t-Statistic
ESR  
 Organic farmers 2.412 1.732 0.6809 3.37*** 
 Conventional farmers -0.140 1.996  
ESR using ACCRA  
 Organic farmers 3.111 1.212 0.899 4.97*** 
 Conventional farmers 0.181 1.796  
  
Weighted Least Squares  
 Organic farmers 3.967 2.677 1.113 5.69*** 
 Conventional farmers 1.799 1.565  
  
OLS  
 Organic farmers 2.662 1.282 1.180 5.92*** 
 Conventional farmers 1.983 1.777  
 ROI of 
treated 
ROI of 
control group 
ATT t-Statistic
PSM  
Kernel (bandwidth=0.4) 2.819 1.900 0.919 2.91** 
Radius (caliper=0.05) 2.818 2.091 0.914 2.22** 
Nearest-neighbor 2.818 1.861 0.958 2.04** 
Significance levels:   *: 10%   **: 5%   ***: 1% 
There are 125 adopters whose propensity scores lie within the common support region. 
For PSM, standard errors are calculated with bootstrapping using 1000 replications. 
Bootstrapping of standards errors is necessary because the estimated variance does not 
include the variance that may appear due to the estimation of the propensity score and the 
imputation of the common support assumption (Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), p.51). Even 
though Abadie and Imbens (2008) criticism the use of bootstrapping for the nearest-
neighbor algorithm, its application is still common practice. 
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 Appendix 
Table A.5.1: Average Pineapple Prices (GHS per Kg) 
Variety Organic 
Farmers 
Conventional 
Farmers 
 Local Export Local Export 
Smooth Cayenne 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.19 
Sugar Loaf 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.21 
MD2 0.10 - 0.14 0.20 
  
 
 
Table A.5.2: Composition of Initial Certification Costs (in GHS) 
Variable Organic 
Farmers 
(N=142) 
Conventional 
Farmers 
(N=111) 
t-Statistic
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Certification 36.866 19.127 % 303.815 54.970% 8.44*** 
Training 27.661 56.516% 51.171 25.834% 6.2*** 
Equipment 9.394 22.622% 69.153 19.165% 12.70*** 
Other 1.211 1.733% 0.108 0.031% -0.86
Significance levels:   *: 10%   **: 5%   ***: 1% 
Column (2) and (4) present the part of each cost category on the total initial certification costs of 
organic and conventional farmers. The t-statistic belongs to the test of difference in means of column 
(1) and (3). 
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 Table A.5.3. Estimation Results of ESR using ACCRA 
 Selection Eq. Organic farmers Convent. farmers 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GENDER -0.457 0.487 0.872* 0.472 -0.029 0.751
AGE 0.042** 0.014 0.004 0.014 0.068 0.025
NATIVE -0.289 0.308 -0.478*** 0.038 0.302 0.384
RISK 0.208 0.134 0.117 0.170 -0.419* 0.246
HHSIZE -0.085* 0.051 0.006 0.065 -0.069 0.083
EDUC -0.378** 0.161 -0.225 0.177 -0.242 0.246
FSIZE -0.018** 0.009 -0.040*** 0.010 0.006 0.014
OWNLAND 0.769*** 0.218 -0.054 0.412 0.669 0.688
GOVERN 0.200* 0.124 0.173 0.220 -0.331 0.281
EXPER -0.023 0.018 0.005 0.022 -0.049* 0.027
LEARN1 0.471 0.302 0.367 0.481 -0.872 0.505
LEARN2 -0.881** 0.421 -0.866 0.838 -0.926* 0.504
DIST -0.287 0.185 0.179 0.216 0.995** 0.402
SOIL 0.136** 0.077 0.022 0.075 0.093 0.114
ORGA 1.711*** 0.645 -0.533 0.515 -0.790 0.668
WEALTH -0.403*** 0.067 -0.167 0.118 0.007 0.053
ACCRA 0.413*** 0.116
BANK -0.741** 0.367 0.924** 0.402
CREDIT -0.122 0.358 -0.270 0.398
VARIETYMD2 -2.021* 1.084 0.126 0.506
HIRED 0.491 0.536 -1.921*** 0.480
INSPECT 0.051*** 0.015 0.061** 0.026
CONTR 0.474** 0.276 -1.280*** 0.447
CERTIFYEARSNO -0.024 0.058 -0.271 0.233
INTERCEPT 3.090*** 1.097 2.141* 1.273 2.780* 1.532
ߩଵ஽  -0.336 1.159
݈݊ߪଵ  0.534*** 0.088
ߩ଴஽  0.303 0.252
݈݊ߪ଴  0.493*** 0.108
Log-Likelihood:                                                    -552.494 
Wald test of indep. eqns.:                               ߯ଶሺ2ሻ = 18.50*** 
Significance levels:   *: 10%   **: 5% ***: 1% 
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 Table A.5.4. Estimation Results of Probit Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
GENDER -0.691* 0.367
AGE 0.033*** 0.040
NATIVE 0.004 0.190
RISK 0.176** 0.083
HHSIZE -0.030 0.033
EDUC -0.116*** 0.398
WEALTH -0.418*** 0.074
FSIZE -0.026*** 0.005
OWNLAND 0.679*** 0.237
GOVERN 0.287*** 0.075
EXPER 0.008 0.129
LEARN1 0.191 0.341
LEARN2 -1.230*** 0.406
DIST -0.245* 0.127
SOIL 0.038 0.036
ORGA 1.101*** 0.193
INTERCEPT 0.366 0.647
Significance levels: *: 10%  **: 5% ***: 1% 
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 Table A.5.5: Results of T-tests Before and After Kernel Matching 
Mean  
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias %reduc. bias t p> |t|
GENDER Unmatched 0.88028 0.97297 -37.6  -2.74 0.007
 Matched 0.90244 0.93456 -12.1 65.6 -0.27 0.778
AGE Unmatched 48.489 42.541 54.0  4.18 0
 Matched 47.043 46.317 11.2 79.3 0.81 0.424
NATIVE  Unmatched 0.73239 0.74775 -3.5  -0.27 0.784
 Matched 0.73729 0.77324 -8.2 134.2 -0.64 0.523
RISK Unmatched 0.14748 -0.18867 34.5  2.69 0.008
 Matched 0.13624 0.14944 -1.3 90.3 -0.12 0.904
HHSIZE Unmatched 5.4577 6.2342 -27.1  -2.16 0.031
 Matched 5.5366 5.6321 -3.5 85.2 -0.33 0.740
EDUC Unmatched 9.470 10.195 -32.7  -3.19 0.002
 Matched 9.6524 9.5154 6.2 81.1 0.51 0.614
WEALTH  Unmatched 4.765 8.481 -109.5  10.875 0
 Matched 5.521 5.958 -12.9 88.2 -1.09 0.317
FSIZE Unmatched 10.151 18.797 -59.1  -4.76 0
 Matched 10.347 14.424 -27.9 52.9 -2.57 0.011
OWNLAND  Unmatched 0.549 0.204 53.35  -7.628 0
 Matched 0.437 0.402 7.6 65.8 -0.91 0.361
GOVERN Unmatched 2.1972 1.8919 27.6  2.17 0.031
 Matched 2.178 2.2313 -4.8 82.5 -0.34 0.732
EXPER Unmatched 11.986 13.288 -18.4  -1.43 0.153
 Matched 11.738 11.774 -0.5 97.3 -0.04 0.964
LEARN1 Unmatched 0.83099 0.57658 59.8  4.64 0
 Matched 0.80508 0.78239 12.9 78.3 0.34 0.733
LEARN2 Unmatched 0.7042 0.31532 -65.0  -5.31 0
 Matched 0.8475 0.14237 -15.3 76.5 -1.39 0.164
DIST Unmatched 0.72889 0.82065 -19.9  -1.11 0.27
 Matched 0.70296 0.76285 -9.9 50.2 -0.89 0.377
SOIL Unmatched 2.9507 2.4054 25  1.98 0.049
 Matched 2.7881 2.8872 -4.5 81.8 -0.34 0.737
ORGA Unmatched 0.34507 0.07207 71.1  5.43 0
 Matched 0.315 0.233 21.4 69.8 1.49 0.138
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 Table A.5.6: Mean bias, Pseudo ࡾ૛ and Likelihood Ratio Before and After Matching 
Algorithm Sample Mean bias Pseudo ࡾ૛ LR ࣑૛ p>࣑૛
Kernel Unmatched 27.671 0.309 161.41 0.000
 Matched 8.189 0.046 18.43 0.299
Radius (0.05) Unmatched 27.671 0.309 161.41 0.000
 Matched 11.278 0.041 14.84 0.462
Nearest-neighbor Unmatched 27.671 0.309 161.41 0.000
 Matched 9.398 0.030 13.45 0.492
    
 
Table A.5.7: Results of Extended Models Before and After Matching 
Specification ATT  t-Stat. Mean bias Pseudo ࡾ૛ LR ࣑૛ p>࣑૛ 
Baseline kernel matching   
 Unmatched 27.662 0.332 173.54 0.000
 Matched 0.954 2.90** 8.190 0.045 20.34 0.159
+ FSIZE²   
 Unmatched 27.830 0.334 174.71 0.000
 Matched 0.963 3.07** 8.213 0.048 21.87 0.190
+ FSIZE² & EDUC²   
 Unmatched 28.115 0.361 173.25 0.000
 Matched 0.916 2.82** 8.253 0.056 22.51 0.210
+ FSIZE² & EDUC² & HHSIZE²   
 Unmatched 27.807 0.358 164.21 0.000
 Matched 0.951 2.19 8.386 0.066 23.68 0.209
Significance levels:   *: 10%   **: 5% ***: 1% 
       
 
 
Table A.5.8: Results - ATT (reduced equipment costs) 
Method Predicted ROI 
of adopt. 
(mean) 
Predicted ROI 
of non-adopt. 
(mean) 
ATT t-Statistic
ESR  
 Organic farmers 2.825 2.205 0.803 5.361*** 
 Conventional farmers 2.784 1.722  
 ROI of 
treated 
(mean) 
ROI of 
control group 
(mean) 
ATT t-Statistic
PSM  
 Kernel 2.892 2.283 0.609 1.86* 
   Radius (0.05) 2.892  2.250 0.642 1.44
 Nearest-neighbor 2.892 2.016 0.782 1.76* 
Significance levels:   *: 10%   **: 5% ***: 1% 
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 Table A.5.9: Estimation Results of WLS Regression 
 Organic farmers Convent. farmers 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
GENDER 0.723 0.506 -0.154 0.464
AGE -0.014 0.015 0.021 0.019
NATIVE -0.618** 0.243 0.657* 0.407
RISK -0.188 0.167 -0.165 0.221
HHSIZE -0.06 0.065 0.010 0.061
EDUC -0.055 0.067 -0.161 0.102
FSIZE -0.035*** 0.011 0.005 0.011
OWNLAND 0.178 0.365 0.259 0.497
GOVERN 0.208 0.163 -0.194 0.179
EXPER 0.018 0.024 -0.027 0.024
LEARN1 -0.410 0.468 -0.261 0.488
LEARN2 -0.501 0.890 -0.717** 0.405
DISTANCE 0.124 0.290 0.623** 0.307
SOIL -0.093 0.076 0.043 0.104
ORGA -0.193 0.424 -1.099* 0.568
WEALTH -0.142 0.096 0.107** 0.045
BANK -0.826** 0.347 0.827** 0.351
CREDIT 0.120 0.382 -0.418 0.477
VARIETYMD2 -2.108*** 0.520 0.321 0.410
HIRED 0.389 0.581 -1.779*** 0.495
INSPECT 0.061*** 0.014 0.040 0.031
CONTR 0.420 0.362 -0.720** 0.364
CERTIFYEARSNO -0.031 0.059 -0.219 0.256
INTERCEPT 2.502 2.265 2.555* 1.438
N 176 173 
ܴଶ  0.412 0.249 
Significance levels:  *: 10%   **: 5%   ***: 1% 
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 Figure A.5.1: Distribution of Propensity Scores and 
Common Support for Propensity Score Estimation 
 
Source: STATA output of own calculation 
Note: “Treated: on support” indicates that organic certified farmers have a suitable comparison. 
“Treated: off support” indicates that organic certified farmers do not have a suitable comparison. 
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 Notes 
                                                
 
1 In addition, since certification often comes with a contract with an exporter, the literature on impacts of contract 
farming is similar in terms of empirical strategy and in some cases overlaps. The link between contract farming 
and certification is that a contractual relationship can facilitate value addition through certification. In some cases 
certification is a prerequisite for contracts. The literature on contract farming that is not specifically related to 
certification under a private voluntary standard (e.g. Bellemare, 2012) is skipped here. 
2 This switch was difficult for many farmers, in particular small-scale farmers, due to the necessary investment in 
expensive planting material and initial lack of information on production particularities and timing of inputs for 
MD2. Initially mainly large companies shifted to MD2 production (FAO, 2009). There were efforts made by the 
Ghanaian government and other donors to support the small-scale pineapple producers with the new variety, for 
instance through the distribution of MD2 suckers. During the same time Costa Rica, where the MD2 originated, 
increased its pineapple market share in Europe from 43.1% to 65% (UNCTAD, 2008). It is nowadays at over 70%. 
3 Source: http://www.organic-world.net/statistics-data-tables-dynamic.html. 
4 Out of the 386 farmers, one farmer had to be deleted because of answers that did not seem to be realistic and 
the ROI and other variables resulted in extreme outliers. 
5 We speak of ”smallholders” or ”small-scale farmers” even though we do not adhere to the definition of a 
smallholder, which is less than two hectares. However, apart from over-reporting of land sizes, all farmers in the 
sample are sufficiently small to fall strictly under group certification schemes. This is the relevant measure for us. 
6 Since our focus is not on the soil, we did not ask more detailed questions about the different soil types and their 
advantages and disadvantages for pineapple production. 
7 Amortization is only generated for positive profits, which is the case for 271 farmers (organic: 154, conventional: 
117). This falsifies the result but is the only reasonable calculation. 
8 As mentioned by Hottel and Gardner (1983) and others it is difficult to measure the adequate wage rate in 
agriculture and the exact amount of labor used for production which are needed to calculate the ROI (and all other 
measures in use, such as farm income). We will explain further below how we dealt with this problem. In addition, 
if organic production does not only affect the farmer’s profit, but also his welfare in other ways (e.g. health) our 
measure will be incomplete. There are two reasons why this does not bother us. First, since the farmers under 
study are poor there should be at least a small monetary gain associated with the adoption of a new agricultural 
technology when a partial aim is to lift farmers out of poverty. Second, non-financial welfare gains are hard to 
measure, let alone to monetize. Therefore incorporating them into the return on investment might not improve our 
measure compared to reporting them separately. 
9 It is of interest to not reduce the sample further as already done by missing ROI components. Therefore the few 
single missing values where imputed using several methods. None of them changed the values presented.  
Missing household head ages were replaced with the age of the wife plus six years, if available, or the age of the 
oldest child plus 23 years. 23 and six are found to be the average differences of the households age and his 
wife/children. The education variable (EDUC) has one missing value which could not be replaced reasonably. The 
same applies for one farmer that misses information on AGE. 
10 Goldstein and Udry (2008) concluded from a study in Akwapim, Ghana, that individuals who have a 
more powerful position in the local hierarchy have more secure tenure rights and are thus more willing 
to invest in soil fertility. 
11 Literacy has been mentioned as an important entry barrier for certifications that require the keeping 
of farm records. When the certification process is organized by the farming group, and the latter takes 
care of the record keeping as well, education of a single farmer may not as important. 
12 To assure that farming equipment bought by the farmers during the evaluation period are not influencing the 
result of the ATT robustness checks were made. Therefore, the same estimations were done excluding the 
equipment costs of knifes, motor-driven vehicles, safety equipment for farm and storage facilities. The results can 
be found in Table A.5.8. 
13 Calipers were actually varied, but only one result is presented here. The 1-nearest-neighbor matching 
generates the same ATT like caliper matching with a caliper being greater than 0.032 and is therefore assumed to 
be sufficiently precise. Radius matching with varying calipers of 0.05 and 0.1 also generates likewise results that 
do not differ significantly from the other results. Furthermore, as Abadie et al. (2004) suggest, we also apply the 
STATA command nnmatch to estimate the ATT with analytical estimators of the asymptotic variance for the 
nearest-neighbor algorithm to avoid bootstrapping of standard errors. The value of the ATT stays very similar.  
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 Organic Certification, Agro-Ecological Practices and Return on 
Investment: 
Farm Level Evidence from Ghana 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The recent empirical literature on economic sustainability of certified export crops shows that 
certification standards that enhance yields are important for improving farm revenues and 
farmer welfare. However, limited evidence exists on the impact of organic certification on the 
adoption of agro-ecological practices. In this study, we use unique farm-level data from 
Ghana to examine the impact of organic certification on the use of agro-ecological practices 
to improve environmental conditions, as well as how using these measures affect farm 
outcomes such as return on investment. In the former, we utilize an endogenous switching 
regression approach to account for selection bias due to unobservable factors. Our empirical 
results reveal that organic certification increases agro-ecological practice use, although from 
a very low starting point. Using a generalized propensity score approach, we show that there 
is a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of agro-ecological practice use and return on 
investment. 
 
 
Keywords: organic agriculture, certification, agro-ecological practices, return on investment, 
impact assessment  
JEL codes: O13, Q13, Q17, Q56 
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 1 Introduction 
Concerns over climate change and increasing pressure on land have resulted in increased 
promotion of sustainable production methods that increase yields, while protecting the 
environment as well as increasing the resilience of crops to climatic change (Kassam et al., 
2012; Branca et al., 2011; FAO, 2011; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Erenstein, 2002). Such 
agro-ecological practices form part of organic agriculture principles, but in practice low-input 
production with no or very little sustainable soil and water management is frequently certified 
as organic in many developing countries. 
To encourage the adoption of sustainable production methods, national governments, 
NGOs and international donors have promoted the marketing of export crops through 
certified marketing channels, mostly through farmer-based groups, as an attractive business 
model for smallholders in developing countries (Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011). These 
sustainable certification schemes have become increasingly popular in many countries 
because they combine valued traits that are related to the environment, poverty alleviation, 
and health outcomes into a single commodity (Barham and Weber, 2012). Consumers 
generally show their preferences for such products by paying higher prices to support an 
environmentally healthy world. On the other hand, the success of these schemes depends to 
a large extent on prices received and incomes earned by the farmers.  
The significance of these schemes in promoting sustainable farm practices and 
improving the incomes of smallholders in developing countries has attracted the attention of 
many policy analysts over the last few years. In particular, several studies have examined the 
impacts of certification schemes on farm outcomes such as farm revenues, profits, and 
household poverty (Pretty et al., 2003; Ninan and Sathyapalan, 2005; Bolwig et al., 2009; 
Valkila, 2009; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Barham and Weber, 2012). Most researchers find 
modest positive impacts of organic certification on farm revenues and household income, 
using various measures and econometric approaches. Most studies attribute the positive 
impacts of certification to price premiums that are paid at least for part of the crop sales (e.g. 
Valkila, 2009; Bolwig et al., 2009; ITC, 2011), although it is usually not clear whether the 
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 effect comes from certification, contract or export market access. It is important to note that 
some researchers have been rather skeptical on the ability of certification to lift farmers out of 
poverty, given the usually low revenue increases. The main reasons for this skepticism are 
the high certification and investment costs involved in the process (Calo and Wise, 2005; 
Valkila, 2009; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011). 
Despite this increasing number of impact assessment studies, very few studies have 
considered the environmental outcomes of different certification programs (Barham and 
Weber, 2012). Philpott et al.’s (2007) study on Mexico examines environmental outcomes by 
analyzing the impact of certification on vegetation and ant and bird diversity in coffee farms 
and forests. Rather surprisingly, their findings show no differences between in vegetation 
characteristics, ant or bird species richness, or fraction of forest fauna in farms based on 
certification. Pretty et al. (2006) conduct a review of 286 interventions to show that the use of 
sustainable agricultural practices increases productivity on developing country farms, albeit 
using best practices. Bolwig et al. (2009) studied the effect of organic contract farming and 
adoption of organic practices on 112 coffee producing smallholders and conclude there are 
somewhat higher revenues for farmers that adopt organic farming techniques, findings 
confirmed by Blackman and Naranjo (2010) who find that organic certified farmers in Costa 
Rica use less chemicals and adopt some environmental friendly management practices. 
However, they base their analysis on only 35 certified coffee farmers in Costa Rica. 
With the notable exception of the study by Pretty et al. (2006), which includes 
countries from sub-Saharan Africa, we find no empirical evidence on the impacts of 
certification on environmental outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, the dependence 
of the yield impact of organic certification on the intensity of agro-ecological practice use has 
hardly been studied in the existing literature. Some authors have argued that organic farming 
in Africa mostly implies the non-application no chemical inputs, without necessarily adopting 
alternative soil fertility management practices. This is particularly so for the many 
smallholders in Africa, who traditionally produce ”organically by default”, since they virtually 
use no external input. The smallholders who use no chemical inputs or very low levels of 
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 external inputs normally face lower entry barriers into organic certification programs, since 
they require small adjustments to meet certification requirements. Organic certification only 
requires abstaining from the use of chemical substances, but not the active use of alternative 
inputs.  
 However, Barham and Weber (2012) suggest that improving productivity by means of 
agronomic practices may be more important than focusing on price increases by means of 
certification. On the other hand access to higher-priced organic markets may provide 
incentives to adopt (more) agro-ecological practices as suggested by (Wollni et al., 2010). 
This study contributes to the literature by examining the effect of organic certification 
on the extent to which agro-ecological practices are used, as well as the impact of the 
intensity of use on the return on investment (ROI). We employ data from a recent farm-level 
survey of 386 small-scale pineapple farmers in the Greater-Accra and Central Regions of 
Ghana. The study accounts for selection bias due to unobservable factors by using the 
framework of endogenous switching regression approach (Lee, 1978). The approach allows 
us to analyze the determinants and effects of the adoption decision of organic farming on the 
use of agro-ecological practices separately for adopters and non-adopters among the sample 
of 386 pineapple farmers. In investigating the impact of agro-ecological practice on ROI, we 
use the generalized propensity score approach developed by Hirano and Imbens (2004) to 
control for selection bias. 
As in many other developing countries, agricultural production in Ghana contributes to 
environmental damage such as underground water depletion, soil erosion, water and soil 
pollution, loss of biodiversity, deforestation, and global climate change. In particular, crops 
that are produced for export are usually intensively treated with pesticides to assure the 
required quality and uniformity. This is also the case for pineapple, the third most important 
agricultural export product of the country after cocoa and palm oil. On the environmental 
side, climate change is expected to have negative effects on agricultural production, while 
population pressure will contribute to increased soil degradation and consequently lower crop 
yields (Diao and Sarpong, 2007). The Ghanaian government has attempted to address these 
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 problems through environmental protection (Government of Ghana, 2010) and has 
established an organic agriculture desk in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA). Our 
findings show that organic certification increases agro-ecological practice use, suggesting 
that certification already serves as a catalyst for the use of agro-ecological practices. We also 
find that the use of agro-ecological practices generally has a positive and nonlinear effect on 
the return on investment. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: The next section gives an 
overview of the pineapple sector in Ghana and the data used in the analysis. It is followed by 
the presentation of the corresponding descriptive statistics. Subsequently, section 3 derives 
the theoretical framework and the empirical strategy. The empirical results are presented in 
section 4. The final section provides concluding remarks and implications. 
 
2 Background and Data 
2.1 Background 
The agricultural sector in Ghana accounts for about 30% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
and employs over 50% of the Ghanaian working population (WDI, 2011). Since certifying 
organic implies a focus on the export market we will briefly summarize this sector1. In recent 
years non-traditional exports of horticultural products experienced a large growth. Exports of 
fresh fruits and vegetables, especially to Europe, are now the most important growth sector in 
Ghana’s agriculture. Pineapples were the first non-traditional export crop which Ghana 
started to cultivate in small quantities for ex- port in the 1980ies. Ghanaian pineapple farmers 
produce the varieties MD2, Smooth Cayenne, Sugar Loaf and Queen Victoria, where Sugar 
Loaf is mainly produced for the local market or for processing and Queen Victoria plays a 
minor role as a high-priced specialty product. The amount of pineapple exports increased 
rapidly until 2004. Exports then experienced a dip due to a change in varieties demanded on 
world markets to which the Ghanaian pineapple sector reacted slowly. Subsequently, many 
farms switched to other crops or went bankrupt. Survival strategies for pineapple were 
switching to the new world market variety (MD2), switching to production for processing and 
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 subsequent export or/and to organic production, because this smaller market did not change 
as extremely and rapidly. 
It is estimated that 75.000 tons of pineapples were produced in Ghana in 2009, of 
which 18.000 tons were exported according to FAO (FAOSTAT, 2011). However these 
numbers should be taken as approximations. The Ghanaian export promotion council 
(GEPC) and the Sea Freight Pineapple Exporters Association of Ghana (SPEG) claimed that 
the amount of exported pineapples is much higher, namely 31.000 tons (GEPC, 2010). 
Worldwide organic food markets expanded by 10-15% in the last ten years and are expected 
to continue to grow strongly, whereas conventional markets only grew by 2-4% (Willer et al., 
2008). 
Actors in the Ghanaian Pineapple Sector 
Pineapple farming in Ghana is mostly located in a radius of 100 km north-west of the capital 
Accra in the regions of Greater Accra, and the Central and Eastern Region. The pineapple 
industry is driven by two dominant groups of producers. On the one hand there are a few 
large or medium-sized producers, and on the other hand there are a large number of small-
scale farmers, who sell their fruits on the local market or as outgrowers to an exporter or 
large farm for export. Among these smallholders, there are two clusters, traditional low-input 
“organic-by-default” producers and a group that we call “modern imitators”, i.e. farmers that 
strive to imitate large-scale high-input production. 
Smallholders prefer selling their fruits on the export market because of higher prices, 
but due to high quality requirements, fruits for export are also more expensive to produce 
(Suzuki et al., 2011). Pineapple export in Ghana is predominantly organized by export 
companies which mostly also have own farm production. The relationship between exporter 
and smallholder is usually oral or written contract based and ex- porters may provide farm 
inputs like pesticides and herbicides, extension services or credit. Furthermore, smallholders 
might be encouraged by exporters to form groups or cooperatives in order to ensure a high 
quality and stable supply of pineapples and facilitate certifications. In our case, some groups 
were formed in this process; some existed before being in contact with an exporter. 
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 Organic Production 
Certified organic products achieve price premia and access to new markets. According to 
Kleemann (2011a and 2011b) organic certified pineapples from Africa indeed receive a (non-
declining) positive price premium on the European market, which is passed on to the 
producers. 
About 0.19% of the agricultural land in Ghana is organic certified, with a presumably 
higher part in pineapples2. Organic certification in our case refers to the European standards 
according to EU regulation (EC) 834/2007 and (EC) 889/2008. It entails, amongst others, to 
largely refrain from using synthetic inputs and to use only certain inputs for flower induction. 
These requirements lead to a higher labor intensity of organic farming by way of more 
manual weeding, pest control and possibly own production of fertilizers. The resulting use of 
on-farm/local inputs in organic farming can be an advantage when markets are missing or do 
not function well. However, a major disadvantage of organic farming is potentially a lower 
yield, in particular when synthetic inputs are not replaced by organic inputs and when 
knowledge about soil nutrient and plant pest and disease management is not sufficient. In 
addition, since organic production involves a long-term investment in soil fertility and 
sustainability time lags between investment and profit may prove an entry barrier for small 
resource- constrained farmers in insecure environments. In Ghana, amongst others GIZ, 
Agro Eco/Louis Bolk, West African Fair Fruit (WAFF), and the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MOFA) promote organic farming in Ghana. 
 
2.2 Data 
Our dataset comes from a farm household survey that was conducted from January to March 
2010 in six different districts3 of the Central, Eastern and Greater Accra regions in southern 
Ghana, where pineapple cultivation is mostly located. Stratified random sampling in three 
stages was used. First, districts with significant amounts of smallholder pineapple production 
for export were selected, using information from development agencies and SPEG. Next, lists 
of all pineapple farmer groups in the selected districts that are certified (organic or 
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 GlobalGAP if conventional) and producing for the export market certified were obtained. 
Finally, in each group a percentage of farmers proportional to the total number of farmers in 
the group were selected randomly from the lists. The farmer answered a detailed 
questionnaire on the household’s management of the pineapple farm, inputs into pineapple 
production, harvesting and marketing, the certification process, and relations with exporters. 
Besides, information on household characteristics, social capital and land disposition were 
requested, as well as data concerning non-income wealth indicators and perceptions of 
different statements about environmental values, organic farming techniques and the use of 
fertilizers and pesticides. 
The dataset includes 386 households from 75 villages and 9 (organic) and 14 
(conventional) different farmer associations. In total, 185 organic farmers and 201 
conventional farmers were interviewed. All organic farmers sold part of their produce as 
organic certified to exporters or processors and part of it on the local market without 
reference to the certification. Respectively all conventional farmers sold their produce 
preferably to exporters or exporting processors, but also on the local market. In theory, there 
could be one-directional overlaps. This means that organic certified farmers could sell as 
organic certified (which has the highest price) as first preference, as conventional export 
produce as second preference and on the local market as last option. However, this is not 
the case in our sample. The opposite, i.e. conventional farmers trying to sell on the organic 
export market, is not possible.  
Descriptive Statistics of Sociodemographic Variables 
The typical household in our sample has a similar income compared to the average in Ghana 
(country average 88.83 GHS per month, survey average: highest density in income groups 
51-150 GHS per month), and a higher income share from agriculture (47.8% versus 67%; 
data from Ghana Living Standards Survey 5). All sociodemographic variables that are 
included in the estimations are presented in Table 6.1. 
Organic farm household heads are older and less educated than in conventional farm 
households. They have smaller farms, but are more specialized in pineapple farming. On 
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 average 39% of the whole organic farm including the homestead and 16% of the 
conventional farm are occupied with pineapple4. They also seem to have fewer assets. 
However, the average organic HH head received credit more often during the last five years 
and stated a higher willingness to take risks in order to achieve successes and a greater 
openness to innovation. 
Even though organic farming is supposedly more management intensive, organic 
farmers did not receive more training for improving farming techniques. The most likely 
reason is the lack of opportunities resulting from niche position of organic agriculture. Even 
with more labor needed for production, organic farmers more often recruit their workers from 
the family than hiring farm workers, which is reflected in the lower proportion of the 
production cost they spend on hired labor. Concerning location specific variables organic 
farmers own a larger share of their land and grow pineapple on different soil types compared 
to conventional farmers. This confirms studies from developed countries5. There is also a 
difference concerning the variety of pineapples planted: Organic farmers prefer Sugar Loaf, 
whereas conventional farmers favor Smooth Cayenne or MD2. To our knowledge this 
difference is caused by the buyers’ preferences. 
Of relevance to the adoption mechanism is the fact that organic farmers seem to have 
a stronger link to the local government and visit the capital more frequently. They are also 
more likely to have learned pineapple farming from friends or family members compared to in 
training courses or as laborers on large farms. Moreover, their certification process is more 
often organized by the farmer organization, compared to conventional farmers. Note that this 
variable indicates who the farmers perceived as the ones organizing this process, which is 
not necessarily the same that financially supported it, different from the similar variable in 
Kersting and Wollni (2012). The majority of farmers of both groups have been certified within 
the last two years and about 40 % have a written contract with an exporter, all others have an 
oral contract. The number of years that the farmers have been certified is slightly longer for 
organic farmers. 
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 Descriptive Statistics of Economic Variables  
Differences in economic characteristics of the farmers are presented in Table 6.2. Columns 
(2) and (3) of Table 6.2 show the average costs for each category per kilogram of 
pineapples. Kilogram is taken as a base factor instead of pieces to control for the fact that 
organic fruits are on average smaller than conventional fruits, they are on average 0.18 kg 
lighter than conventional fruit. 
As expected, there are large differences in labor, equipment and input costs per Kg 
between organic and conventional pineapple production, and costs for land are similar for 
both groups. While organic farmers spent much more on labor - hired workers as well as 
household labor - conventional pineapple producers use more inputs and equipment6. We 
also observed that organic farmers do not use any chemicals, utilize very little organic 
fertilizers, spent a lot of time with manual removal of weeds and more often produce their 
own planting and mulching material, or exchange it with other farmers (not presented in the 
Table). Expenses for inputs like inorganic fertilizers, herbicides, fungicides and pesticides, as 
well as suckers (seedlings), are hence much higher for conventional farmers. In addition, 
they use chemicals to induce flowering more frequently (90% of conventional but only 30% of 
organic farmers) and spend more on plastic foil and safety equipment for their farm. 
Certification costs are higher for conventional farmers, but in total they are small, 
because this Table shows only the part that the farmers themselves cover. A large part is 
often paid for by the exporter or a donor or NGO. As shown by Kersting and Wollni (2012), 
this fraction can be quite high, in their case around 95 per cent for both recurrent and initial 
costs. 
Overall, these cost differences form the individual investment that each farmer makes 
in his production structure. For instance, for organic certification as such the farmer has to 
invest in certification, and potential changes in production.  
Note that the production cycle on organic farms is on average longer than the 
production cycle on conventional farms, namely 18.72 month instead of 15.46 month. The 
different lengths of the production cycles do not impair the informative value of the ROI. 
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 However, it obviously affects other key figures such as yearly income from pineapple farming. 
The average ROI of certified organic farming is higher than that of conventional farming, due 
to higher prices and lower production costs. 
It is evident from Table 6.2 that conventional farmers sold 1.5 times as many 
pineapples as organic farmers. This is mainly because of the larger areas under conventional 
farming, as well as the higher yields obtained from this farming method.  
As expected, export prices were in general higher than local prices for both groups. 
But organic pineapple achieved a price premium on both local and export markets, even 
though they were not marketed as certified locally. This points towards different marketing 
strategies by organic farmers, which seem to better match local preferences, a presumption 
for which we however do not have further information for verification. One hint is that the 
Sugar Loaf variety yielded the highest prices on the local (and export) market and was 
produced more frequently by organic than by conventional farmers. 
Descriptive Statistics of Intensity of Agro-ecological Practice Use 
To examine the impact of organic agricultural practices on the ROI we employ the framework 
proposed by Rigby et al (2001) to construct a variable that consists of the different organic 
cropping practices most relevant for pineapple production. The framework is based on a 
scoring system that ranges from 0 (technique not used) to 5 (highest frequency or intensity 
this technique was used also taking into account the type of material used). The practices 
considered include organic fertilizer, non-chemical weeding, mulching, manure, trash lines, 
infiltration ditches and crop rotation. The information on relevant practices was given by an 
agronomist and included in the questionnaire. Weeding seems to be out of range at first 
sight; however it is very important in pineapple production. Since pineapple grow relatively 
small, apart from using herbicides or not, the weeding technique is relevant for soil water 
management and erosion control. Variables for organic pesticide use, cover crops, and 
leguminous residues use are zero when not used, and one when used7. All the variables 
were weighted according to the average importance of each practice for sustainability given 
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 by 13 Ghanaian agronomists. The variable used in the analysis (AGRECPRAC) was then 
constructed by adding up.  
Table 6.3 shows the descriptive statistics for each method. Robustness checks were 
made by a) repeating the analysis without any weights and b) using an alternative weighting 
scheme which consisted in giving similar practice groups (fertilizers and fertilizing material, 
soil cover, and weeding and pesticides) the same overall weights, and c) by excluding 
weeding, since we cannot distinguish between weeding by hand (which is not strictly a 
sustainable practice) and weed prevention using e.g. beneficial organisms. For a), b) and c) 
all regressions were replicated. 
Figure 6.1 presents kernel density estimates of the intensity of agro-ecological 
practices by the two categories of farmers. The estimates reveal that although conventional 
farmers also use sustainable farming methods, their intensity of use is generally less than 
that of their counterparts practicing organic farming. Moreover, it is clear from the results that 
there are hardly any organic farmers that do not employ these farming practices, whereas 
some conventional farmers never employed agro-ecological practices.  
 
3 Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framework employed here is based on the assumption that farmers choose 
between adopting organic farming and practicing conventional farming. For analytical 
purposes, we assume here that farmers are risk neutral, and take into account the potential 
benefit derived from adopting organic farming or non-adoption in the decision making 
process. Farmers are therefore assumed to choose the technology that provides maximum 
benefits. Under the assumptions, let us represent the net benefits farmer i derives from 
adopting the technology as ܦ௜஺ and the net benefits from non-adoption represented as ܦ௜ே. 
These two regimes can be can be specified as 
ܦ௜஺ ൌ ܼ௜ߚ஺ ൅ ݑ௜஺  (6.1) 
ܦ௜ே ൌ ܼ௜ߚே ൅ ݑ௜ே (6.2) 
 where ܼ௜	is a vector of variable factor prices, fixed factors, as well as farm and household 
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 characteristics; ߚ஺ and ߚே  are vectors of parameters; ݑ௜஺	and ݑ௜ே  are iids. The farmer will 
normally choose the organic technology if the net benefits obtained by doing so are higher 
than that obtained by not choosing the technology, that is ܦ௜஺ ൐ 	ܦ௜ே.  
The individual preferences of the farmers are normally unknown to the analysts, but 
the characteristics of the farmer and the attributes of the technology under consideration are 
observed during the survey period. Given the available information, net benefits can be 
represented by a latent variable ܦ௜∗, which is not observed, but can be expressed as a 
function of the observed characteristics and attributes, denoted as Z, in a latent variable 
model as follows:  
ܦ௜∗ ൌ 	ߚܼ௜ ൅ ߤ௜,					ܦ௜ ൌ 1ሾܦ௜∗ ൐ 0ሿ (6.3) 
where ܦ௜ is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 for household i, in case of adoption of the 
technology and 0 otherwise, ߚ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, ܼ௜ is a vector of 
household and plot-level characteristics as defined earlier, and ߤ௜ is an error term assumed 
to be normally distributed. The probability of adoption can then be expressed as  
Prሺܦ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ Prሺܦ௜∗ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ Prሺߤ௜ ൐ െߚܼ௜ሻ ൌ 1 െ ܨሺെߚܼ௜ሻ (6.4) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function for ߤ௜.  
Impact of organic farming on agro-ecological practices 
As indicated earlier, the intensity of use of agro-ecological practices vary between organic 
farm practices and conventional farm practices. To capture the effects of the different farm 
practices on the use of agro-ecological farm methods, we employ a specification from the 
impact assessment literature on outcomes to participation choice. Specifically, we 
hypothesize that adoption or non-adoption of organic technology, positively influences the 
use of agro-ecological farm practices. This may be expressed as 
௜ܻ ൌ 	 ௜ܺߚ ൅ ߜܦ௜ ൅ ߝ௜ (6.5) 
where ௜ܻ represents the intensity of agro-ecological practices and ܦ௜	is the adoption dummy; 
௜ܺ 	 is a vector of farm-level and household-level characteristics, such as age and education 
of farmer, access to credit, social network variables, farm size, and soil quality variables. The 
180
 coefficient 	ߜ in the specification captures the impact of adoption on the use of agro-
ecological practices. The issue of self-selection is crucial here because the decision of 
households to adopt or not to adopt organic farming may be associated with the net benefits 
of adoption. Selection bias arises if unobservable factors influence both the error term of the 
technology choice, ߤ௜, in equation (6.13) and the error term of the outcome specification (εi), 
in equation (6.5), resulting in correlation of both error terms. When the correlation between 
the two error terms is greater than zero, OLS regression techniques tend to yield biased 
estimates. To address these issues, we employ an endogenous switching regression model 
(ESR) to jointly examine the determinants of adoption and the impact of adoption on the 
intensity of agro-ecological practice use8. 
The parametric approach of the endogenous switching regression (ESR) model goes 
back to Lee (1978) and Maddala (1983), and accounts for self-selection and systematic 
differences across groups. Outcome equations are specified differently for each regime, 
conditional on the adoption decision, which is estimated by a probit model. Thus, if we define 
௜ܻ஺ and ௜ܻே	as the intensity of agro-ecological practices for organic and non-organic farmers, 
we can specify the outcome equations as: 
௜ܻ஺ ൌ 	 ௜ܺᇱߚ஺ ൅ ߦ௜஺          if   ܦ௜ ൌ 1 (6.6) 
௜ܻே ൌ 	 ௜ܺᇱߚே ൅ ߦ௜ே         if   ܦ௜ ൌ 0 (6.7) 
Although self-selection based on observables is taken into account in the above 
specification, unobservable factors could still create a correlation between ߤ௜and ߦ௜஺, ߦ௜ே. 
The endogenous switching regression model treats the sample selectivity problem as a 
missing value problem, which can be estimated and plugged into the equations (6.6) and 
(6.7). Thus, after estimating a probit model in the first stage, the Mills ratios ߣே and ߣ஺ and 
the covariances ߪఓ஺ ൌ ܥ݋ݒሺߤߦ஺ሻ and ߪఓே ൌ ܥ݋ݒሺߤߦேሻ and can be computed and employed 
in the following second stage specification: 
௜ܻ஺ ൌ 	 ௜ܺᇱߚ஺ ൅ ߪ஺ߣ௜஺ ൅ ݑ௜஺    if   ܦ௜ ൌ 1 (6.8) 
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 ௜ܻே ൌ 	 ௜ܺᇱߚே ൅ ߪேߣ௜ே ൅ ݑ௜ே    if 		ܦ௜ ൌ 0 (6.9) 
In these equations the error terms ݑ௜஺ and ݑ௜ே have conditional zero means. 
Following Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) we use the full information maximum likelihood method 
(FIML) to estimate this model, i.e. the selection equation and the outcome equations are 
estimated simultaneously. 
When the correlation coefficients of ߤ and ߦ஺ (ߩ௜஺ ൌ 	ߪఓ஺/ߪఓߪ஺) and of ߤ and ߦே 
ሺߩ௜ே ൌ 	ߪఓே/ߪఓߪே) are significant, the model has an endogenous switch, i.e. selection on 
unobservables is substantial. The coefficients obtained from the endogenous switching 
regression model can be employed to derive the average treatment effect (ATT) ߬஺்்ாௌோ as: 
߬஺்்ாௌோ ൌ ܧሺ ௜ܻ஺|ܦ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܧሺ ௜ܻே|ܦ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	ܺᇱሺߚ௜஺ െ ߚ௜ேሻ ൅	൫ߪఓ஺ െ ߪఓே൯ߣଵ (6.10) 
 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Empirical Results for Adoption 
The full information maximum likelihood estimates of the determinants of adoption of organic 
farming, as well as the impact of adoption on the intensity of use of agro-ecological practices 
are presented in Table 6.4. As mentioned earlier, identification of the model requires that 
there is at least one variable in the selection equation that does not appear in the outcome 
equation. The variable representing relation to the local government is used as identifying 
instrument, and as such dropped from the outcome equations. Quite interesting is the 
insignificance of the correlation coefficients presented in the Table. This finding indicates the 
absence of any endogenous switch, suggesting that there is no substantial selection on 
unobservables. 
The selection equation, which can be interpreted as probit estimates of determinants 
of adoption generally indicate that farm-level and household characteristics do influence 
adoption decisions of farmers. The estimates of the impact of adoption on the intensity of use 
of agro-ecological practices show that the farm-level and household characteristics influence 
the behavior of adopters and non-adopters differently. In particular, education and wealth 
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 appear to have positive and significant effects on organic farmers using more agro-ecological 
practices, while no significant effect is observed for conventional farmers. Land ownership 
also appears to influence the intensity of use by organic farmers, but not by conventional 
farmers. Similarly, the number of years being certified positively and significantly influences 
the intensity of agro-ecological practices by organic farmers, but exerts a negative, albeit 
insignificant effect on conventional farmers.  
The estimates for the average treatments effect (ATT), which shows the impact of 
organic certification on the use of agro-ecological practice was computed with equation 
(6.10). The results are presented in Table 6.5. Unlike the mean differences in the use of 
agro-ecological practices shown in Table 6.3, the ATT estimate accounts for selection bias 
arising from the fact that adopters and non-adopters may be systematically different. The 
estimated ATT is positive and highly significant, suggesting that organic certification does 
indeed act as a catalyst for the increased use of agro-ecological practices. Specifically, 
organic certification moves the farmer up 15-20% on the full range of possible intensities, or 
by about 80% taking the overall mean use as a reference point. It is interesting to note that 
when asked directly for changes in production methods after certification, 67% of organic and 
only 35% of conventional households claimed to have changed their use of agro-ecological 
practices. The robustness of the ESR is checked by estimating the same model, but using 
the three other specifications described in section 3.2. The estimates, which are reported in 
the Table 6.5, also confirm the positive and highly significant impact of organic certification on 
the intensity of agro-ecological practices. 
Given the absence of any endogenous switch, we also employed propensity score 
matching (PSM) approach to compute the ATT and compare with those from the ESR. PSM 
is basically a technique that mimicks an experiment ex post. The results, which are presented 
in the lower part of Table 6.5, show that the ATT ranges between 4.07 and 4.23, depending 
on the matching algorithm used. Overall, the results confirm the positive and significant 
impact of organic certification on the intensity of agro-ecological practices. The matching 
quality test conducted with the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) test show that differences in 
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 the means of the covariates between the two groups vanish after matching. The sensitivity of 
the estimates to unobservables was also tested with the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds. Based 
on kernel matching, the critical value of Γ(Γ*) =1.35 indicates that the ATT would still be 
significant even if matched pairs differ in their odds of certification by the factor 1.35.  
 
4.2. Impact of Intensity of Agro-ecological Practice Use on ROI 
In this section, we examine the impact of agro-ecological practices on the return on 
investment (ROI), in order to ascertain whether using these practices tend to affect the 
economic viability of the farm. Given that the intensity of agro-ecological practices is a 
continuous variable, we employ the generalized propensity score (GPS) approach developed 
by Hirano and Imbens (2004). Thus, the analysis in this section considers the treatment 
variable as a continuous variable, and not a dichotomous decision variable as was assumed 
in the previous analyses. 
In line with GPS approach, equation (6.5) can be re-specified as ௜ܻ ൌ ݂ሺ ௜ܺ ௜ܶሻ, where 
௜ܻ 	refers to the return on investment and ௜ܶ is the actual level agro-ecological practice of the 
farm. Of significance is the average dose response function (DRF), which relates to each 
possible treatment level ݐ௜, the unbiased potential outcome ௜ܻሺݐሻ of the farmer i: 
ߠሺݐሻ ൌ ܧሾ ௜ܻሺݐሻሿ	∀	ݐ	݅݊	ܶ  (6.11) 
where ߠ represents the DRF. In line with Hirano and Imbens (2004), we presume that the 
assignment to the treatment is weakly unconfounded given the controls, i.e. 
௜ܻሺݐሻ ٣ ௜ܶ	⎸ ௜ܺ 	∀	ݐ	݅݊	ܶ  (6.12) 
Thus, the treatment assignment process is supposed to be conditionally independent 
of each potential outcome given the control variables, hence there is no systematic selection 
into specific levels of agro-ecological practice intensity caused by unobservable 
characteristics (Flores et al., 2009). Weak unconfoundedness means that this independence 
only has to hold for each level of treatment t but not jointly for all potential outcomes. The 
generalized propensity score (GPS) suggested by Hirano and Imbens (2004) is defined as 
the conditional probability of a particular treatment given the observed covariates. When 
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 ݎ൫ ௜ܶ, 	 ௜ܺ൯ ൌ 	 ்݂ ୄ௑ሺݐ ٣ ݔሻ is the conditional density of potential treatment levels given specific 
covariates, then the GPS of a household i is given as ܴ௜ ൌ ݎሺ ௜ܶ, 	 ௜ܺሻ. The GPS is a balancing 
score, i.e. within strata with the same value of ݎ	ሺݐ, ܺሻ the probability that T = t does not 
depend on the covariates ௜ܺ. Given this balancing property and weak unconfoundedness, 
Hirano and Imbens (2004) show that using the GPS to remove the selection bias allows the 
estimation of the average DRF of equation (6.11). 
In the first step the conditional expectation of the outcome as a function of treatment T 
and GPS R is estimated: 
ߚሺݐ, ݎሻ ൌ ܧሺܻ| ௜ܶ ൌ ݐ, ܴ௜ ൌ ݎሻ  (6.13) 
Then, the DRF at each level of treatment can be estimated by averaging the 
conditional expectation over the GPS at that treatment level: 
ߠሺݐሻ ൌ ܧൣߚ൫ݐ, ݎሺݐ, ௜ܺሻ൯൧  (6.14) 
In our application, the GPS is estimated using a normal distribution of the logarithmic 
treatment given covariates ௜ܺ. The validity of the assumed normal distribution is assessed 
using the Kolomogorov-Smirnov test for normality. We followed Hirano and Imbens (2004) 
and took the logarithm of the treatment variable, because the distribution of the agro-
ecological practices was skewed. This procedure yielded low skewness (0.090) and kurtosis 
(1.698) values and a positive Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality at the 5% level of 
significance. The balancing property of the estimated GPS is tested by employing the method 
proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004). The common support condition, i.e. that households 
in one group have to match with comparable households in other treatment groups, is 
imposed by employing the method suggested and Flores et al. (2009). After estimating the 
GPS, the DRF is estimated using a flexible polynomial function as in Bia and Mattei (2008). 
The average potential outcome at each treatment level is estimated using a quadratic 
approximation of the treatment variable and a linear one for the GPS. The specification is 
estimated using OLS regression for the ROI. Confidence bounds at 95% level are estimated 
using the bootstrapping procedure.  
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 Results of Generalized Propensity Score Matching 
The treatment variable is AGRECPRAC as indicated previously. The results of the maximum 
likelihood estimation of the GPS, which are presented in Table A.6.1 in the appendix, are not 
discussed here, since the estimates only serve to balance the observed distribution of 
covariates across the treated and untreated groups (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). It is however 
interesting to note that as in the regressions in the previous section, the organic certification 
dummy is again highly significant in the probit regression. Balancing tests indicate that the 
GPS has quite well balancing properties, i.e. the GPS eliminates bias in the estimates of the 
dose-response function9. Regarding the common support condition, 278 farmers were on 
support, which represents 87% of the initial 311 farmers for which we have sufficient data to 
calculate the ROI. 
Figure 6.2 shows the dose response function of the impact of the use of agro-
ecological practices on pineapple farming ROI10. There is a non-linear hook shaped 
relationship, whereby the effect on the ROI is positive, but in different ways at different levels. 
At very low levels of agro-ecological practice use the impact is high, but declines with more 
intensive use, before rising again. It is significant to note that in our analysis a low level of the 
index implies very little use of agro-ecological practices and even a high level is still low 
compared to developed country agriculture. At the lowest point the estimated ROI is just 
below the mean of the sample (2.265). While the impact of using agro-ecological practices is 
overall positive, relatively low and relatively high levels do much better than a medium level 
of agro- ecological practice intensity. This implies that the motivation to increase the use may 
be low when farmers are unaware of the shape of this impact curve or have a high discount 
rate into the future. A look at the kernel density estimates in Figure 6.1 shows that most 
farmers are exactly in this impact dip. 
To understand the differential behavior of the farmers, we examine the composition of 
agro-ecological practices used at different intensities. Specifically, we divided the sample into 
several equally sized groups, according to the AGRECPRAC, below and above the low 
impact dip. As a tendency, at low levels of intensity the average farmer restricts the use very 
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 few practices and first starts to use them more intensively before adding different practices. 
Strikingly though it is not the potentially costly organic fertilizers and pesticides that are used 
significantly less in the low-use groups, but rather animal manure, mulch, and cover crops. 
Since the farmers stated that they know what each practice is, the problem cannot be 
information. We suppose that a decisive factor may be economies of scale in transport cost.11  
Robustness Checks 
The large confidence bands at the ends of the distribution in Figure 6.2 suggest that 
impacts are less clear among the non- and very intensive users. We therefore conduct a 
robustness check in which we exclude values of AGRECPRAC of over 13. The result 
obtained is shown in Figure A.6.1 in the appendix. It is slightly different at high values, with 
no flattening out, with the predicted impact higher at the right end. However, the shape the 
curve, which is of primary interest, remains the same. As a further robustness check, we use 
different specifications of the agro-ecological practice index. The results are presented in 
Figures A.6.2 (different weights described in section 3.2), A.6.3 (no weights), and A.6.4 
(weeding excluded) in the appendix and are all sufficiently similar to the original version. 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Some concerns have been raised that organic certification and sustainable farming practices 
are insufficiently linked on farms in developing countries. Most farmers certified as organic 
producers have therefore been considered to be producing organic-by-default, with very little 
or no use of productivity-enhancing inputs and soil-improving measures, and often resulting 
in low yields and unsustainable production.  
In this paper we examine the impact of organic certification on the intensity of agro- 
ecological practice use, as well as the return on investment of such practices, using recent 
farm-level data from the Greater Accra and Central regions in Ghana. Our empirical results 
show that organic certification increases agro-ecological practice use, suggesting that 
certification already serves as a catalyst for the use of agro-ecological practices. 
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 The estimates of the economic impacts of agro-ecological practices generally reveal a 
positive and nonlinear relationship between the ROI and the intensity of agro-ecological 
practice use, indicating that more intensive use of agro-ecological practices is economically 
beneficial for farmers. This finding suggests that from an environmental policy perspective 
this link needs to be strengthened considerably, since the intensity of agro-ecological 
practice use is overall quite low. The low level of use is probably because of the nonlinear 
relationship, which suggests economic benefits at low levels and high levels. However, 
farmers need to surmount a low impact gap to attain high levels, including availability of 
organic material and high transport costs for organic material. Given that external inputs from 
cocoa production and juice factories are normally available for use, but at prohibitive 
transport costs for individual farmers, government agencies or certification agencies could 
organize intermediates to fill this gap by purchasing these organic materials from juice 
factories and cocoa producers and selling to farmers. Certification may therefore help ease 
the problem through high prices on the produce and the support by buyers. Moreover, 
certification systems could also require the active use of organic soil fertility management 
methods to increase their intensity of use.  
 Overall, such a strategy could provide an alternative sustainable development 
strategy for parts of the rural population. If successfully managed, organic certification for the 
dominantly small farmers in Africa may provide two types of economic benefits. It may reduce 
rural poverty by providing market access and higher profits through a combination of high 
prices and better or more resilient yields, and it may provide environmental benefits for the 
local economy in the long term.  
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 Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Intensity of Agro-ecological Practice Use and Certification 
 
Source: own estimation. 
 
Figure 6.2: Impact of Intensity of Agro-ecological Practice Use on ROI 
 
Source: own estimation. 
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 Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in the Estimations 
Definition Variable Organic 
Farmer
s
(N=185)
Conven
t. 
Farmer
s 
(N=201) 
t-Stat.
Gender of household head (HHH) 
=female, 1=male 
GENDER 0.891 0. 982 -3.51*** 
Age of HHH AGE 46.313 42.970 2.82*** 
Household size (persons living in household) HHSIZE 5.23 5.917 -2.35** 
Fraction of adults in household 
(older than 15) (%) 
ADULT 0.684 0.665 0.75
Being native in community 
0=no, 1=yes 
NATIVE 0.738 0.738 -0.01
Maximal educational level in household 
1=none, 2=primary school, 
3=junior secondary, 4=senior secondary, 
5=technical/vocational training, 6=tertiary/university 
EDUC 9.470 10.195 -3.19*** 
Farm size (acre) FSIZE 10.35 18.720 -5.02*** 
Share of land owned OWNLAND  0.549 0.204 7.628*** 
Pineapple land (acre) PINLAND 4.014 3.066 2.07** 
Access to credit during the last 5 years 
0=no, 1=yes 
CREDIT 0.317 0.232 1.78* 
Bank account with more than 200 GHS 
0=no, 1=yes 
BANK  0.339 0.512 -3.21*** 
Number of durable goods owned WEALTH  4.765 8.481 -10.875*** 
Relation to the local government 
1=none, 
2=HHH knows someone in the local government, 
3=HHH has friends in the local government, 
4=strong relation/politically active 
GOVERN 2.257 1.774 4.27*** 
Self-stated openness to innovation and risk (factor 
analysis: the stronger the agreement, the higher the 
factor) 
RISK 0.152 -0.166 3.01*** 
Years of experience in pineapple farming EXPER 11.557 11.595 -0.05
How pineapple farming was learned    
 from family members and friends 
 0=no, 1=yes 
LEARN 1 0.863 0.501 7.97*** 
 as a laborer on a farm or from 
 0=no, 1=yes 
LEARN 2 0.071 0.286 -5.51*** 
Importance of preserving the environment 
1= very important, ..., 4= not important 
ENV 1.775 1.281 6.91*** 
Number of years being certified CERTIFYEARS 3.165 2.032 3.875*** 
Distance to the closest local market (hours) DIST 0.698 0.804 -1.59
Soil characteristics 
1=red or black sandy, 2=white sandy, 3=white 
rocky, 4=rocky red or black, 5=sandy or rocky clay, 
6=clay, 7=other 
SOIL 2.781 2.304 2.13** 
 Smooth Cayenne SC 0.098 0.351 -5.99*** 
 Sugar Loaf SL 0.634 0.036 15.06*** 
Share of production cost for (of total labor costs) hired 
workers 
HIRED 0.484 0.607 -3.13*** 
Assistance or training for farming received during last 
5 years 
0=no, 1=yes 
ASSIST 0.732 0.708 0.50
Number of farm inspection during the last 5 years INSPECT 1.913 2.619 -0.94
Written contract with exporter 
0=no, 1=yes 
CONTR 0.410 0.417 -0.13
Organizer of the certification process 
0=else than farmer organization, 
1=farmer organization 
ORGA 0.508 0.143 7.84*** 
Significance levels:   *: 10%   **: 5%   ***: 1%.  
We use a conversion factor of 1 GHS = 0.46 Euros (calculated on the basis of the exchange rate on January 12, 
2012). 
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 Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics of Economic Variables 
Variable Organic 
Farmers 
 
Conventional
Farmers 
t-Stat.  
Agricultural equipment 0.002 0.009 -2.77 *** 
Agricultural inputs 0.011 0.077 -5.97 *** 
Renewal of certification 0.000 0.006 -4.27 *** 
Land used for pineapple 0.004 0.004 -0.004  
Hired workers 0.037 0.019 3.77 *** 
Household labor 0.034 0.009 5.68 *** 
Yield (pineapple per acre) 15780 18259 -4.11 *** 
Quantity sold (in Kg) 23486 36235 -2.81 *** 
Average local price (GHS per Kg) 0.210 0.131 8.50 *** 
Average export price (GHS per 
Kg) 
0.251 0.196 5.40 *** 
Share sold on local market 0.495 0.354 3.00 *** 
Revenue (GHS per Kg) 0.219 0.170 5.80 *** 
Production costs (GHS per Kg) 0.105 0.118 -0.94  
Profits (GHS per Kg) 0.114 0.052 4.01 *** 
ROI 2.760 1.800 3.11 *** 
We use a conversion factor of 1 Ghana Cedi (GHS)=0.46 Euros. The t-statistic 
belongs to the mean difference test between column (2) and (3). Significance 
levels: *:10%  **:5%  ***:1% 
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 Table: 6.3 Descriptive Statistics of Agro-Ecological Practices 
Variable Organic 
Farmers 
(N=176) 
Conventional 
Farmers 
(N=168) 
t-Statistics
Organic fertilizer 2.164 0.030 8.288*** 
Organic pesticides 0.083 0.082 -0.032
Mulch 1.590 1.328 5.294*** 
Manure 1.998 0.912 3.543*** 
Weeding 2.410 2.327 0.566
Cover crops 0.175 0.161 0.353
Crop rotation 0.980 0.132 6.343*** 
Trash lines 2.932 1.043 9.451*** 
Infiltration ditches 1.066 0.721 1.979** 
Leguminous residues 0.066 0.018 2.217** 
Significance levels for the t-statistics of the mean difference test:   *: 10%   **: 5% ***: 1% 
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 Table 6.4: Estimation results of ESR for Impact of Organic Certification on Agro-
ecological Practice Use 
 Selection Eq. Organic farmers Convent. farmers 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GENDER -0.122 0.513 0.173 0.101 1.769 0.597
AGE 0.004 0.018 -0.006 0.023 -0.056** 0.024
NATIVE -0.151 0.275 0.443 0.513 0.401 0.399
RISK 0.306*** 0.095 -0.133 0.207 0.135 0.196
HHSIZE -0.058 0.052 -0.146 0.099 -0.068 0.071
EDUC -0.094* 0.059 0.323** 0.096 0.135 0.286
WEALTH -0.296*** 0.090 0.397*** 0.142 0.138 0.089
FSIZE -0.012 0.010 -0.006 0.012 0.0001 0.011
OWNLAND 0.586** 0.236 1.051** 0.558 0.927 0.827
EXPER 0.034 0.032 0.020 0.036 0.024 0.033
LEARN1 0.829** 0.597 1.053 1.146 -0.774 0.440
LEARN2 -0.537** 0.217 0.357 1.387 -0.223 0.530
DIST -0.341** 0.164 -0.130 0.405 -0.947** 0.373
SOIL 0.008 0.058 -0.316*** 0.1281 -0.268*** 0.085
ORGA 1.403*** 0.218 -1.232* 0.665 0.828 0.747
ENV 1.431*** 0.325 -1.423*** 0.412 0.038 0.388
GOVERN 0.445*** 0.164
BANK -0.468 0.558 0.403 0.497
CREDIT -0.526 0.466 -0.239 0.487
VARIETYMD2 2.550*** 0.989 -0.128 0.396
HIRED -0.569 0.821 0.452 0.578
INSPECT -0.113 0.026 0.074** 0.029
CONTR 1.154** 0.543 -0.083 0.380
CERTIFYEARSNO 0.299** 0.141 -0.203 0.457
INTERCEPT 1.038 0.985 1.027 1.347 3.455** 1.754
ߩଵ஽  -0.320 0.466
݈݊ߪଵ  0.916*** 0.070
ߩ଴஽  0.260 1.048
݈݊ߪ଴  0.744*** 0.104
Log-Likelihood: -993.143 
Wald test of indep. eqns.: ߯ଶሺ2ሻ = 3.69*** 
Significance levels for the t-statistics of the mean difference test:   *: 10%   **: 5% ***: 1% 
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 Table 6.5: Results of Impact of Organic Certification on Agro-ecological Practice Use 
Method Predicted Use of
certified 
Predicted Use of 
non-certified 
ATT t-Statistic 
ESR  
 Organic certified farmers 5.921 2.518 3.403 13.314*** 
 Conventional farmers 8.135 3.788  
Alternative Specifications  
ESR using different weights  
 Organic certified farmers 6.102 3.046 3.056 11.465*** 
 Conventional farmers 7.979 3.594  
ESR using no weights  
 Organic certified farmers 5.986 2.136 3.851 12.258*** 
 Conventional farmers 8.115 3.266  
ESR (weeding excluded)  
 Organic certified farmers 5.728 2.667 3.061 10.894*** 
 Conventional farmers 7.934 3.363  
PSM  
 Kernel (bandwidth=0.4) 6.751 2.680 4.071 7.98*** 
 Radius (caliper=0.05) 6.751 2.523 4.228 7.34*** 
 Nearest-neighbor 6.751 2.351 4.400 6.98*** 
Significance levels for the t-statistics of the mean difference test:   *: 10%   **: 5% ***: 1% 
For PSM, standard errors are calculated with bootstrapping using 1000 replications. Bootstrapping of 
standards errors is necessary because the estimated variance does not include the variance that may 
appear due to the estimation of the propensity score and the imputation of the common support 
assumption (Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008)). Even though Abadie and Imbens (2008) criticism the use 
of bootstrapping for the nearest-neighbor algorithm, its application is still common practice. 
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 Appendix 
 
 
Table A.6.1: Estimation Results of Generalized Propensity Score 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
Equation 1 
ORGANIC 0.165*** 0.026
GENDER 0.050 0.052
AGE -0.005** 0.002
RISK 0.019 0.048
HHSIZE -0.041*** 0.018
EDUC 0.101** 0.079
FSIZE 0.003** 0.001
OWNLAND 0.283*** 0.096
EXPER 0.042* 0.021
LEARN1 -0.101* 0.060
LEARN2 0.108* 0.074
DIST -0.152 0.135
ORGA -0.126 0.114
SOIL -0.112*** 0.022
WEALTH 0.165*** 0.071
ENV 0.266** 0.170
INTERCEPT 0.935*** 0.149
Equation 2 
INTERCEPT 0.31*** 0.014
Significance levels for the t-statistics of the mean 
difference test:*: 10%  **: 5% ***: 1% 
 
 
Table A.6.2: Estimation Results of the Coefficients of the Dose Response Function 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
T -0.305** 0.121
T2 0.019*** 0.004
GP S -3.252** 1.401
T * GP S 0.385 0.259
INTERCEPT 4.638*** 1.251
Significance levels for the t-statistics of the mean 
difference test:*: 10%  **: 5% ***: 1% 
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 Figure A.6.1: Impact of Intensity of Agro-ecological Practice Use on ROI  
(restricted to values lower than 13) 
 
Source: own estimation. 
 
 
Figure A.6.2: Impact of Intensity of Agro-ecological Practice Use on ROI  
(different weights for agro-ecological practices) 
 
Source: own estimation.  
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 Figure A.6.3: Impact of Intensity of Agro-ecological Practice Use on ROI  
(no weights) 
 
Source: own estimation. 
 
 
Figure A.6.4: Impact of Intensity of Agro-ecological Practice Use on ROI  
(weeding excluded) 
 
Source: own estimation.  
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 Notes 
                                                            
1 Because we study the same sector and make use of the same dataset as Kleemann et al. (2012) this section is 
very similar to the respective one in that paper. More detailed information about the export market for pineapple is 
provided in Kleemann (2011a). 
2 Source: http://www.organic-world.net/statistics-data-tables-dynamic.html.  
3 Ajumako Enyan Esiam, Akuapem South, Ewutu-Efutu-Senya, Ga, Kwahu South and Mfantseman. 
4 The land variables are likely to be subject to reporting error. Therefore we included several checks in the 
questionnaire (like asking for the farm size in one part and for field sizes for each crop in another part) and 
checked on the farm or verified with GPS data when available. Nevertheless we are aware that farm sizes are still 
likely to be smaller than reported. In addition, we speak of ”smallholders” or ”small-scale farmers” even though we 
do not adhere to the definition of a smallholder, which is less than two hectares. However, apart from over-
reporting of land sizes, all farmers in the sample are sufficiently small to fall strictly under group certification 
schemes. This is the relevant measure for us. 
5 Since our focus is not on the soil, we did not ask more detailed questions about the different soil types and their 
advantages and disadvantages for pineapple production. 
6 We are aware that measurement errors are frequent in measuring agricultural inputs and outputs in developing 
countries. However, when farmers in both groups are sufficiently similar in their sociodemographic characteristics 
we can assume that measurement errors do not significantly differ between farmers. 
7 In these cases either it was logical to pose the question with a yes/no option only, as in the case of cover crops 
or the quality of the data retrieved from the survey did not allow the division into frequency of use, as in the case 
of organic pesticides and leguminous residues. 
8 The unbiased treatment effect is hard to measure because, when treatment is non-random as in our case, 
untreated individuals may differ systematically because of self-selection into treatment. A popular approach to 
avoid biased results is to randomize treatment. In our case randomization over which farmers use which agro-
ecological methods is impossible to realize because all the methods in question are already common or widely 
known by the farmers. The underlying treatment is not a development intervention, but the outcome of various 
interventions in a longer time horizon. 
9 For testing the balancing property of the GPS, the treatment variable was divided into 4 intervals with cut-off 
points at 25%, 50%, etc. Without adjusting for the GPS, t-tests of mean difference between the intervals revealed 
that 14 t-tests were significant at the 5% level, after dividing into 4 intervals and conducting block-wise t-tests this 
number was reduced to 2. We repeated the analysis with more intervals, namely 7, which did not affect our 
conclusions, but the number of observations in each interval becomes quite small, so the results are weaker. 
10 The estimated quadratic dose response function regression is shown in Table A.6.2 in the appendix. All GPSM 
regressions were also repeated with net farm income as impact variable. Due to the low investment level of the 
farmers, the results did not change significantly. Therefore the results are omitted here, but are available upon 
request from the author. 
11 This is explained as follows using the examples of mulch and manure. When the farm is relatively strongly 
specialized in pineapple, mulching material and manure cannot be produced on the farm (see also e.g. Branca et 
al. (2011) and several others). Often, the needed material would be available at no or low cost, but needs to be 
transported to the farm. Since this material is relatively bulky, transport costs can impede their use in case of lack 
of cash or if their perceived benefits are lower than the effort of organizing and paying for their transport. 
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 Chapter 7 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation has tried to shed light on the profitability and ecological sustainability of 
certified organic small-scale production in Africa against the background of a strongly 
growing organic niche market. 
In Africa, certified organic agriculture appears as a luxury at first sight. The challenge 
to increase agricultural production and food security and the desire to catch up economically 
appear more relevant and urgent than any concern for the environment. The phenomenon of 
the „Environmental Kuznets Curve“ that describes an inverted U-shaped empirical 
relationship between environmental quality and economic development can be applied as 
well to this sector of the economy. Yet there is traditionally a high affinity to nature in Africa 
that is determined by cultural traditions - natural religions - and the large proportion of people 
living off the land in rural areas. In addition, continuing population growth, impacts of climate 
change and environmental degradation are a topic of a broad population stratum. 
Consequently there is a tendency for general increased awareness of the importance of 
environmental protection and thus a tunneling through the sectoral Environmental Kuznets 
Curve by implementing sustainable agriculture approaches is thinkable. Against this 
background strategies are required that combine agricultural development for higher incomes 
for the rural poor and natural resource protection. Organic farming could be one option that 
connects these two factors. Its big advantage is its involvement in all three sustainability 
criteria. The high prices paid for organic certified products on international markets make it 
economically attractive.  
Working from large to small, we first analyzed the international market integration for 
premium-priced organic certified products. The conventional market acts as a price leader for 
the organic one where organic prices react to changes in conventional prices only if these 
changes are sufficiently large. This implies that general demand shocks are transmitted to 
the organic market through the conventional market with a time lag and lower intensity. 
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 Because these thresholds do not change over time, we conclude that market integration has 
not increased. Moreover, the price premium on organic pineapple does not decline. 
According to hedonic demand theory, the combination of these two elements happens when 
the organic core market expands faster than supply. This conclusion implies potential for up 
scaling the organic market, i.e. increasing the number of farmers potentially benefitting from 
the increasing demand, a result that increases the relevance of the analyses on the local 
level presented in the following chapters. 
Using the example of the pineapple sector in Ghana as a case study, we then studied 
conditions and effects for the participating farm households. In Ghana, many small-scale 
farmers, both conventional and organic, have been excluded from the export pineapple value 
chain due to recent world market changes. In a first step we consider the question whether 
these farmers can successfully be reintegrated in the Ghanaian pineapple export sector. We 
find that, even though smallholders tend to have quality problems with their fruit and large 
farms have advantages due to economies of scale, production for the export market is 
feasible for both organic and conventional smallholders provided that mutual trust is 
reinstalled and thereby transaction costs reduced. Moreover, organic production is the more 
profitable due to the retail level price premium on organic products that is passed on to 
farmers and that overcompensates lower yields on organic farms. Being founded in hedonic 
demand theory allows this analysis to be applied to other similar niche-main market 
situations. Other sustainability standards or ethical certifications such as Fair trade may 
provide a very similar context. However, a premium is paid for certified products only and the 
certification with internationally approved labels requires a substantial investment on the side 
of the farmers. Whether or not the investment in organic certification proves to be beneficial 
for farmers was analyzed next.  
Using detailed primary data from our own survey of small-scale pineapple farmers in 
Ghana in 2010 and controlling for selection bias, we find a positive effect of organic 
certification on the return on investment in organic farming. Contrary to previous research we 
can single out the effect of certification vis-à-vis the effect of contract farming and exporting. 
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 The data also shows that relatively poorer, less educated households are more likely to 
adopt organic production. While we cannot determine whether this happens because they 
are more attracted by this form of production or because of targeting by exporters and 
NGOs, it nevertheless implies that organic certification is pro-poor. Hence, overall, our 
results suggest a positive effect of switching from conventional to organic production when 
competing on the global market for pineapple, particularly for relatively poorer farmers.  
But does organic farming also deliver on its core value ecological sustainability? Due 
to its holistic approach that acknowledges the multifunctionality of agriculture, organic 
agriculture has a weakness in its complex implementation. While long-term trials show that 
organic agriculture in tropical countries can achieve (almost) equal yields as conventional 
production, this dissertation shows that this is not – or not yet - the case for African small-
scale farmers, with a major reason being that active agro-ecological soil and plant 
management is very limited. The intensity of agro-ecological practice use on small farms in 
our sample is in fact very low.  
A common concern is that organic certified small-scale farmers in Africa remain in a 
state of ”organic-by-default” production with little or no use of inputs or other soil enhancing 
methods and consequent low yields and unsustainable production. This is because in 
practice low-input “organic-by-default” producers tend to be certified organic easiest as they 
already fulfill the requirement of no chemical use which lead to shorter transition periods. The 
spread of agro-ecological techniques is thus a key factor for the sustainability of organic 
agriculture in Africa. This is relevant, because agriculture contributes strongly to 
environmental damage and global climate change, which makes it an important point of 
action for international policies for sustainable and green development.  
In the last chapter, we showed that certification already serves as a catalyst for the 
use of agro-ecological practices and that using them more intensively is on average 
economically useful for the farmers, i.e. our results suggest that there is not necessarily a 
trade-off between economic efficiency and environmental friendly farming practices. Still, 
from a policy perspective this link has to be strengthened considerably, because the intensity 
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 of agro-ecological practice use is overall unsatisfactory, which leads to both lower yields and 
soil degradation. The question remains why this level is so low. As shown by our example, 
insufficient infrastructure may represent a strong barrier for the use of agro-ecological 
practices. Organic farmers often do not produce sufficient organic material to manage soil 
nutrients efficiently. In Ghana external organic inputs from cocoa production or juice factories 
are available but transport costs are prohibitive for a single farmer. Organization of 
intermediation through the buyer or another external actor could solve this problem. On a 
higher level, certification systems could require the active use of agro-ecological production 
methods. While this would certainly increase their use, a drawback is that this would also 
raise the already high entry barriers to certification especially for resource-poor farmers. We 
therefore suggest that not only support for the certification process and financing should be 
given, but that it is equally important to tailor the technical support to the ecological and 
social goals that are implicit in organic certification systems.  
If successfully managed in such a way, organic certification for the dominantly small 
farmers in Africa may provide an alternative sustainable development strategy for parts of the 
rural population. It may reduce rural poverty by providing market access and higher profits 
through a combination of high prices and better or more resilient yields, and it may provide 
environmental benefits for the local economy in the long term.  
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Impact of Certified Organic Pineapple Farming on Sustainability and Livelihoods of Farmers in 
Ghana 
 
Research Project by: 
 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (Linda Kleemann) and University of Kiel, Germany (Prof. Dr. Awudu 
Abdulai) in collaboration with Department of Agricultural Economics (Dr. Victor Owusu), Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology, Kumasi 
 
Main researcher: Linda Kleemann 
IN CASE OF URGENT QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL ME ON:  0205670697 
 
PART 0. PINEAPPLE SURVEY IDENTIFICATION 
 
 
Questionnaire Number: _______  
 
Date of interview: Day: _______Month:  ____________Year:  2010  
 
Time started: ________________________   Name of enumerator: _________________________ 
 
District: ________________________________ DISTCODE:  ___________ 
 
 Village: ________________________________  PARCODE: ___________   
 
Household code: ____________________________  
 
GLOBALGAP (EurepGAP) or ORGANIC? * __________________________________   
 
Name and surname of household head __________________________  
 
Name of respondent (if different from household head) __________________________________________  
Sex of respondent (F/M): ____________________  Relation to head:  ______________________________ 
Mobile number of household head (or respondent): ______________________________________________ 
Email address of household head (or respondent): _______________________________________________ 
 
Language in which the interview was conducted: _______________________________________________ 
 
*IF FARMERS ARE BOTH ORGANIC AND GLOBALGAP CERTIFIED, THEN WRITE ‘ORGANIC’; IF FARMERS ARE NOT 
ORGANIC CERTIFIED, THEN WRITE ‘GLOBALGAP’. PLEASE REFER TO THIS SPECIFICATION THROUGHOUT THE 
WHOLE QUESTIONNNAIRE.  
 
[BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE SURVEY. PLEASE EXPLAIN TO THE FARMER:] 
Thank you for participating in this interview. The interview contributes to a research project on economic and 
environmental aspects of pineapple farming. We want to compare organic and GLOBALGAP (formerly called 
EurepGAP) certification for pineapples. This research project is carried out by the Kiel Institute in Germany in 
collaboration with Department of Agricultural Economics (Dr. Victor Owusu), University of Kumasi. Please be 
assured that everything you tell me will be kept confidential by the research team and will not used for other 
purposes than research. If you cannot answer some of the questions please leave them blank. The information we 
collect about your household and pineapple enterprise will be mixed with information about many other 
pineapple farmers and there will be no reports about you personally but only about pineapple farming in the area 
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or in Ghana in general. The research team is not related by business ties or employment to pineapple exporters. 
If you are interested, you can receive information on your farm or farmer group in comparison with the other 
groups that have been interviewed after the finalisation of the data analysis. In this case, please let the 
interviewer know at the end of the interview. The interview will take about 1.5 hours. Do you have any questions 
before I start?  
 
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO ADD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT MIGHT BE RELEVANT FOR THE STUDY. IN CASE 
YOU NEED MORE SPACE, THERE IS ADDITIONAL FREE SPACE ON THE LAST SHEET. 
 
  
 
PART 1. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS & SOCIAL CAPITAL 
1.1. How many people do usually live in your house? 
_____________________________ [Number (#) of people] 
 
1.2. What is the status of the household head? [TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) A married man or woman who presently lives in the house; 
 (2) A married man or woman who lives somewhere else but supports the household, e.g. by going there 
occasionally or giving or sending money; 
 (3) A married man who is absent and does not support the household (the wife is in fact the acting head) 
 (4) A single, widowed or divorced woman/man;  
 (5) A child;  
 (6) Other (specify) _______________________________  
 
1.3. What is the religion of the household head? [TICK ONLY ONE. DO NOT READ OPTIONS TO THE FARMER.]  
 (1) Christian;   (2) Muslim;   (3) Traditional;  
 (4) Other (specify)____________________________  

1.4. Please tell me about the members in your household1, including own children, adopted children, 
orphans, elders, and others who are residing and working with you. 
1A household is a group of people, often related by family ties, who reside and farm together and ‘eat from the 
same pot’. Children in boarding school are also considered members.  
PLEASE FIRST LIST ALL MEMBERS, AND THEN ASK QUESTIONS FOR EACH.  
Name  
(& surname if 
different from 
household head) 
Relation 
to 
househol
d head  
C 
O 
D 
E 
Sex Age 
What is his/her 
most important 
activity (time-
wise)* 
What is his/her 
highest level of 
formal education For how many 
months during 
the past 12 
months has 
he/she been 
away from this 
household?  
 
[WRITE NUMBER 
(#) OF MONTHS] 
1=spouse 
2=child 
3=adopted 
child 
4=niece/n
ephew 
5=cousin 
6=Other 
(specify) 
 
M=1 
F= 2 
in years
1=Pineapple farming 
(own farm) 
2=Other farming 
activities (own farm) 
2=Farm labour on 
other farms 
3=Other non-farm 
work (specify which) 
4=Day school 
5=Boarding school 
6=Other (specify) 
1=None 
2= Primary school  
3= Junior Secondary  
4=Senior Secondary  
5= Technical / 
Vocational Training  
6=Tertiary / University 
7 = other(specify) 
 Self 1      
  2      
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  3      
  4      
  5      
  6      
  7      
  8      
  9      
  10      
  11      
* ‘Activity’ includes domestic work (cooking, cleaning, etc.) and includes schooling and higher education and includes 
farming activities for self consumption.  
 
1.5. What is the average monthly cash income level of your household including donations, gifts and 
remittances? Do not include your own consumption and gifts in kind.  
[NEW GHC;  PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) <50 GHC;   (2) 51-150 GHC;   (3) 151-300 GHC;    (4) 301-500 GHC;  
 (5) >500 GHC 
 
1.6. Does this household have electricity? 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes; ] 
 
1.7. Are you native in the community?  
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes; ] 
1.7.1. IF YES (1), have you ever lived in another place, such as another village or town, or abroad, for six or 
more months at a time? 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes]  If YES (1), where? ____________________ 
1.7.2. IF NO (0), for how long do you live in the community? _________________ [years] 
1.7.3.  IF NO (0), which community or town do you come from? _________________________ [name] 
 
1.8.1. When you think of the people you meet regularly and consider as friends; are most of them …  
[TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) pineapple farmers;   (2) other farmers (they are farmers, but do not grow pineapple on a 
commercial basis);    (3) no farmers? 
 
1.8.2. When you think of the people you meet regularly and consider as friends; are most of them …  
[TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) native to this community;   (2) native to a neighbouring community;  
 (3) living in the nearest city;   (4) none of the above? 
 
1.8.3. What is the household head’s relationship to the traditional local authority?   
 (1) relative;   (2) close friend;   (3) know him a bit;   
 (4) do not know him personally. 
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1.8.4. What is the household head’s relationship to the local government?  
[TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) strong relation/household head is politically active;   (2) …has friends in the local government;   
 (3) …knows someone in the local government;    (4) no relation. 
 
1.8.5. What is the household head’s relationship to the local MOFA1 office? [TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) strong relation/household head is politically active;   (2) …has friends in the local government;   
 (3) …knows someone in the local government;    (4) no relation. 
1Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
 
1.9. How often has someone from your household been in one of the following places in the last five years? 
[1= at least once every week; 2= at least once a month; 3= at least once every 6 months; 4= at least once a 
year; 5= at least once; 6= never; WRITE THE CODES ON THE CORRESPONDING LINES.] 
Local market    ________ 
Accra     ________  
Other districts of the same province  ________  
Other provinces    ________   
Bordering countries    ________   
Other countries     ________   
 
1.10. Does someone from your family live in another country?  
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes]  If YES (=1), in which country: ____________________________________ 
 
1.11. Besides your mother-tongue, which languages do you speak? [MORE THAN ONE OPTION IS POSSIBLE] 
 (1) other local languages, which ones ______________________________________________  
 (2) English 
 (3) other foreign languages, which ones ____________________________________________  
 
1.12. Membership of farming-related groups and organisations 
1.12.1. Is anyone in the household a member of a local farmers’ organisation or association, a cooperative, a 
common interest group, a committee, a self help group, or any other local group that has to do with farming 
or marketing of farm produce? And/Or is anyone in the household a member of a local savings group or micro-
credit project/scheme? 
_______ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
IF NO (0), GO TO THE NEXT QUESTION. 
1.12.2. If YES (1), let us talk about each organisation or group that household members belong to (e.g. farmer 
association, pineapple value chain committee, church group, savings group, Ghana Organic Agriculture 
Network, …) [PLEASE NOTE THAT THE TABLE COVERS MORE THAN ONE PAGE] 
 Group 1 Group 2  Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
What is the name of the organisation or group?      
Who in the household is member of this group? 
 
 
    
What is the focus of the organisation? 
[1=Political party; 2=Farmer group; 3= 
Pineapple Cooperative; 4=Agricultural 
organisation;5= Religious; 6=Other (Specify)] 
 
    
When did the household member join the 
organisation or group? [Year] 
 
    
How much money did the member spend on the      
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organisation or group last year? [New GHC] 
How much time did the member spend on the 
organisation or group last year? [days] 
 
    
What are the main farming-related activities of 
the organisation or group, if any? 
 
    
How often does the group/organisation usually 
meet? 
 
    
How many members does this group have 
nowadays? [# of people1] 
 
    
1 # = number 
 
 
 
 
PART 2. LAND OWNERSHIP, LAND DISPOSITION, AND LAND USE 
 
2.1. Which of the following varieties of pineapple are you farming/producing at the moment? 
[PLEASE PROVIDE THE NUMBER (#) OF ACRES FOR EACH OF THEM. THE TOTAL NUMBER (#) OF ACRES PER VARIETY 
SHOULD BE THE SAME AS THE SUM OF ORGANIC AND CONVENTIONAL ACREAGES FOR THE SAME VARIETY. IF THIS IS 
NOT THE CASE, PLEASE TRY TO CLARIFY.  
IN CASE OTHER AREA UNITS ARE USED, USE THE CONVERSION TABLE TO CALCULATE ACREAGE.] 
[please tick, 
when 
acreage 
>0] 
Variety Total 
Acreage 
Acreage per production 
system 
# of plants 
per acre 
Total 
production cost1 
per crop cycle conventional organic 
 (1) Smooth Cayenne      
 (2) Sugar Loaf      
 (3) MD2      
 (4) Queen      
 (5) Other (specify) 
______________ 
     
SUM  [PLEASECOMPUTE]      
1PLEASE ASK THE FARMER TO ESTIMATE THE TOTAL PRODUCTION COST, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THE 
INPUTS (LAND, WORKFORCE, CUTLERS, FERTILIZER, TRANSPORT COSTS, ETC.). 
 
2.2. Why did you decide to plant this variety/-ies and not another one/other ones?  
 (1) Buyer demands or market need;   (2) lower cost of production;   (3) availability of suckers;  
 (4) other (specify): ___________________   
 
2.3. In which year did you start pineapple farming? 
_____________ [year] 
 
2.4. Have you been working in the pineapple sector before starting your own farm? 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes; ] 
2.4.1. If YES (1), in what position were you working? _________________________________  
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2.5. How did you learn pineapple farming? 
 (1) From family members;   (2) As a labourer on a farm;    (3) From friends  
 (4) From a training course;   (5) By myself. 
 
2.6. Do you farm any crop or fruit other than pineapple on a commercial basis (i.e. produce for the market)? 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
2.6.1. If YES (1), please specify on how many acres: __________ [acres]. 
2.6.2. If YES (1), please specify which crop(s) __________________________________________________. 
 
2.7. Do you produce any crop or fruit other than pineapple for consumption by the household/family? 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
2.7.1. If YES (1), please specify on how many acres: __________ [acres]. 
 
2.8. How long does it take you to produce pineapple on one plot* from planting to harvest, i.e. how long is 
one crop cycle? 
_______________________________ [# of months] 
*A plot is an. area with a homogenous cropping pattern. There may be one or several plots on a parcel. 
 
Now, let us talk about the last crop cycle. 
2.9. Which of the following varieties of pineapple did you produce in the previous crop cycle? 
[SAME AS QUESTION 2.1]  
[please tick, when 
acreage >0] 
Variety Total Acreage Acreage per production system 
conventional organic 
 (1) Smooth Cayenne    
 (2) Sugar Loaf    
 (3) MD2    
 (4) Queen    
 (5) Other (specify) 
______________ 
   
SUM  [PLEASECOMPUTE]    
 
2.10. Did you produce any crop or fruit other than pineapple in 2008? 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
2.10.1. If YES (1), please specify how many acres: __________ [acres]. 
 
2.11. Let us now talk about your future plans. Do you intend to cultivate more, less or the same amount of 
pineapple next year? 
 (1) more;    (2) less;    (3) the same. 
 
2.12. And how about the past?  
In total, did you cultivate more, less or the same amount of pineapple 5 years ago? 
 (1) more;    (2) less;    (3) the same. 
 
Let us now talk about your present farm again.  
2.13. Do you prepare your land for planting pineapples manually or do you plough it by tractor 
or animal draft? [TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) Manually;   (2) Tractor;    (3) Animal draft  

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2.14. How many acres of land does this household operate, including fallowing and including the one on 
which the homestead is located? ____________ [acres; FOR OTHER UNITS PLEASE SEE CONVERSION TABLE.]   
 
2.15. How would you describe this land and how much do or did you pay for it?  
[MULTIPLE CHOICES POSSIBLE] 
Description of 
land 
[Please 
tick] 
Acres Percentage of 
total land 
operated* 
Since when 
[year] do you 
operate this 
land? 
Cost [total payment per year 
(new GHC)] 
Outright 
purchase 
 (1)    
 
[total payment at purchase] 
Stool land  (2)     
gift   (3)     
Share tenancy 
(abunu/abusa) 
 (4)     
family land  (5)     
leased  (6)     
other; specify  (7)     
Total [PLEASE 
COMPUTE] 
    
*PLEASE NOTE WHATEVER CLASSIFICATION IS EASIEST FOR THE INTERVIEWEE.  
 
2.16. What is the present use(s) of the land where pineapple is not produced?  
[MORE THAN ONE OPTION IS ALLOWED!] 
 (1) food crops;     (2) cash crops;    (3) grazing;   (4) fallow   
 (5) other (specify): _________________  
 
2.17. Currently, does your household operate all of your land? 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
2.17.1. If NO (0), do you rent* out a part of your land?  
[*Rent out refers to any agreement where the household receives money for not using the land themselves] 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
2.17.2. If YES (1), how many acres do you rent out? 
___________________ [acres] 
 
2.18. How many acres of your land do you leave fallow currently? 
_________________ [acres] 
 
2.19. Which share of your household’s food consumed do you produce by yourself? 
 (1) Almost everything;   (2) about half or less;    (3) less than one quarter. 
 
2.20. What do you do with your agricultural production waste?  
 (1) I burn it;   (2) I throw it away;    (3) I re-use it as manure;   (4) I sell it;  
 (5) Other (specify) ____________________________ . 
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PART 3. CERTIFICATIONS FOR PINEAPPLE 
 
3.1. Which certifications do you currently have for your pineapple?  
[CERTIFICATIONS HAVE TO BE RENEWED ANNUALLY OR BI-ANNUALLY. PLEASE ASK WHEN THE CERTIFICATION HAS 
BEEN RENEWED LAST TO MAKE SURE THAT IT IS STILL VALID.  
PLEASE TICK THE RELEVANT ONES. SEVERAL OPTIONS ARE ALLOWED.] 
Certification [Please 
tick] 
Single farmer 
(=1) or Group 
certification 
(=2)  
If group 
certification, name 
of the group 
First year of 
certification 
[month/year] 
Date of last 
renewal 
[month/year] 
(1) GLOBALGAP  
(formerly Eurepgap) 
    
(2) Organic      
(3) Fairtrade       
(4) Other (specify): 
___________________ 
     
 
3.2. Did you have certifications in the past that you did not renew?  
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes; ] 
3.2.1. If YES (1), which ones: 
  (1) GLOBALGAP (EurepGAP);    (2) Organic;   (3) Fairtrade;  
 (4) Other (specify): ______________________  
 
3.2.2. If YES (1), why did you not renew this certification/these certifications? 
Reasons for 
abandoning 
certification 
Reason(s) for not renewing certifications  
A maximum of two options is  allowed (DO NOT read all the options to the farmer):  
 (1) The pineapple exporter/international organisation/NGO* did not pay for the renewal; 
 (2) We did not have the means or the money to pay for the renewal;  
 (3) We did not know that we had to renew the certification; 
 (4) We thought we would not need the certification anymore; 
 (5) It was too difficult. 
 (6) Other (specify): _____________________________________________________  
 
* NGO = Non-Governmental Organisation. This term refers to any aid or similar organisation, that is not 
controlled by local or foreign government and includes e.g. Ghana Organic Agriculture Network (GOAN). 
 
FROM NOW AND THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE QUESTIONNAIRE WHENEVER CERTIFICATIONS AER MENTIONED IN THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE: IF FARMERS ARE BOTH ORGANIC AND GLOBALGAP CERTIFIED, THEN WRITE ‘ORGANIC’; IF FARMERS 
DO NOT PRODUCE ORGANIC CERTIFIED PINEAPPLE, THEN WRITE ‘GLOBALGAP’. THIS SHOULD CORRESPOND WITH THE 
SPECIFICATION AS ON THE FIRST PAGE (PART 0).  
 
3.3. Concerning your ORGANIC or GLOBALGAP certification, can you tell me what, in your opinion, 
are the 3 most important features of being certified in terms of production, farm management, etc? 
[PLEASE CONSIDER ONLY ORGANIC OR GLOBALGAP (FORMERLY EUREPGAP) FOR THIS QUESTION.] 
Certification: ___________________ [1=Organic; 2=GLOBALGAP] 
1. ____________________________________________________________ 
2. ____________________________________________________________  
3. ____________________________________________________________ 
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3.4. Let us now talk about your ORGANIC or GLOBALGAP certification. In the following table, the 
questions on the left side are only for ORGANIC certified farmers. The questions on the right side are only for 
conventional GLOBALGAP certified farmers.  
A) ONLY ORGANIC FARMERS B) ONLY CONVENTIONAL FARMERS 
3.4.1. How did you get to know about the possibility 
to get ORGANIC certification? 
[MORE THAN ONE OPTION IS ALLOWED.] 
 (1) from other farmers/producer’s groups;    
 (2) from relatives;    
 (3) from a government agency; 
 (4) from an NGO/international organization;  
 (5) from an exporter/buyer;  
 (5) other (specify)_________________________ . 
3.4.1. How did you get to know about the possibility 
to get GLOBALGAP certification? 
 [MORE THAN ONE OPTION IS ALLOWED.] 
 (1) from other farmers/producer’s groups;    
 (2) from relatives;    
 (3) from a government agency; 
 (4) from an NGO/international organization;  
 (5) from an exporter/buyer;  
 (5) other (specify)_________________________ . 
3.4.2. Why did you decide to produce organically? 
[a maximum of three options is possible; DO NOT 
READ ALL THE OPTIONS TO THE FARMER] 
 (1) Production costs are lower than for 
conventional production. 
 (2) Prices are better. 
 (3) Health or food safety reasons. 
 (4) Environmental concerns. 
 (5) Contracts with exporters are better.  
 (6) The market is better/there is less competition. 
 (7) Cultural reasons and/or tradition. 
 (8) Customer/buyer demands. 
 (9) Other farmers/friends recommended it to me. 
 (10) Other reasons, please specify 
_______________________________ . 
3.4.2. Why did you get GLOBALGAP certified?  
[a maximum of three options is possible; DO NOT 
READ ALL THE OPTIONS TO THE FARMER] 
 (1) Yields are better 
 (2) Prices are better. 
 (3) Health or food safety reasons. 
 (4) Environmental concerns. 
 (5) Contracts with exporters are better. 
 (6) The market is better/there is less competition. 
 (7) Customer/buyer demands. 
 (8) Other farmers/friends recommended it to me. 
 (9) Other reasons, please specify 
_______________________________ . 
 
3.4.3. In your opinion, has organic farming affected 
your and your family’s health positively?  
_____________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
IFYES (1), please explain why: 
_____________________________________  
____________________________________  
3.4.3. In your opinion, has farming according to 
GLOBALGAP standards affected your and your 
family’s health positively?  
_____________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
IFYES (1), please explain why: 
_____________________________________  
____________________________________ 
3.4.4. What is preventing you from switching to 
conventional production?  
[a maximum of three options is possible] 
 (1) Lack of money/capital to invest.  
 (2) Lack of market/buyers.  
 (3) Lack of time and/or knowledge.  
 (4) Conventional production is too difficult. 
 (5) Conventional production is less profitable. 
 (6) Never though about it. 
 (7) Other reasons, please specify 
_______________________________ . 
3.4.4. What is preventing you from switching to 
organic production?  
[a maximum of three options is possible] 
 (1) Lack of money/capital to invest.  
 (2) Lack of market/buyers.  
 (3) Lack of time and/or knowledge.  
 (4) Organic production is too difficult. 
 (5) Organic production is less profitable. 
 (6) Never thought about it. 
 (7) Other reasons, please specify 
_______________________________ . 
3.4.5. Has the ORGANIC certification strongly 
affected the way you do your farming (in terms of 
land maintenance, input use, harvesting methods)? 
__________________________ [0=No; 1=Yes; ] 
3.4.5. Has the GLOBALGAP certification strongly 
affected the way you do your farming (in terms of  
e.g. land maintenance, inputs, harvesting methods)? 
__________________________ [0=No; 1=Yes; ] 
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From here on, the questions are again for all farmers. AGAIN, IF FARMERS ARE BOTH ORGANIC AND 
GLOBALGAP (FORMERLY EUREPGAP) CERTIFIED, THEN REFER TO ORGANIC CERTIFICATION; IF FARMERS ARE 
NOT ORGANIC CERTIFIED THEN REFER TO GLOBALGAP CERTIFICATION. 
 
3.5.1. Who organised the certification process? [PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE] 
 (1) Me myself;    (2) The farmer group;    (3) The exporter;    (4) An international aid 
organisation;   (5) NGO;   (6) Other, specify: ___________________________ . 
 
3.5.2. Who paid for the certification? [PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE] 
 (1) Me myself;   (2) The farmer group;   (3) The exporter;   (4) An international aid 
organisation;   (5) NGO;   (6) Other, specify: ___________________________ . 
 
3.5.3. How much did you have to pay for the initial certification?  
[WRITE 0 IF THE FARMER DID NOT HAVE TO PAY FOR IT.] 
_________________ [new GHC] 
 
3.5.4. How much do you have to pay for the yearly renewal of the certification?  
[WRITE 0 IF THE FARMER DID NOT HAVE TO PAY FOR IT OR DID NOT HAVE TO RENEW IT YET.] 
_________________ [new GHC] 
 
3.5. Did you receive special training in preparation of the certification?  
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
3.6.1. If YES (1), have you implemented any of the techniques or methods that you have learned in the training? 
 (0) No;   (1) No, was not suitable for my farm;   (2) No, but I am planning to do so;   
 (3) Yes. 
 
3.7. What kind of investments did you have to make in order to achieve the certification? 
Please tell me about all the investments that you had to make. [DO NOT READ THE OPTIONS TO THE FARMERS.] 
Investment Costs in new GHC  
[WRITE ZERO IF NO COST] 
Time spent on this investment 
[days] 
Equipment (like chemical storage 
facilities, protective clothing, toilets, 
etc.) 
  
Training   
Other, specify: 
________________________ 
  
 
3.8. Are you planning or would you like to get any (additional) certification in the near future? 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
3.8.1. If YES (1), which one? 
____________________________________________   
 
3.9. Has your farm been GIS mapped? [GIS=geographical information system] 
___________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
3.9.1. If YES (1), when (month/year) and by which organisation? 
_______/________ [mm/YYYY] ______________________________ [organisation name]  
 
3.10. Would you renew your certification even if the exporter would no longer buy from you? 
 (0) No. 
 (1) Yes, I would find another exporter.  
 (2) Yes, in any case. 
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PART 4: PINEAPPLE PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT BY THE HOUSEHOLD 
[AGAIN, IF FARMERS ARE BOTH ORGANIC AND GLOBALGAP (FORMERLY EUREPGAP) CERTIFIED, THEN REFER TO 
ORGANIC CERTIFICATION; IF FARMERS ARE NOT ORGANIC CERTIFIED THEN REFER TO GLOBALGAP 
CERTIFICATION.] 
 
[IF THE FARMER HAS PLANTED MORE THAN ONE VARIETY OF PINEAPPLE AND TREATS THESE VARIETIES DIFFERENTLY 
IN TERMS OF THE QUESTIONS THROUGHOUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE, ASK FOR THE VARIETY THAT IS PRIMARILY SOLD 
FOR EXPORT & THEN REFER TO THIS VARIETY.] 
4.1.  # of pineapple plants; changes in productivity  
1. Has the number of plants that you have per acre changed since you 
received GLOBALGAP (formerly EurepGAP) /ORGANIC 
certification? 
[0=No; 1=Yes, increased; 2=Yes, decreased] 
 
2. Has the productivity of your farm changed since you received 
GLOBALGAP/ORGANIC certification? 
Productivity change could be more (positive change) / less (negative 
change) harvested amount (# of pineapple) per hectare.  
[0=no, remained constant; 1=Yes, increased; 2=Yes, decreased] 
 
4. If YES (1 or 2), can you estimate by how much it has decreased or 
increased? [IF POSSIBLE, GIVE %, OTHERWISE CLEARLY STATE THE 
UNIT USED] 
 
5. What part of your pineapple harvest did you sell to exporters before 
you received GLOBALGAP/ORGANIC certification?  
[WRITE DOWN UNIT, E.G. % ] 
 
6. What part of your pineapple harvest do you sell to exporters now 
(after receiving GLOBALGAP/ORGANIC certification)?  
[WRITE DOWN UNIT] 
 
 
4.2. Did you grow any other crop aside pineapple on any of your pineapple plots during the last 5 years 
(since 2005)?  
________________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
4.2.1. If YES (1), on what part of your pineapple plots? [WRITE DOWN UNIT] 
_______________________________________________________________________   
 
4.3.1. How many years have you used the same land for pineapple? ____________ [# of years] 
4.3.2 How many years do you leave a pineapple plot fallow? ___________ [# of years] 
 
4.4. What kind of soil do you have on most of your pineapple plots? [PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE] 
 (1) Red or black Sandy;   (2)  White Sandy;   (3) White rocky;   (4) Rocky red or black; 
 (5) Sandy or Rocky Clay;   (6) Clay;   (7) Other (specify): ______________________.    
 
4.5. How big a problem is soil erosion (i.e. washing away of soil when it rains) on your pineapple plots?  
 (1) not a problem (no erosion);    (2) a small problem (mild erosion);   
  (3) a big problem (severe erosion). 
 
4.6. Compared to other farmers in the region, do you think your pineapple yields are: 
 (1) higher;    (2) average;   (3) lower. 
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4.7. Which factors are for you the most important constraints to pineapple production expansion?  
[A MAXIMUM OF TWO OPTIONS IS POSSIBLE.] 
 (1) lack of suckers;   (2) lack of market;   (3) lack of time;   (4) lack of land;  
 (5) lack of credit;   (6) other (specify) ____________________ . 
 
4.8. Soil fertility and water conservation management practices applied on pineapple plots  
Let us talk about what you do to improve the soil fertility and conserve water on your pineapple plots. I will now 
mention different ways of managing soil fertility and conserving water. Please then tell me if you use this 
method or practice currently, if you have used it before joining the GLOBALGAP (formerly EurepGAP) 
/ORGANIC certification scheme, and how you have changed it because of the certification.  
[PLEASE NOTE THAT THE TABLE COVERS MORE THAN ONE PAGE] 
Soil fertility and water conservation 
management practices? 
Current 
Pineapple Plots 
Did you apply this 
method on your 
pineapple plants 
before starting the 
certification 
process? 
 
[0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
How have you changed 
the way you use this 
method since joining 
the certification 
scheme, if at all? 
[0=no change, 
1=reduced frequency 
&/or amount, 
2=increased frequency 
&/or amount] 
Trash lines  
[# per pineapple plot, leave blank if not used] 
   
Infiltration ditches  
[# per pineapple plot, leave blank if not used] 
   
Live cover crops (types) (e.g., peas, beans, 
etc.)  
[name types of cover crops, if any; leave blank 
otherwise] 
   
Live cover crops [estimated part of pineapple 
plots; WRITE DOWN UNIT, E.G. % ] 
   
Mulch [estimated part of pineapple plots; 
WRITE DOWN UNIT] 
   
Type of mulching materials (e.g. maize stalks, 
banana leaves, pineapple husks, grass, plastic 
mulch) 
[name material of mulch, if any; leave blank 
otherwise] 
   
Organic fertilizers, compost or green manure 
(made from grass, cocoa husk, palm branches, 
other crop residues, etc) or black soil 
[estimated amount in kg per pineapple plot, 
leave blank if not used] 
   
Chemical fertilizers (NPK, Urea, etc.) 
[amount in kg per pineapple plot, leave blank 
if not used] 
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Animal manure (poultry (chicken droppings), 
goat, pig, cattle) or cow dung [amount per 
pineapple plot, leave blank if not used] 
   
Leguminous residues mixed into the soil  
[amount in kg per pineapple plot, leave blank 
if not used] 
   
Other soil & water conservation methods  
[specify type & amount or frequency] 
   
 
 
   
 
4.9. Have you changed the way you manage soil and water on your other plots (plots with other crops, not 
pineapple) since joining the GLOBALGAP (EurepGAP) /ORGANIC certification scheme?    
___________  [0=No; 1=Yes]  
 
4.10. Change in biophysical features of pineapple plots since joining the GLOBALGAP 
(EurepGAP)/ORGANIC certification scheme 
For each feature, please tell me how it has changed on your pineapple plots since entering into the certification 
process or if there has been no change. 
Perceived changes in biophysical feature since joining the 
GLOBALGAP/ORGANIC certification scheme  
CO
DE
Pineapple Plots 
[0=no change, 1=declined, 
2=increased] 
Good cover with pineapple plants (i.e. absence of gaps)  
[0=no change, 1=improved, 2=worsened] 
1  
Incidence of phytophtora 2  
Other pest and disease infestation 3  
Weed infestation 4  
 
4.11. Do you irrigate your pineapple plots?  
 (0) No;    (1) Yes, partly;    (2) Yes, fully. 
 
4.12. Pineapple planting methods and plant spacing 
Let us talk about the methods you currently use to plant pineapple. 
IF THE FARMER HAS FARMS MORE THAN TWO DIFFERENT VARIETIES, ONLY REPORT THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT 
ONES IN ECONOMIC TERMS. 
Planting methods and plant spacing 
CO
D 
E 
Current 
Pineapple Plots 
Variety 1 
Current 
Pineapple Plots 
Variety 2  
When was the last time you planted pineapple? [year and month]? 1   
Did you produce the suckers yourself?  [0=No; 1=Yes] 2   
How many of the suckers have later died?  
[WRITE DOWN UNIT, E.G. PART OR % ] 
3   
Did you practice sorting and grading of your planting material 
(suckers, slips) before planting? [0=No; 1=Yes] 
4   
Did you disinfect the suckers? [0=No; 1=Yes] 5   
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4.13. Current pineapple plant management practices 
 
Let us talk about what you do to manage the pineapple plants. I will mention different management practices. 
Please then tell me then whether you have applied or are planning to apply this practice on your current 
pineapple plots, and if so, how many times you used it. Please also tell me, if you have applied it before joining 
the GLOBALGAP (formerly EurepGAP) /ORGANIC certification scheme, and how you have changed it 
because of the certification.  
Pineapple plant management practices 
C 
O
D 
E 
Current 
Pineapple Plots
Did you apply this 
practice on your 
pineapple before 
achieving the 
certification? 
 
[0=No; 1=Yes] 
How have you 
changed the way you 
use this practice 
since achieving, if at 
all? 
0=no change,  
1=reduced frequency 
&/or amount,  
2=increased 
frequency &/or 
amount 
Clean weeding (with a hoe) or slashing weeds 
(cutting without uprooting or turning the soil) 
[# of times weeded this way] 
1   
 
Apply chemical pesticides (against pests and 
diseases) and/or herbicides and/or fungicides 
(against weeds and fungi) [# of times done] 
2   
 
Apply organic pesticides (e.g., Tephrosia 
vogelii, Neem extract, wood ash, red chillies, 
Tithonia ash, marigold solution, stinging 
nettle, urine) [# of times done] 
3   
 
Applying ethylene/ethrel or calcium carbide 
for flower induction (forcing)?  
[0=No; 1=Yes] 
4    
If YES (1), ethylene (e.g. ethrel) [=1] or 
calcium carbide [=2]? 
5    
If YES(1), how many months after planting  
[this might be several times] 
6    
Do you apply the ethylene/calcium carbide 
yourself or does the exporter do that?  
[1=self, 2=exporter] 
7    
 
4.14. Have you changed the way you manage soil and water on your other plots (plots with other crops, not 
pineapple) since joining the GLOBALGAP/ORGANIC certification scheme?    
___________  [0=No; 1=Yes]   
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PART 5. PINEAPPLE HARVESTING & MARKETING 
 
5.1. Changes in pineapple quality     
[AGAIN, IF FARMERS ARE BOTH ORGANIC AND GLOBALGAP CERTIFIED, THEN REFER TO ORGANIC CERTIFICATION; 
IF FARMERS ARE NOT ORGANIC CERTIFIED THEN REFER TO GLOBALGAP CERTIFICATION.] 
 How specifically has the quality of your pineapple (at time of sale) changed 
since you received GLOBALGAP (formerly EurepGAP) or ORGANIC 
certification with respect to: 
 
1 Size and weight of the pineapple? 
0=no change; 1=bigger/heavier now, 2=smaller/lighter now; 3=Other (specify)
 
 
2 Colour of pineapple? 
0=no change; 1=improved (specify); 2=worsened (specify); 3=Other (specify) 
 
 
3 Bruises, sunburn, or similar? 
0=no change; 1=improved; 2=worsened; 3=Other (specify) 
 
 
4 Internal browning?  
0=no change; 1=improved; 2=worsened; 3= don’t know; 4=Other (specify) 
 
 
 
5.2. Are you keeping records on your farming activities, such as harvest, production or sales records? 
______________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
5.3. Pineapple harvested in the last year (January 2009 to today) 
Let us talk about each of the seasons you harvested pineapple in the last year (2009) and up to today.  
IF THE FARMER HAS HARVESTED AND SOLD MORE THAN TWO DIFFERENT VARIETIES, ONLY REPORT THE TWO 
MOST IMPORTANT ONES IN TERMS OF QUANTITY. IF THE FARMER HAS ONLY 1 VARIETY, THEN REPORT ONLY 1. 
Year Quantity 
harvested 
 
[UNIT: 
Kg, 
pieces, 
boxes, 
other 
(specify)] 
Con- 
version 
factor 
into kg1 
Corresponding 
number of 
acres  
[# of acres that 
the pineapple 
was harvested 
at] 
Variety of 
pineapple 
harvested 
[1=Smooth 
Cayenne, 
2=Sugar 
Loaf, 
3=MD2, 
4=Queen, 
5=Other 
(specify)] 
Quantity 
sold to 
exporters 
1=%;  
2= units 
from 1st 
column 
[WRITE 
UNIT IN 
BRACKETS.] 
Quantity 
sold on the 
local 
market 
1=%;  
2= units 
from 1st 
column 
[WRITE 
UNIT IN 
BRACKETS.] 
Quantity 
consumed/ 
self-
processed/ 
gift  
1=%;  
2= units 
from 1st 
column 
[WRITE UNIT 
IN 
BRACKETS.] 
Quantity 
wasted on 
the field  
1=%;  
2= units 
from 1st 
column 
[WRITE 
UNIT IN 
BRACKETS.] 
2009  
First 
variety  
        
2009 
Second 
variety  
        
2010 
First 
variety 
        
2010 
Second  
variety 
        
1PLEASE ASK THE FARMER FOR THE AVERAGE WEIGHT OF THE PINEAPPLE HARVESTED AND/OR # OF PINEAPPLE IN 
BOX IF APPLICABLE. 
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5.3.1. How many plants did you force (i.e. induce flowering) in 2009? 
____________________________________________ [# of plants] 
5.3.2. If you have forced some plants, how many of these were harvested later? 
____________________________________________ [# of pineapples] 
5.3.3. And how many of these were sold to the exporter? 
____________________________________________ [# of pineapples] 
 
5.4. Pineapple sales in the last year (January 2009 to today) 
Let us talk about each of the seasons you sold pineapple in the last year (2009) and up to today. Please tell me 
about sales to both exporters and to middlemen and other buyers. I am only interested in the sales of pineapple 
harvested from the fields operated by this household, and not in pineapples bought from other farmers and resold 
(i.e. trading in pineapple).  
FINISH ONE SALE BEFORE GOING TO THE NEXT. IF THE FARMER DOES NOT REMEMBER  THE SUM OF ALL SALES IN ONE 
OF THE SEASONS, GET AS MANY SALES AS HE DOES REMEMBER AND FILL OUT ALSO THE ‘ALL SALES’ COLUMN. WRITE 
‘0’ IF NO SALES HAVE TAKEN PLACE. IF THE FARMER KEEPS RECORDS, (QUESTION 5.2.), ASK HIM/HER TO USE THEM 
TO ANSWER THE QUESTION. PLEASE CONTINUE ON FREE SPACE PRVIDED ON THE LAST PAGE IF YOU NEED MORE 
SPACE. 
FOR EACH SALE, SEPERATELY FILL IN SALES FOR THE local AND export MARKET. NOTE THAT THE TABLE COVERS 
MORE THAN ONE PAGE. 
  
Aspect of selling pineapple 
Sales 
 
2009 first 
variety 
2009 
second 
variety 
2010 
first 
variety 
2010 
second 
variety 
All Sales 
Lo
ca
l 
How much was sold at this instance 
[kilogramme]? 
FILL IN FROM PREVIOUS TABLE 
    
 
 
Ex
po
rt 
     
Lo
ca
l 
Which variety was sold at this 
instance?  
FILL IN FROM PREVIOUS TABLE 
 
 
 
    
Ex
po
rt 
 
 
 
 
    
Lo
ca
l Who bought the pineapple? 
1=Middleman/Trader, 
2=Exporter/Cooperative (specify) 
3=Other farmer, 4=Shop keeper/ Market 
woman, 5=Processor for export, 
6=Processor for local market, 7=Other 
(specify) 
     
Ex
po
rt 
 
 
 
 
    
Lo
ca
l Where was the pineapple sold? 
1=On-farm; 2=Road-side; 3= 
Office/store of Project./Coop/Exporter; 
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Aspect of selling pineapple 
Sales 
 
2009 first 
variety 
2009 
second 
variety 
2010 
first 
variety 
2010 
second 
variety 
All Sales 
Ex
po
rt 
4=Nearest village, or retail shop; 
5=Other (specify) 
 
 
 
 
    
Lo
ca
l 
What did it cost in total to transport 
the pineapple to the point of sale?  
[new GHC; LEAVE BLANK IF SOLD ON-
FARM] 
 
 
 
    
Ex
po
rt 
 
 
 
 
    
Lo
ca
l 
How much did the buyer pay you in 
this sale in total?  
[new GHC]  
 
 
 
    
Ex
po
rt 
 
 
 
 
    
Lo
ca
l 
What was the unit price?  
[new GHC/Quantity unit]  
[SPECIFY UNIT!] 
 
 
 
    
Ex
po
rt 
 
 
 
 
    
 
5.4. Let us talk about the way you handle your pineapple after harvesting. How do you store your pineapple 
before it gets picked up or before you transport it to the exporter or to the local market? 
 (1) un-shaded on bare ground;   (2) shaded on bare ground;   (3) in bag or box on floor;   
 (4) Stored in a cooled room;    (5) other, specify:__________________ 
 
5.5. How long do usually you store your pineapple after harvest (before it is sold)?  
__________________________ [average # of days] 
 
5.6. How long does it take you to go from your farm to the closest local market using your usual method of 
transportation?  
[SPECIFY UNIT: HOURS / MINUTES, OR SIMILAR] 
__________________________________________  
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PART 6. PARTICIPATION IN THE OUTGROWER SCHEME OR CONTRACT WITH EXPORTER 
 
Let us talk about the past, i.e. before you entered into the certification process first. 
6.1. Did you participate an outgrower scheme/contract farming with an exporter before you entered into 
the certification process? [AS ALWAYS, REFER TO ORGANIC IF THE FARMER IS ORGANIC AND GLOBALGAP 
CERTIFIED AND TO GLOBALGAP OTHERWISE.] 
______________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
6.2. Who was your main buyer of your pineapple before you received GLOBALGAP (formerly 
Eurepgap)/ORGANIC certification?  
[WRITE “1” FOR THE MOST IMPORTANT, “2” FOR THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT, AND SO ON. LEAVE BLANK WHEN 
NOT SOLD TO THIS BUYER.]  
(1) Market women/ shop keepers _________ ;   (2) Processors for the local market __________ ;  
(3) Exporters or processors for the export market ___________ ;  
(4) Roadside sellers/Traders ___________ ;   (5) I sold myself to consumers ___________   
(6) Other (specify): _______________________________  
 
Now let us talk about your current farm again.  
6.3. Do you sell your pineapples for export to one or more different exporters? 
 (1) only to one exporter;    (2) to two or more exporters. 
 
6.4. Do you participate in an outgrower scheme/contract farming with an exporter (currently)? 
______________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
6.4.1. If YES (1), what is the name of the exporter? 
_____________________________________  
 
6.4.2. If, NO (2), who is your most important exporter buyer (2009 to today)?  
[i.e. the major buyer among the exporters that the farmer sells to] 
____________________________________________________ [name] 
 
Now let us talk about your participation in the outgrower scheme or about your most important exporter buyer. 
[NAME IT! (NAME FROM PREVIOUS QUESTION 6.4.1 or 6.4.2)] THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REFER ONLY TO THIS 
PARTICULAR BUYER. 
 
6.5. How often do you meet or talk to this exporter? 
_________________ [times per year or month, SPECIFY UNIT] 
 
6.6. Has this frequency changed since you entered into the certification process? 
 (0) No.  (1) Yes, it we meet or talk to each other more often now.   (2) Yes, it got less.  
 
6.7. Is there any formal agreement with this exporter that you sell to? 
_____________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
6.7.1. If YES (1), is this agreement written or oral?    (1) Written;   (2) Oral  
6.7.2. If YES (1), for what period of time is this agreement formalised (how many years or months)? 
 ___________________________________ [SPECIFY UNIT] 
 
6.8. Does this buyer guarantee to buy a certain volume of pineapple or a certain part of your harvest? 
_____________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
6.9. For how long have you been selling pineapple to this buyer? [PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) For one year or shorter;   (2) For 3 years or shorter (but more than one year);  
 (3) For five years or longer. 
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6.10. How would you describe the quality of the relationship between you and this buyer?  
 (1) Very good;    (2) Good;   (3) OK;    (4) Not very good. 
 
6.11. Has this quality of the relationship changed since you entered into the certification process? 
 (0) No change.    (1) Yes, it got better.    (2) Yes, it got worse.  
 
6.12. Is the exporter usually coming to pick up the fruit at the agreed time (i.e. is not too late or too early)? 
_____________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
6.13. Are you happy with the amount of fruit that the exporter is buying from you? 
_____________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
6.14. Who sets the price for pineapple that you sell? [PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) The buyer sets the price.   (2) The price is negotiated.   (3) The price is written in the contract. 
 
6.14.1. How often is the price for pineapple renegotiated/reset between you and this buyer?  
[PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE.] 
 (1) once a year.       (2) more than once a year.   
 (3) less than once a year.      (4) at every purchase.   
 
6.14.2. Has the way prices are negotiated changed since you received GLOBALGAP/ORGANIC 
certification? 
 (0) No change.   (1) Yes, prices are reset/ renegotiated more frequently.  (2) Yes, …less frequently.  
 
6.15. As a rule, how many weeks after the harvest does this buyer usually pay you?  
 (1) the same day;   (2) > 1 day and < than 1 week;   (3) > 1 week and < than 1 month; 
 (4) > 1 month and < than 3 months;        (5) 3 months or more. 
 
6.15.1. Has this changed since you received GLOBALGAP (EurepGap)/ORGANIC certification? 
 (0) No change.   (1) Yes, the buyer pays faster after harvest.   (2) Yes, the buyer pays later.  
 
6.16. Do you have the phone number of this buyer? 
_____________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
6.17. Does this buyer visit your plots in order to inspect the fruits before harvesting? 
 (0) No;    (1) Yes, sometimes;    (2) Yes.   
 
6.18. Does this exporter have cold storage facilities? 
_____________ [0=No, 1=Yes, 2= I don’t know] 
 
6.19. Reason(s) for not selling pineapple as ORGANIC or GLOBALGAP certified 
For all pineapple sales in 2009 and up to today where the pineapple was not sold under this certification 
(including sales to the local market), please tell me why you did not sell this pineapple as certified ORGANIC or 
GLOBALGAP?  
A MAXIMUM OF THREE OPTIONS IS POSSIBLE. DO NOT MENTION ALL THE OPTIONS TO THE FARMER. 
 (1) The pineapple exporter was not buying during this period;   
 (2) The pineapple was rejected by exporter(s);  
 (3) The pineapple exporters’ buying post was too far away and we did not have the means or the money to 
transport the pineapple to the place of sale;  
 (4) We urgently needed cash; 
 (5) The middleman paid a higher price than exporter(s); 
 (6) Other (specify): _________________________________________________ . 
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6.20. How do you get information on the export market for pineapple? [MORE THAN ONE OPTION IS POSSIBLE] 
 (1) From the exporter/main buyer;    (2) from other buyers;   (3) from other farmers;  
 (4) from a market news service (radio, sms, etc) ;   (5) from MOFA (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture) 
 (6) elsewhere (please specify): ____________________________________  
 
6.21. Does the buyer process your pineapple (to e.g. sliced or dried pineapple or pineapple juice) or does 
he/she export your pineapple fresh?  
 (1) fresh;    (2) processed;  (3) both;    (4) don’t know.
 
6.22. Is your pineapple exported by air or sea? 
 (1) Air;    (2) Sea;    (3) don’t know.
 
6.23. Change in income from pineapple since receiving certification 
How has your income from pineapple changed since 
receiving the certification?  
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE] 
 1. It has not changed.  
 2. It has increased. 
 3. It has reduced. 
How has the stability of your pineapple income changed 
since receiving the certification?  
[ONLY ONE ANSWER IS POSSIBLE] 
 1. It has not changed. 
 2. It has become more certain. 
 3. It has become less certain. 
 
6.24. Equipment, training, and inputs received from this buyer (exporter) or another organisation 
Have you received any of the following types of support (buy or get for free) from this buyer or other 
organisations (NGOs, aid organisations, etc. like MOFA, GTZ, TIPCEE, SNV, WAFF, Technoserve, 
GOAN, etc.) in the last 5 years (since 2005)? Please tell me about each input, equipment or training that you 
received. Training includes any training on demonstration plots, agricultural extension, etc., which is related to 
farming or marketing of farm produce.  
[LEAVE CELLS BLANK IF NOT RECEIVED/NOT APPLICABLE. NOTE THAT THE TABLE COVERS MORE THAN 1 PAGE. ] 
Input or equipment received in the 
last 5 years (since 2005) 
C
O
D
E 
Name/s of 
institution/s/ 
person/exporter/s 
granting this 
support 
When was 
the last 
time you 
received it? 
(year) 
Approx. # 
of times 
support 
received 
(since 2005) 
Did you have to 
pay for it 
directly or 
indirectly? 
0=No; 1=Yes 
Provision of a loan 1     
Payment in advance 2     
Help in getting loan from a bank 3  
   
Provision of fertilizer or chemicals 4  
   
Provision of equipment (specify): 
________________________ 
________________________  
5  
   
Help on how to improve your 
farming techniques 
6  
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Training  7     
Farm inspections by 
exporter/organisation staff or 
external inspection officers 
8  
   
Exporter did forcing (spraying ethrel, 
calcium carbide) 
9  
   
Exporter did spraying with pesticides 10  
   
Any other support (specify): 
________________________  
11  
   
 
6.25. How much would you get from an exporter and on the local market for pineapple if you had another 
type of certification? [NEW GHC PER KG OR PER PIECE, SPECIFY UNIT] 
PLEASE ASK THE FARMER, NO MATTER IF HE/SHE IS ORGANIC OR CONVENTIONAL GLOBAL GAP CERTIFIED, 
FOR BOTH PRICES, ORGANIC AND CONVENTIONAL. ASK THE FARMER TO GUESS IF HE/SHE DOES NOT KNOW THE 
EXACT PRICE. WRITE”DON’T KNOW” ONLY IF THE FARMER HAS NO IDEA.  
 Exporter Local Market 
 On average in 2009 On average in 2009 
Organic certified    
Conventional GLOBALGAP certified    
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PART 7. INPUTS IN PINEAPPLE PRODUCTION  
 
7.1. Did you hire labour to work on your pineapple farm in the last year (2009)?  
By hired labour I also mean work parties and relatives paid in cash or kind. 
__________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
IF NO, ONLY FILL OUT THE FIRST TWO COLUMNS IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.  
 
7.2. Labour Inputs: participation in pineapple production, and marketing by different labour types in the last crop cycle (i.e. from planting to harvest) 
Let us talk about whom did what kind of work on all your pineapple plots in the last crop cycle. I will now mention the different work tasks in pineapple; for each task, 
if done at all, then please tell me who in the household participated in this work, and whether you hired labour to carry out the work. By hired labour I also mean work 
parties and relatives who you paid in cash or kind. Please also tell me the amount of work done by each group, and the cost of hiring in case of hired workers. NOTE 
THAT THE TABLE COVERS 2 PAGES.  
Last crop cycle Family labour Hired labour 
Type of work/activity in 
pineapple in the last crop 
cycle  
How many 
household 
members 
worked on 
the pineapple 
plots 
including 
yourself? 
How many 
days did 
these 
household 
members 
work on 
average on 
the pineapple 
plots? 
How many 
labourers did 
you hire in total 
in the last crop 
cycle for these 
activities? 
How many 
days/months 
did each of 
them work? 
 
[specify unit of 
work:  day(D) 
or month (M)] 
What was the 
rate paid per 
unit of work 
in the last 
crop cycle?  
[new GHC per 
day or month, 
SPECIFY UNIT] 
How many 
days/months 
were done in 
total in the last 
crop cycle by 
hired 
labourers? 
[SPECIFY UNIT] 
What was the 
total amount 
of cash paid 
for hired 
workers in the 
last crop 
cycle? 
[new GHC] 
What other costs 
did you incur? 
(e.g. food & drinks, 
in kind payment) 
 
[Estimated value , 
new GHC; IF NO 
ESTIMATION CAN BE 
MADE, GIVE IN KIND 
ESTIMATIONS] 
Land preparation (ploughing, 
harrowing, removal of debris, 
plastic mulch, etc.) 
        
Pre-planting activities 
(fertilizer application, 
preparation of suckers, …) 
        
Planting of pineapple suckers 
        
Weed control         
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Pest and disease control 
(insecticide/fungicide 
application, etc.) 
        
Soil fertility management and 
water conservation (incl. 
fertilizer application, manure, 
planting of cover crops, trash 
lines, etc.) 
        
Forcing         
Harvesting         
Negotiations with the buyer         
Total Marketing (do not fill 
in) 
        
Total Prod. (do not fill in)         
 
7.3. Of the labourers you hired in 2009, can you indicate what part are casual, and what part are permanent workers on your farm? 
[WRITE DOWN UNIT, E.G. PART OR % ] 
Casual workers _________  
Permanent workers _________  
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7.4. Agricultural equipment and inputs used for pineapple production in the last crop cycle 
I will now mention different types of input and equipment that can be used in farming and especially in pineapple production. For each one, please tell me if you have 
used it in the last crop cycle. Please also tell me how much you had to pay for it, i.e. price at purchase, rent, or if it was given for free. 
GO FIRST THROUGH ALL THE POSSIBLE INPUTS/EQUIPMENT (THE ‘USED IN THE LAST CROP CYCLE?’ QUESTION) AND THEN ASK THE OTHER QUESTIONS FOR THOSE WHERE THE 
ANSWER WAS YES(1). 
 
Equipment/Input for pineapple 
production 
C 
O 
D 
E 
Used in 
the last 
crop 
cycle? 
 
0=No 
1=Yes  
How did you 
obtain the input 
or equipment?  
1=purchased, 
2=rented,  
3=given for free 
Unit 
1=piece, 2=bag, 
3=gallon, 4=basin, 
5=tin, 6=kilogram, 
7=litre, 
8=wheelbarrow, 
9=Other (specify) 
Total # of 
units 
acquired 
2009 
What was the 
total cost? 
[new GHC] 
From whom or where did you get it? 
1= private input supplier (shop, 
individual), 2=Another farmer,  
3= the exporter,  
4=other organisation (specify), 
5=Other (specify) 
Pineapple suckers 1       
Inorganic fertilizers 2       
Organic fertilizers, compost, 
manure  
3       
Mulch 4       
Herbicides/Fungicides 5       
Inorganic pesticides 6       
Organic pesticides 7       
Other chemicals 8       
Ethylene/Calcium Carbide 9       
Plastic foil/plastic mulch  10       
Knife 11       
Tractor/Motorcycle/Car/Trotro 12       
Safety equipment for farm 13       
Storage facilities 14       
Other, specify* 15       
 16       
* E.g. hoe, stumping saw, hand pulper, sprayer, etc. 
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PART 8. HOUSEHOLD ASSETS OTHER THAN LAND, CASH INCOME, NON-AGRICULTURE 
EXPENDITURES, AND CREDIT 
 
Let us now talk about your livestock, equipment and other items owned by the household.  
8.1. Livestock ownership.    
[MENTION ALL OPTIONS!] 
Animal type CO DE 
# owned end 
of 2009? 1 
# owned end 
of 2008? 
Value if sold 
or bought? 
[new GHC] 
Cattle [bulls, heifers, calves (any type)] 1    
Goats or sheep 3    
Pigs  4    
Chicken (poultry) 5    
Other (specify):  
 6 
   
1 If the farmer cannot to give a precise number, ask him to say within which of the following ranges: 0 – 5, 5 – 
10, 10 – 20, 20 – 30, etc. 
 
8.2. Equipment/durable goods owned by the household.     
[MENTION ALL OPTIONS!] 
Type of equipment CO DE 
# owned end of 2009? 
(0=No; 1=Yes) 
# owned end of 2008? 
(0=No; 1=Yes) 
Bicycle 1   
Motorcycle 2   
Car / Pick-up 3   
Wheelbarrow/push cart 4   
Animal drawn cart 5   
Bullock plough 6   
Knapsack sprayer 7   
Hoe 8   
‘Slasher’ /pineapple cutter 9   
Watering can 10   
Radio &/or TV 11   
Mobile phone 12   
Safety equipment 13   
Bank account 14   
Other (specify) * _____________  15   
___________________________ 16   
* E.g., saw, grain mill, borehole, private well cart, tractor, etc. 
 
8.3. Do you have any significant deposits in a bank account (more than 200 new GHC)? 
__________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
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8.4. Please tell me about your main cash income sources in the last two years (2008 and 2009)  
FIRST ASK THE FARMER TO MENTION THE MOST IMPORTANT CASH INCOME SOURCES FOR THE HOUSEHOLD IN THE 
LAST TWO YEARS (2008 & 2009), FARM AS WELL AS NON-FARM. THEN ASK HIM TO RANK THEM ACCORDING TO 
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE, STARTING WITH THE BIGGEST CASH EARNER IN 2009. IF POSSIBLE ALSO GIVE 
PERCENTAGES. USE PROBING TO MAKE SURE YOU CAPTURE ALL SIGNIFICANT INCOMES. 
Cash income source 
C 
O 
D 
E 
Farmer’s rank 
according to 
economic 
importance 
2009 
Part or 
percentage of 
cash income in 
2009 
[SPECIFY 
UNIT!] 
Farmer’s rank 
according to 
economic 
importance 
2008 
Part or 
percentage of 
cash income in 
2008 
[SPECIFY UNIT!] 
Pineapple sales (excluding 
trade in pineapples) 
1     
Other crop or livestock 
products sales1 
2     
Trade 3     
Non-Farm Work Income 4     
Transfers, subsidies or 
donations (from the 
community, state, development 
agencies, etc.) 
5   
  
Remittance income from 
family members or assistance 
from relatives or friends 
6   
  
Others, specify:  
_______________________  
7     
 8     
 9     
 10     
1ONLY INCLUDE CROPS GROWN AND PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY THE HOUSEHOLD (EXCLUDING TRADE).  
 
8.5. Did you receive any formal or informal credit for agricultural production in the last 5 years? 
_____________ [0=No; 1=Yes] 
 
8.5.1. If YES (1), what or who was the source of credit: [SEVERAL OPTIONS ARE POSSIBLE!] 
 (1) Bank;    (2) Trader;    (3) Exporter;   (4) Money lender;  
 (5) Government institution;    (6); Microcredit /savings group;   
 (7) Relatives / neighbours / friends;   (8) NGO;    (9) cooperative;  
 (10) Other (specify): _____________________________  
 
8.5.2. If NO (0), why did you not receive credit? [MORE THAN ONE OPTION IS POSSIBLE] 
 (1) Not interested (due to high interest rate, etc.);   (2) No need;   (3) No credit available;  
 (4) Others (specify): ______________________________  
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PART 9. SELECTED NON-INCOME HOUSEHOLD WEALTH INDICATORS AND PERCEPTIONS 
 
9.1. FOOD CONSUMED IN THE HOUSEHOLD 
.1 Usually do you manage to have the following 
meals during the day?  
       PLEASE TICK 
 (1) Breakfast 
 (2) Lunch 
 (3) Dinner 
.2 During the last 12 months, has there been a 
period when your household didn’t have 
sufficient food? 
 (1)Yes 
 (2) No 
If  “NO”, leave out the next question ( 9.1.3) 
.3 Altogether, how long did that period last? 
 
PLEASE READ THE OPTIONS AND TICK ONLY 
ONE  
 
 (1) One week or less 
 (2) Between 1 and 4 weeks 
 (3) Between 1 and 3 months 
 (4)  More than 3 months 
 (5)  Don’t know/I don’t remember 
.4 How often do you eat meat or fish? 
PLEASE READ THE OPTIONS AND TICK ONLY 
ONE  
 (1) At least once a week 
 (2) At least once a month 
 (3) Less than once a month  
 THE HOUSE AND ITS FACILITIES 
.5 How many rooms does your household 
occupy, excluding bathroom, corridors, and 
kitchen? 
 (1) 1 room 
 (2) 2 rooms 
 (3) 3 rooms 
 (4) 4 rooms or more 
.6 What type of fuel does your household 
mainly use for cooking?  
 (1) Wood 
 (2) Coal 
 (3) Gas 
 (4) Electricity 
 (5) Other, please specify ___________________ . 
.7 Of which material are the walls of your 
house made? 
 
IF POSSIBLE, JUST OBSERVE! 
 (1) Bricks 
 (2) Plastered, cement, or cement bricks 
 (3) Mud 
 (4) Corrugated iron, old tins, or similar 
 (5) Other, please specify:                                 . 
.8 How is your bathroom located and do you 
share it?  
 (1) inside and exclusive to the family 
 (2) inside and shared 
 (3) outside and exclusive to the family 
 (4) outside and shared 
 (5) no bathroom 
 HEALTH 
.9 In the past, did someone in your family get 
health problems from using chemicals in 
farming (pesticides, fungicides, fertilizer, 
etc.)? 
 (1) Yes 
 (2)  No 
.10 In the last year how many working days have 
you lost for illness or injuries?  
 
 (1) none 
 (2) less than 5 days 
 (3) 6-15 days 
 (4) more than 15 days 
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9.2. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
 How much do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements: 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Partly 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Do not 
know 
No 
answer 
 
.1 I always want to try new farming 
techniques.       
.2 I need to take risks to achieve success.       
.3 Pineapple cultivation is very risky.       
.4 Using new agricultural techniques 
significantly increases agricultural 
income. 
      
.5 Spraying pesticide, herbicide, or 
fungicide affects my or my family’s 
health negatively. 
      
.6 Fertilizer is not available in time.   
.7 Fertilizer is very costly.       
.8 Pesticides, herbicides, & fungicides are 
not available in time.       
.9 Pesticides, herbicides, & fungicides are 
very costly.       
.10 Organic pineapple farming significantly 
reduces yields.       
.11 Organic farming requires too much 
labour.       
 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK FOR GENERAL FEELINGS OR PERCEPTIONS. PLEASE TICK ONLY ONE. 
9.3. Generally speaking how happy do you consider yourself? 
 (1) very happy;   (2) happy enough;    (3) not very happy;    (4) not happy at all 
 
9.4. How important do you consider to preserve the environment?  
 (1) very important;    (2) important enough;    (3) not very important;   (4) not important.  
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PART 10. END OF INTERVIEW 
 
We have now come to the end of this interview. I want to thank you very much for all your time and effort to 
provide me with the answers. Is there something you want to ask in relation to the research and to being 
interviewed? 
 
Time ended: _____________________  
 
Enumerators comments on the interview, the respondent, the household, the pineapple farm, and/or important 
information that was revealed during the interview but that was not recorded: 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
THANK YOU!!! 
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 Enumerator Manual 
Prepared by Linda Kleemann (020 567 0697) 
 
1 GENERAL ISSUES 
 
I have prepared a conversion table for everyone, that you can use whenever you need to 
convert units.  
 
Whenever I am around I will take pictures of the interviews and the farms and I might record some 
interviews or parts of some with a voice recorder.  
 
Timeline: 4 weeks 
 
Please read the questionnaire carefully …..  Do you have any questions? Is there anything in the 
questionnaire that you don’t understand? 
 
This document is to provide you with answers to questions that might occur during, before or 
after the interviews. If the answer to your question is not provided in this manual, ask the 
supervisor/team leader for help. 
Furthermore, you can always call me if I am not anywhere near and you have a question or 
one of the farmers has a question. 
 
When you do the interviews, please ask for the household head or the person in the household 
that is most involved in pineapple farming on their own farm. If none of the two is present 
you may interview another household member, but make sure that this person is able to 
answer your questions. In particular, do not interview: 
 Children of less than 14 years of age 
 Household members that are not involved in the pineapple production of this farm. 
 
2 INTERVIEWER'S TASK 
 
Your role as an interviewer is crucial to the survey.  The quality of the data to be collected will 
be determined by the quality of your work. You should keep in constant touch with your 
supervisor/team leader or/and the main researcher and inform him of any problems you 
encounter in your work in the field. 
 
The team leader, on his part, will collect and check your work and help you solve any problems 
that may arise. 
 
Your principal task is to conduct interviews with as many as possible households per day during 
the survey period. You must follow strictly all instructions contained in this manual.  Read all 
questions exactly as they appear in the questionnaire. 
 
You are solely responsible for keeping these working materials in order. 
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 2.1 CHECKING THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
After finishing each interview, you must verify that all the sections have been filled out correctly 
and legibly. This must be done immediately after the interview before you hand in the 
questionnaires to your supervisor/team leader and, most importantly, before leaving the area. 
 
Although you may correct minor errors due to your having written down the answers badly, you 
must never under any circumstance make any other changes in the completed questionnaire 
without asking the respondents the same questions again.  Do not copy the information you have 
collected into a new questionnaire. At the end of each day's work, all filled questionnaires must 
be submitted to your supervisor/team leader for editing. Errors detected must be corrected before 
submitting the questionnaires to the main researcher. 
 
2.2 RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERVISOR/TEAM LEADER 
 
You should always follow the advice given to you by your supervisor/team leader who is the 
representative of the main researcher.  He/she will assign you work at the beginning of each 
cycle of the survey.  In order to satisfy him/her that your work is up to standard, the 
supervisor/team leader will carry out the following checks in the field. 
 
* He/She will examine in detail all questionnaires filled out by you to verify that 
each interview has been carried out properly and in full. 
 
* He/She will randomly observe your interviews to evaluate your method of asking 
questions. You will not be informed in advance. 
 
* Each day he/she will discuss your work with you and make regular reports to the 
main researcher on your performance in the field. 
  
Your supervisor/team leader is the link between you and the survey organisation. Just as you will 
receive instructions from him/she, you must inform him/her of any difficulties or problems that 
you encounter. For instance, if you do not understand a procedure or the meaning of a question 
in the questionnaire, you should ask your supervisor/team leader for an explanation. 
 
3 INTERVIEWING PROCEDURES 
3.1 CONTACTING THE RESPONDENTS 
 
If possible, you should contact each of the heads of households to be interviewed a day before 
the interview.  The purpose of this is to introduce yourself, explain the purpose of the survey, and 
confirm that the interview will take place the next day.  
 
3.2 EXPLANATION OF THE SURVEY 
 
When you enter a household the first thing you should do is to greet every one, introduce 
yourself and say that you are conducting a survey of organic and/or GlobalGAP certified 
pineapple farmers in Ghana. 
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 You should explain that: 
* The interview contributes to a research project on economic and environmental 
aspects of certified pineapple farming. This research project is carried out by the Kiel 
Institute in Germany in collaboration with Department of Agricultural Economics (Dr. 
Victor Owusu), University of Kumasi. The survey is very important for planners to 
know how to improve the quality of pineapple farmers’ living standards. 
 
* The communities and the households that will be interviewed have been  
randomly selected.  Other neighbouring communities and households have been 
selected in the same way. 
 
* The survey is not concerned in any way with taxes, and all the information 
recorded will be regarded as confidential and covered by the obligation of 
statistical secrecy. 
 
You should frequently remind the respondent of the purpose of the survey and of the fact that the 
data obtained would be kept confidential. This is very important at the beginning of each visit.  If 
you are accompanied by a supervisor/team leader, you should introduce him/her at the beginning 
of each interview. Explanations play a great part in the willingness of people to reply to 
questions. Part of this is also written in the explanatory part at the beginning of the questionnaire. 
 
3.3 THE INTERVIEW 
 
You must be careful to follow all the instructions set out in this manual the most important of 
which is to ask the questions exactly in the form in which they appear on the questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire should be filled during the interview. You must not record the answers on scraps of 
paper with the intention of transferring to the questionnaire later. Neither should you count on 
your memory for filling in the answers once you have left the household. 
 
3.4 TEMPO OF THE INTERVIEW 
 
You must maintain the tempo of the interview; in particular, avoid long discussions of the 
questions with the respondents. If you are receiving irrelevant or complicated answers, do not 
break in too suddenly, but listen to what the respondent is saying and then lead him/her back to 
the original question. Remember it is you who are running the interview and therefore you must 
be in control of the situation at all times. 
 
3.5 OBJECTIVITY OF THE INTERVIEWER 
 
It is extremely important that you should remain absolutely NEUTRAL about the subject of the 
interview. Most people are naturally polite, particularly with visitors, and they tend to give 
answers and adopt attitudes that they think will please the visitor. You must not express surprise, 
approval or disapproval about the answers given by the respondent and you must not tell him/her 
what you think about these things yourself. 
 
You must also avoid any preconceived ideas about the respondent's ability to answer certain 
questions or about the kind of answer he is likely to give. Your most important task is to read the 
questions exactly as they are written in the questionnaire. 
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3.6 PRIVATE NATURE OF THE INTERVIEW 
 
All the data collected are strictly confidential. Any breach of the confidentiality is forbidden by 
law. In principle all the questions should be asked in complete privacy to ensure that his 
answers remain confidential. The presence of other people during the interview may cause him 
embarrassment and influence some of his answers.           
 
3.7 CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEWER 
 
The interviewer must observe the following rules: 
 
1. You must be courteous towards everyone (the respondent and his/her family and 
friends, the supervisor/team leader, the other members of the team and everyone 
else involved). Your behaviour can have an enormous influence on people's 
opinions in the localities covered by the survey. 
 
2. You must avoid disturbing or upsetting anyone by your behaviour. 
 
3. You must be properly dressed, so that the respondent will be inclined to trust you, 
as a reliable and responsible person. 
 
4. You must arrive at the stated time, and never keep the respondents waiting. 
 
5. You must exercise patience and tact in conducting the interview, to avoid 
antagonising the respondent or leading him to give answers that are not in 
conformity with the facts. 
3.8 USE OF INTERPRETERS 
 
When you first enter a household, you must find out whether you will need an interpreter or not.  
If no one in the household speaks English well enough to interpret and none of the team 
members speaks the language of the household, you must ask the household to choose someone 
(for instance, a friend, a neighbour or a relative) to interpret for the interviewer.  This person 
should be someone who speaks English well and is trusted by the household, since the questions 
are confidential. 
 
You should be aware that in either case certain problems can arise from the use of interpreter: 
 
1. It is difficult to know how good the translation is.  It is possible that the 
respondent's friend who speaks English does not speak it well enough to translate 
everything said during the interview, and he will not want to admit it. 
 
If you find that the replies do not correspond to the questions, try tactfully to help the interpreter 
or to replace him. You could for instance, suggest that interpreting is a very tiring job, and that 
the interpreter should take a rest while someone else carry on. Or you might say that you have 
already taken up too much of his (interpreter's) time, and that the job should be shared among a 
number of people. 
239
  
 2. Another difficulty often encountered is that the interpreter is so familiar with the 
household that he starts to answer for the respondent without directing the 
question to him (respondent).  In such a situation you must politely remind the 
interpreter that it is the respondent that has been chosen for the interview, and that 
it is only his/her answers that you can write in the questionnaire. 
4 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILLING OUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
There are a number of basic principles that the interviewer must observe throughout the 
questionnaire. 
 
1. Questions must be read to the respondent just as they are written in the questionnaire. Read 
all questions in a clear and comprehensive manner, and wait patiently for the reply.  
Respondents may delay in giving the reply because either he/she (a) has not heard the 
question well or (b) not understood the question or (c) does not know the answer. 
 
In any case, repeat the question much clearly.  If there is still no answer, ask whether the 
question has been understood and, if necessary, reword the question without changing the 
sense. If it is difficult to get the right answer, you should help the respondent to consider 
his/her reply. 
4.1 CODES 
 
2. Most answers in the questionnaire are pre-coded.  You must write only the code 
corresponding to the answer given by the respondent in the appropriate box or column or tick 
the corresbonding box . 
 
3. For those questions, which are not pre-coded, the interviewer should write the answers in 
figures, that is, numerals and not in words. For example, if the question is "how many acres 
of farm were cultivated by the member of the household in the past 12 months?" and the 
answer given by respondent is twenty acres, write 20 in the box or column as below: 
4. Sometimes, there are special directives given to the interviewer at the end of a question or 
after answering a question. 
 
5. OTHER (SPECIFY).  If the reply given by the respondent does not fit in the list of pre-coded 
responses, you must use the code number of "other (specify)".  In this case you should give 
details briefly in the space provided. 
 
6. Write names of persons, places or things very legibly. This applies to figures as well. 
 
7. Do your best to avoid accepting answers like "I don't know" by helping the respondent to 
consider his answer. Nevertheless, it does happen that even with the help of the interviewer, 
the respondent cannot give an answer. In that case, you should refer to the supervisor/team 
leader who will help you. 
 
4.2 DATA ENTRY and NOTES FOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The data will be entered directly from the questionnaire. Everything that you write on the 
questionnaire will be entered in the computer straight away. Notes, explanations and calculations 
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 should be written onto the questionnaire in order to facilitate edit resolution.  These notes, etc. 
should never be written in the data entry area. Consider the following points seriously; 
 
1. Write legibly in pencil without crossing out or over writing. 
2. Write in capital letters and in the case of figures don't use roman numbers: i.e. write 6 
instead of VI. If you are not sure of the spelling of a place or name see the 
supervisor/team leader. 
3. Never go beyond the space allotted for a question, even when the next space is not used. 
4. In writing amounts and other figures, always separate each group of three figures with a 
comma, starting from the right: e.g. 100000 as 100,000; but not 100 000. 
5. In a question whose reply is a quantity:  
 a) write the figure and the unit if the unit is not pre-specified.  
 b) write only the figure and not the unit if the unit is pre-specified.  
 
Generally where a question specifically calls for a unit of measurement, the CODE for the unit 
will be shown in the appropriate page for your reference. 
NOTE 
i. Persons with more than one name:  If a person has two names, one for official use and 
the other for use at home, write down the name(s) by which he/she is best known in 
the neighbourhood or village where he/she is being enumerated and then write his/her 
other name(s) in parenthesis.  For example, Ato Safo (Charles Mensah). 
 
ii. Persons with identical names:  You may also come across households where two or 
more persons have identical names.  In such a case you must record also the nick-
names, or any other names by which they are distinguished in the household or by 
neighbours and friends, e.g., Kofi Kyamba Panyin and Kofi Kyamba Kakraba.  Failing 
this you must distinguished them by physical characteristics such as height or fatness 
or shortness.  Thus, for instance, you can have Abongo Jato (fair coloured) or Kofi 
Dogo (tall). 
Sex 
It is important to ask for the sex of the person when information is being given to you by a 
third person. Do not infer the sex from the name or names of the person. Bear in mind that 
some names can be misleading in this respect e.g. Kafui, Sena, Kakra, Panyin, etc. Some 
people also use George as a short form of Georgina and Ben for Benedicta. 
 
Relationship 
Record how the person listed is related to the head of the household. Be particularly careful in 
doing this if the respondent is not the head of the household; make sure that you record the 
relationship of each person to the household head, not the relationship to the respondent.  For 
example, if the respondent is the wife of the head of the household and she says that Nab is 
her brother, then Nab should be coded as OTHER RELATIVE not BROTHER OR SISTER, 
because Nab is a brother-in-law of the head of the household.  If the head of the household is 
married to a woman who has a child from a previous marriage, that child’s relationship to the 
head of the household should be coded as ADOPTED/FOSTER/STEP CHILD. 
 
Age 
Age is to be recorded in completed years.  The age is that on the last birthday.  If, for instance, 
the respondent’s eighteenth birthday falls on the following day, you must enter 17 as the 
answer.  If the person does not know his/her age refer to events that have taken place in his/her 
life or in the Community (village, town, country) or the World such as the independence day of 
Ghana, World Wars, Earthquakes etc. as shown in the Calendar of Events. 
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 What to do when a person does not know his/her age 
(i) For such a person, use the following method to estimate his/her age:- 
(a) Ask him/her to name any historical event (preferably a local one) which occurred 
around the time of his/her birth. 
(b) Ask him/her to give you an indication of how old he/she was when that event 
occurred or how many years elapsed before his/her birth. 
(c) Then use this information to work out his/her age.  For example, if a respondent tells 
you that he/she was about 15 years when Ghana attained her independence this person 
must be 15 + 47 (i.e. 6th March 1957 to May 2004) = 62 years. 
(ii) If this approach does not elicit the required information, then base your estimate on 
biological relationships.  For instance, a woman who does not know her age but who 
has two or three children of her own is unlikely to be less than 15 years old however 
small she may look.  You may then try to work out her age by the following method: 
(a) Ask her, at what age she had her first child. 
(b) Determine the age of her oldest child. 
 
Schooling 
Formal schooling refers to attendance of either a Primary, Middle/JSS or Secondary school, 
Vocational/Technical or Professional school or Training or an Apprenticeship course. 
Attendance at a Koranic school, for no matter how many years, is to be included only if the 
person attended no other school. 
 
Main Occupation  
This is the work to which most time is devoted when a respondent has several jobs.  For instance, 
the main occupation for the past 12 months of a respondent who farms mostly but often goes 
fishing during the dry season is farming. 
 
Physical Characteristics Of The Dwelling 
If the exterior walls of the dwelling are composed of several materials, for instance, one part of 
the wall is of bamboo, another part of earth and yet another part of concrete, choose the 
predominant material.  
 
Payment in kind  
This can be in the form of foodstuffs, cooked food, drinks, etc. The value of any payments in 
kind must be estimated and added to any cash payments and the total recorded. 
 
AGRICULTURAL ASSETS; LAND, LIVESTOCK AND EQUIPMENT LAND. 
Land rented out refers to land that has been given out for which periodic payments are received 
as well as land that has been leased out.  You should record only those pieces of land rented out 
for which payment(s) have been received during the past 12 months. For example if land has 
been leased for ten (10) years and the amount was received in bulk during the last 12 month 
period, then the whole amount must be recorded. The cedi equivalent of foreign currencies 
should be recorded. 
 
Share cropping is a system of sharing the produce of a farm between the landlord-farmer and 
the tenant farmer for a period of time.  For instance, in Ghana we have the `abunu' and `abusa'.  
With the `abunu' system, the landlord-farmer and the tenant farmer share the produce of the farm 
equally while with the `Abusa' system the tenant farmer is entitled to one part and the landlord-
farmer two parts of the produce. 
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 Another variation of the `abusa' involves both the tenant farmer and the landlord-farmer each 
taking one part of the produce (in money value).  The third part is used in maintaining or 
developing the land or farm.  The proportion received by the household is to be entered in 
percentages (%) e.g. 1/2=50%, 1/3=33%, 1/4=25%, 1/5=20%. 
 
AGRICULTURAL COSTS AND EXPENSES 
Amount spent in kind must be estimated and added to the amount in cash. 
NGOs refer to Non-Governmental Organizations like Global 2000, FAO, DFID, USAID, World 
Vision International, etc. 
 
NOTES and DEFINITONS 
Respondent 
The respondent for this section is either the head of household or main respondent identified by 
the household. 
 
Remittances are regular or irregular contributions in terms of money or goods and food made to 
person(s) living abroad or elsewhere. For example, any money, food or goods sent out or 
received by the household to/from a household member or relative staying abroad or elsewhere 
is a remittance.  Read instruction at the top carefully and follow it. 
 
END OF INTERVIEW 
At the end of the interview you should express your gratitude to the household interviewed 
before leaving.  Thank them for their co-operation and assistance. 
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 Unit Converter: 
 
 
1 new Ghanaian Cedi = 10 000 (old) Ghanaian Cedi 
1 (square) pole (or perch, rod) = 30.24 square yards = 25.93 m² = 0.006 acres 
1 hectare (ha) = 10000 m² = 2.5 acres = 400 (square) poles 
1 acre = 0.4 ha = 4046.8 m² = 160 (square) poles 
Square mile = 640 acres 
1000 kg = 1 ton (t)  
1 box of pineapples = 12 kg 
1 container (on export vessel) = 16 tons 
1 pallet = 65 boxes = 780 kg  
Rod, Pole or Perch = 5.5 yards = 5.029 m 
Rope = 20 feet = 6.10 m 
1 foot (ft) = 12 inches (in) = 0.30479 m  
1 m = 3.2809 feet   
1 mile = 1.60934 km  
1 km = 0.62137 mile = approx. 15 minutes (1/4 hour) walk 
1/10 = 10%; ½= 50%; 1/3 (one third) = 33%; 2/3 (two thirds) = 66%, etc. 
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